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4.0 The Influence of the New Right 
Broad macro-level discussions of the influence of 
the new right, in whatever form, are interesting but 
ultimately inconclusive (f or example, Barry et al. 
1989). Some authors perceive variable new right 
influence across many policy areas (Flynn 1989, 
Ashford and Jordan 1993), others (Marsh and Rhodes 
1992) emphasise that there were many other interests 
acting on the Thatcher Governments and care must be 
taken not to assign Thatcherism a causal influence 
in every instance of policy change. 
Cockett (1994) has suggested that after the early 
1980s the new right think-tanks declined in 
influence and 'ideological Thatcherism' came to an 
end. But this is problematic. Why should this be the 
case if the Thatcherite grouping had secured a 
powerful position within the Conservative Party and 
Government ? And what then provides the explanation 
for further policy developments, particularly the 
apparent radicalism of the third term reforms ? 
Cockett's -concentration on what he terms the 
'economic revolution' - the neoliberal economic, and 
particularly monetarist, agenda - neglects other 
strands and the continued development of new right 
ideas. 
The new right themselves are, unsurprisingly, not 
taken to be wholly reliable when considering their 
own influence. The Adam Smith Institute's The First 
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Hundred (1989) purported to note one hundred of the 
ASI's ideas which had been taken up by the 
Government during the 1980s. Milton Friedman (1977) 
claimed that new right ideas have become 'dominant, 
because of 'brute experience,, the obvious, 
deficiencies of any other forms of social, political 
and economic organisation. Neither type of claim is 
sufficient. Yet without the hew right, can a full 
picture of the movements in contemporary politics be 
developed ? 
There is little doubt that the new right has altered 
to some degree the content of contemporary political 
debate. In the f ield of welfare, f or example, the 
new right has helped . 
identify the issues thought 
important to reform. As George and Wilding (p. 45, 
1994) have commented: ".. [a] valuable element in New 
Right social analysis is its breadth. It was the New 
Right, effectively, who brought key questions about 
state welfare to the forefront of public discussion. 
What is the impact of state welfare on behaviour ? 
What are the implications of the extension of social 
rights without the parallel extension of obligations 
? How can state welfare be used to induce socially 
desirable behaviour ? 11 The underclass', dependency 
and individual responsibility have become dominant 
themes (though the recurrence of similar debates 
throughout the history of social provision should 
not be neglected). But again, this is very general, 
and could be disputed. The new right could be 
characterised as purely reactive, picking up on 
changes in public opinion, or the impact of 
structural factors. Alone, such a perspective does 
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not secure the notion that the new right has been 
influential in shaping and constructing the debate 
on many aspects of political activity, indeed 
altering commonly-held views. 
4.1 Role of 'the Case Studies 
Instead, a more micro-level case needs to be made. 
The case studies presented here are meant to be 
illustrative as well, as interpretative. 
First, they are meant to investigate the influence 
of the new right, as far as possible, in key policy 
areas. Second, to investigate aspects of the nature 
of 'Thatcherism', discussed later [chapter nine] . 
Third, to illustrate the argument concerning the 
nature of new right conceptions of citizenship. 
Fourth, and relatedly, to illustrate the analysis of 
citizenship - as a site of conflict, as potentially 
regressive as well as progressive phenomenon 
[chapter three]. Fifth, to examine the influence of 
new right conceptions of citizenship in terms of 
actual policy change. Sixth, and as a corollary to 
this, to speculate on the importance of political 
ideas, theories and discourses. 
They begin with the assumption that the new right 
think-tanks were important in some manner, since 
their work is noted, but not that they were 
necessarily influential or successful. Especially 
important to recognise is that the relationship 
between the think-tanks and Thatcherism was not 
necessarily direct, clearly identifiable or precise. 
Typical deficiencies in accounts of the role of 
ideology in public policy should be avoided. Freeden 
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(1990) warns against assuming the powerful role of 
individuals without locating them in the 
intersections between people and ideas, texts being 
taken as doctrines (particularly apt in the new 
right's 'pamphlet warfare') setting up clearly 
identifiable chains of causation, the imposition of 
authorial intention and the assumption of the basis 
of ideologies in elites. But, as he comments (p. 24, 
ibid): "If politics is indeed the art of the 
possible, the range of the possible is the realm of 
ideology, and ideological innovators and 
distributors must be pursued for the vital clues 
they offer to our understanding of political choice, 
wherever such clues may be located. " 
Yet it would be ironic if having accepted that the 
think-tanks were significant because they fought to 
open-up previously dismissed or ignored policy 
options, we did not appreciate that policy-makers 
considered more alternatives subsequently. The 
think-tanks provided a maximum agenda from which the 
Thatcher Governments could choose, depending on 
administrative, political and economic convenience. 
The first case study concerns the Education Reform 
Act (1988) [chapter five), the second the Community 
Charge [chapter six], the third 'workfare, 
programmes [chapter seven], and the fourth the 
Conservative notion of active citizenship' [chapter 
eight]. Hence three investigate. policy changes, and 
one examines a predominantly rhetorical campaign. 
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Chapter Five 
The Education Reform Act 1988 
"Thus, in a society in which the attaining of social 
privileges depends more and more closely on possession 
of academic credentials, the school does not only have 
the function of ensuring discreet succession to a 
bourgeois estate which can no longer be transmitted 
directly and openly. This privileged instrument of the 
bourgeois sociodicy which confers on the privileged 
the supreme privilege of not seeing themselves as 
privileged manages the more easily to convince the 
disinherited that they owe their scholastic and social 
destiny to their lack of gifts or merits, because in 
matters of culture absolute dispossession excludes 
awareness of being dispossessed. "' 
5.0 Introduction 
"I would sum up the Bill's 169 pages in three words - 
standards,, freedom and choice. "2 
A benign view of the Education Reform Act of 1988 
(ERA) might suggest it contained measures to enhance 
citizenship in education: by encouraging more parental 
participation, enforcing greater public 
accountability, guaranteeing standards nationally, and 
extending choice. However, the ERA represents a 
project to control education, rather than further 
genuine'citizenship. 
1 Bourdieu and Passeron (p. 210,1994). 
2 Kenneth Baker, Ransard, 1/12/87, col. 780. 
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5.1 Policy Outline 
The ERA was perhaps the most significant piece of 
education law making for England and Wales since the 
1944 Education Act, unique in effecting both schools 
and higher education. Given this scope, this case 
study will be concerned only with the measures 
affecting secondary schooling. The reforms covered 
three main areas - Grant-Maintained schools, the 
National Curriculum, and Local Management of Schools. 
5.1a Grant-Maintained Schools 
Grant -maintained (GM) schools are funded not through 
local authorities but directly by central government. 
Any existing state secondary school would be able to 
become a GM school, if the governors, parents and the 
Secretary of State for Education agree. The GM 
school's governing body becomes responsible for the 
admissions policy of the school and its implementation 
(including for exclusion and appeals ' against non- 
admission), as well as owner of the school site, 
employer of the staff and responsible for all aspects 
of employment practice. 
The value of the annual maintenance grant of each GM 
school is recovered by the government from the LEA 
(Local Education Authority) it opted-out of, and the 
cost of other grants (capital grants and 'special 
purpose' grants) to GM schools is covered by a 
reduction in the-level of funding to LEAs generally. 
S. Ib National Curriculum 
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After the 1944 Act, legal control of the curriculum in 
maintained schools was ascribed to LEAs; in practice 
they never exercised their powers over the curriculum, 
which effectively had become the responsibility of 
heads and their senior staff (though of course, the 
external examinations remained a strong influence in 
upper forms). 
The ERA proposals for a National Curriculum (NC) 
concerned the years of compulsory schooling 5-16. The 
original proposals outlined the required ', foundation 
subjects' - ten compulsory subjects including the 
three core disciplines of Maths, English and Spience, 
together with seven others: a modern foreign language, 
technology, history, geography, art, music, physical 
education. There would be statutory regulations 
covering the full ability range for the three core 
subjects at the ages of 7,11,14, and 16, and also 
attainment targets for the other foundation subjects. 
Further statutory regulations would prescribe 
programmes of study, setting a common content to the 
foundation subjects, andthere would be externally set 
and moderated assessment tests for the foundation 
subjects. Further regulations require the 
dissemination of detailed information - concerning the 
curriculum, attainment targets, programmes of study 
and assessment results. In particular, aggregated 
assessment and examination results would be published 
each year for each age group, nationally, for each 
local authority and for each school. 
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The non-statutory School Curriculum Development 
Committee was to be replaced by a permanent statutory 
National Curriculum Council (NCC), to advise the 
Secretary of State and consult on his behalf, 
c oncerning the maintenance and updating of the NC. 
Subject Working Groups (WGs) were to be established 
for each foundation subject, to advise on attainment 
targets and programmes of study. The new Schools 
Examination and Assessment Council (SEAC) would advise 
on assessment and examinations. The legislation on the 
NC and assessment applies to all LEA and GM schools in 
England and Wales, while City Technology Coll, eges are 
required to adhere to the substance of the NC. 
5.1c Local Management of Schools (LMS) 
This was the delegation of financial, responsibility 
from local authorities to schools (sometimes also 
referred to as "Local Financial Management'). It was 
developed and refined over many years, by a series of 
steps taken at the start of each financial year. Prior 
to LMS, the level of funding of schools had been 
determined by decisions of the LEA Education 
Committees according to a variety of criteria (which 
were complex and subject to local factors such as 
lobbying and political considerations, and not always 
open to public scrutiny). Under LMS, the budget of 
each school is determined according to a formula that 
applies across the whole LEA, delegated to schools 
governing bodies. LEAs were obliged to draw up a 
scheme for LMS according to criteria laid down by 
government and submitted to the Secretary of State for 
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approval. LEAs have to publish details of their 
expenditure per pupil year by year and school by 
school for all their schools. Further, for all 
remaining LEA schools, authorities may not normally 
fix an admission limit for a school lower than its 
'standard number' (of places, as defined by section is 
of the 1980 Education Act). 3 
5.2 Interpretations of ERA 
There are a number of existing (and often inter- 
related) interpretations of this policy change. It has 
been seen as representing the 'triumph' of the free- 
market right in education (Flude and Hammer 1990, 
Demaine 1988, Simon 1988) .4 The system would in effect 
be marketized. The diversity predicted would produce a 
hierarchy of schools (Bristol Polytechnic Education 
Study Group, in Bash and Coulby 1989). This would have 
divisive effects, to Ball (p. 214,1990): ".. signalling 
the break-up of a national state education system. 115 
3 The 1944 Act (echoed in the 1980 Act) in effect subordinated 
parental preference to the provision of efficient education and 
the efficient use of resources. This was replaced by the ERA 
(section 26). 
4 Baker sometimes used neoliberal discourses: ".. it will be for 
the parents to judge performance - not the producers but the 
consumers" (speech to North of England Education Conference, 6th 
January 1988, quoted p. 66 Cultural Studies Birmingham 1991, see 
also his speech to Conservative Party Conference, The Guardian, 
Sth October 1986). 
5 Unsurprisingly, Bob Dunn (Minister of State during the Act's 
passage) denied this: ".. more and more specialized, 
dif f erentiated schoo ls" (could develop] "without any one being 
regarded as inferior to others" (Education 1988). But this 
appears to contradict the other Government justification for 
greater diversity: that clearer differences between schools would 
act as a greater incentive for more poorly-regarded schools to 
raise their standards. 
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Ball identifies in particular the LMS provisions as 
most significant, replacing the principle of equal 
access to education for all with the principle of 
differentiation in the market place. The ERA was 
predicted to lead to the re-introduction of selection 
(Whitty, in Bash and Coulby 1991) Since popular 
schools could not expand beyond their standard number, 
they would be tempted covertly to be selective, 
thereby boosting their assessment test scores, and 
further disadvantaging those unable to compete in this 
market. 6 It would also make schools more ', business- 
like' with governors acting as boards of directors 
(Coopers and Lybrand 1988). Hence it represents the 
capture by neoliberals of conservative education, 
which it is suggested will make it difficult for 
Conservatives to develop any coherent plan for 
education in the future. 
The ERA is not regarded as new in this sense, because 
the 'privatisation, of the system had been developing 
under the Thatcher Governments, via the use of public 
money to support education and training by private 
providers and the attempt to make the public sector 
behave more like the private sector (Whitty and Menter 
1989). The ERA merely accelerated the trend, and 
6 This would create an inner city, working class and black 
, educational underclass', hence (p. 103, ibid): ".. grant- 
maintained status seems to exemplify what is at the heart of 
contemporary Conservative ideology: schools operating in the open 
market (thus satisfying the liberal tendency) , while the central 
state ensures the reproduction of a stratified society. " 
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produced better rewards f or schools able to compete 
well in the market. 
Within these conceptions, measures which further 
central control do so to reinforce the market. So for 
example, the NC enables testing which along with open 
enrolment and LMS, helps parents become consumers 
(Bash and Coulby 1991) . State intervention was needed 
to protect the market from vested interests and 
restrictive practices, and support the appropriate 
sense of 'self-help', enterprise and 'common' national 
identity (Whitty, in Flude and Hammer 1990) . Thus the 
marketization of the system is in part disguised. 7 
others suggest that although the reforms are 
significant, the marketization interpretation has to 
be moderated, since LEAs were retained and state 
education was still freely available (Fitz and Halpin 
1991) .A variant of the marketization 
interpretation 
suggests that the ERA represents an interim step 
towards a voucher system, by identifying individual 
school costs through devolved budgets, then per capita 
costs (Demaine 1988, Maclure 1988), and by shifting 
allocative decisions to consumers from officials 
(Raab, in Ashford and Jordan 1993). 8 
7 Hence allowing advocates to claim (Lawlor, p. 9,1988b) : "it is 
not an attack on state education but on the monopoly' of local 
authority-delivered education. It will make for greater 
flexibility in the state system and give parents a wider choice 
of schools. Indeed, it will strengthen state education by leading 
to more, better, state schools. " 
8 These interpretations are supported by the new right's 
recognition of the possible need for such an interim step 
(Seldon, p. 45-54,1986, Pirie, p. 36,1982, and interview with 
Sexton, Bali, p. 88,1990). 
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To some, the ERA represents a compromise between the 
new right factions, and so lacks internal coherence 
(Whitty 1990, Bash and Coulby 1991). This explains its 
centralising and decentralising, modernising and 
restorationist impulses. It seeks to satisfy economic 
liberalism and socially-conservative control (Dale 
1990) . Hence 
(Ranson, p. 13,1988) : "Schools may be 
'privatised' progressively but their reproduction of 
culture (the curriculum) will be nationalised (or 
anglicised) ." Aside 
from its actual effects, the ERA 
can be seen as an attempt to reunify the new right 
alliance (Johnson 1989, Johnson, Cultural Studies 
Birmingham 1991). 
Other interpretations may agree with some of the 
above, but suggest also that the ERA was designed to 
disable opposing forces. The new right had 16ng 
complained about the 'producer capture' within 
education, and hence the ERA was meant to neutralise 
professional resistance from teachers and educational 
administrators (Johnson, CSB 1991, Hickox and Moore, 
in Flude and Hammer 1990). This was legitimated by 
criticising standards and evoking 'parent power'. Once 
the 'Problem' of institutional and professional 
autonomy was resolved, the new right could force a 
return to the traditional version of liberal -humanist 
education, before progressivism and educationalism, 
that is teacher expertise and theory (Whitty ibid) 
Similarly, it has been suggested that the ERA 
represents part of the attack on local government, 
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whose role in education was unpopular with the right. 9 
Power is taken away from the former partners - 
teachers' organisations and LEAs - and given to 
governing bodies and. the Secretary of State (Fitz and 
Halpin 1991) . 10 The NC and testing are needed to make 
sure the system does not degenerate into chaos (Troyna 
and Carrington 1990). Interest-group politics has been 
replaced by an audience of dispersed decision-makers - 
parents, governors and industry (Raab 1989). 
These interpretations are partially correct, but do 
not grasp the overall project in education. To do so, 
it is . necessary first to examine the way new right 
discourses set the form of the debate over education, 
and then their influence on the ERA policy process. 
5.3 The New Right Project in Education 
, ', It (Labour's education programme]- attended to the 
machinery of reform - the comprehensive school - but 
not to its actual conditions of existence, its real 
practices and strategic social purposes. Fabian-like, 
it assumed that all these 'details, were best left to 
the experts and professionals. Believing ultimately in 
9 For example, the Centre for Policy Studies' Deputy Director of 
Studies argued: "The root of the problem is the LEA itself" 
(Lawlor 1988a) . LEAs should 
be limited to merely distributing 
money to schools with their services put out to tender (Lawlor 
1988b) . Similarly 
(Thatcher, p. 8,1987): "There's no reason at 
all why local authorities should have a monopoly of free 
education. What principle suggests this is right ?" 
10 The idea that GM schools and LMS will free LEAs from detailed 
oversight of schools and allow them to manage the system as a 
whole is largely rhetorical when considered alongside the 
restrictions on local educational initiatives via the NC (Maclure 
1988) and the reforms of local government finance [chapter six]. 
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the neutrality of the state, Labour does seem to have 
subscribed to the erroneous view that 'Education 
should really be taken out of politics,. It is not an 
error Margaret Thatcher's government is likely to 
make. 
Though there had always been a strand of right-wing 
thought which disagreed with the post-war 
'settlement', it was only in the late 1960s and early 
1970s that a movement began to coalesce. 12 A group of 
academics and political commentators began to give 
voice to concerns in the Black Papers, five of which 
were published between 1969 and 1977. These argued 
educational standards (especially numeracy and 
literacy) were declining, encouraged by indiscipline 
and mediocrity in part fostered by politically- 
motivated teachers teaching critical approaches. They 
formed the basis of a powerful symbolic crusade 
against 'schooling 'out 
of control, (Ball 1990) . Yet 
these remained relatively marginal right-wing concerns 
unt. il the mid-1970s, Callaghan's 'Great Educational 
Debate' and the subsequent (ineffectual) Green Paper 
from the Labour Government. 13 By the time of the 1979 
3-1 Hall, S., 'Educa: tion in Crisis', chapter one, p. 3, Wolpe and 
Donald (1983). 
12 There are a number of different interpretations of new right 
education movements - Guthrie and Pierce (1990), Quicke (1988), 
Wexler and Grabiner (Sharp 1986), Brown and Lander (1991), Raab 
(Ashford and Jordan 1993), David (1991), Clark and Astuto (1989). 
13 Callaghan (p. 333,1976) denied that his speech was: ".. a 
clarion call to the Black Paperites", but it assigned a 
credibility to their notion of crisis (as Brian Cox, co-editor of 
the Papers, noted, Mack, p. 589,1977). 
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General Election, the right-wing groupings had formed 
quite a tight network with distinctive education 
policies, influential both within the Conservative 
Party and beyond. It is worth examining this crucial 
period to understand better how the new right 
constructed the 'crisis in education', and eventually 
reaped its rewards Weave 1989). 
5.3a 'Voucherism' 
However, before this, it is important to note that 
previous to this period the neoliberal right had a 
vision for education -' that of Ivoucherism'. The 
details of proposals for a voucher system differed 
widely14, but all derived from fundamental economic 
liberal principles. 15 The idea of universal exits for 
all parents by distributing earmarked purchasing p ower 
in place of providing nil-priced schooling, (in 'the 
language of the new right), had been advocated by 
Friedman in 1955 and revised in 1962 (Friedman 1962) . 
The so-called 'Friedman voucher, was taken up by some 
British writers. Peacock and Wiseman (1964) were the 
first economists in Britain to examine the separation 
of the supply of schools from its financing by the 
14 Maynard (p. 26-34,1975), suggests that there are eight main 
variants (also Seldon 1986). For three examples, see Barnes 
(Economic Affairs October, 1981), Peacock (Economic Affairs 
January 1983), and West (Economic Affairs October 1982). 
Is Friedman and Friedman (p. 191,1980): "In schooling, the parents 
and child are the consumers, the teacher and school administrator 
the producers. Centralization in schooling has meant larger size 
units, a reduction of the ability of consumers to choose, and an 
increase in the power of the producers [whose] interests as 
teachers, as administrators, as union officials are different 
from their interests as parents and from the interests of the 
parents whose children they teach. " 
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state by parents enabled in a free market by, vouchers, 
grants, or loans (also West 1965, ' Harris and Seldon 
1963). The voucher was advocated subsequently by the 
pressure group Friends of the Education Voucher 
Experiment by Representative Regions (FEVER), founded 
in December 1974.16 The campaign for the introduction 
of a voucher system is an important subtext in the 
development of Thatcherite education policy. 
5.3b The Educational New Right Forms 
Though the originators of the Black Papers claimed to 
disapprove of political labels, they acted as a 
catalyst for the formation of a highly interconnected 
new right educational movement. 17 There was the 
National Council for Educational Standards (NCES)18, 
the Conservative Philosophy Group, the 
'Buckinghamites' (for an independent University of 
Buckingham), and groups lobbying for an assisted 
places scheme. Especially important were the networks 
around the Institute of Economic Af fairs (IEA) , pince 
it was the most productive think-tank and a focus for 
voucherism. The IEA's Ralph Harris was a Black Paper 
writer and had an active interest in education, the 
IEA housed the National Council for Educational 
Standards and was the organisational base for the 
16 After support for a motion to promote parent-power through 
experimental vouchers was proposed at the September 1974 
Conference of the ' 
National Council of Women. FEVER aimed to turn 
the academic and intellectual campaign for vouchers into a 
populist one (Seldon, p. 13,1986). 
17 For example, Cox and Dyson (p. 154, p. 157-8,1970). 
18 Formed 1972, founder members included Brian-Cox, Dyson, Boyson 
and Maude. 
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Buckingham campaign. Max Beloff, the principal of 
Buckingham, was chair of a Party advisory group on 
policy in the early 1980s. Mark Carlisle's personal 
advisor as Shadow Minister and as Secretary of State 
was the neoliberal Stuart Sexton, and Dr Rhodes 
Boyson, a Black Paper edit'or, was associated with 
neoliberals as early as 1967 (Seldon, p. 13,1986) and 
active in Conservative Party education policy-making 
by the mid-1970s. Boyson and Harris founded the 
Churchill Press/Constitutional Book Club. 1-9 Boyson 
wrote two important texts - Right Turn (1970) and The 
Crisis in Education (1975), syntheses of Friedmanite 
'freedom' and Black Paper 'excellence' and 
I standards' . 
20 
5.3c The Educational New Right Advances 
Though the Party had failed to construct a radical 
education agenda for the 1974 General Election, by the 
later half of the 1970s the distinctive Black Paper 
position (parental choice and educational standards) 
began to make significant connections within the Party 
(helped of course by the accession of Thatcher to the 
leadership) . 21 In particular, 
in 1980, the Centre for 
1-9 This ran 1969-79 (but was re-started in 1993 by John Raybould), 
to counter the undermining influence, on traditional educational 
values by progressives. It published preservationists including 
Tibor Szamuely, Russell Lewis, Anthony Dyson, as well as Harris 
and Boyson. 
20 Brynin (1993) has criticised the 'myths, which legitimated the 
Thatcherite reforms - falling standards, indiscipline, failing 
schools (based on only one criteria), and interference from LEAs. 
21 Indeed, to Knight (1990) the period 1975 to 1983 is distinct 
because the Party began to make educational policy in line with 
conservative philosophy (sound -basic skills, selection at some 
age, choice of schools and academic excellence including the 
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Policy Study's Education Study Group (CPSESG) was 
established, with Baroness Cox as Chairman and John 
Marks as Secretary. Cox, Marks and Fred Naylor 
(contributors to the Black Papers) had been associated 
with the NCES before 'joining the CPSESG. In 1982, the 
first major publication for the CPSESG proposed 
reforms for higher standards and "centres of 
excellence' in particular subject areas, as well as 
vouchers (Cox and Marks 1982). 
*Excellence', in education became the key discourse 
(incorporated into The Right Approach 1976), though 
the educational new right had also appeared to have 
nurtured and captured parental desire for choice and 
freedom. Boyson became especially valuable in being 
able to foster concern at the fate of intelligent 
working class children, and linking this to a general 
debate on social morality. 22 Around this time, as a 
result of the campaign on standards, he appeared to 
anticipate the NC23, and propose a system of national 
testing . 
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preservation of grammar schools), as a result of the influence of 
the conservative educationalists (Maude 1968, O'Sullivan 1968, 
and the Swinton Journal). 
22 Boyson (p. 137,1975): "We shall not improve the quality of 
education in this country until we return to a sense of purpose, 
continuity and authority in our general attitude to life and 
society. " 
23 (p. 141,1975): "It is not difficult to draw up a basic 
curriculum occupying some 60-80 per. cent of teaching time in the 
infant, primary and secondary schools. All that would be 
necessary is the stipulation of standards in numeracy and basic 
literacy, geographical, historical and scientific knowledge to be 
attained at various ages by the average child. Achievement could 
then be monitored by nationally set and marked examinations, or 
by HMIs [Her Majesty's Inspectors]. " Three years earlier he had 
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Particularly important in the development of policy 
for the 1979 General Election were John Ranelagh and 
Stuart Sexton. 25 Sexton's ideas included proposals for 
minimum standards and a minimum curriculum, an 
independent inspectorate for all schools and schools 
of excellence with particular subject specialisms (see 
Sexton, 'Evolution by Choice', - p. 86-9 Cox and Boyson 
1977). 26 He combined both neoliberal and 
neoconservative influences - the market (via a voucher 
system) would resolve the problems in education, and 
parents would be the best guardians of standards 
(Knight, p. 143,1990). 
5.3d 1979-83 
Though slogans of parental choice and educational 
standards allowed a broad appeal and gathered up 
constituencies of dissatisfaction, once in office 
tensions were unavoidable. The first Thatcher 
administration did not focus its energies on education 
directly, but dealt with it by stealth - it aimed to 
reduce spending on education through various local 
fiscal controls and the reform of local government 
expenditure. The Education Act (1980) included the 
Assisted Places Scheme, for pupils to transfer from 
advocated a national curriculum ('Bring out Your Illiterates' 
The Daily Telegraph, 12th April 1972),. 
24 In the editorial to the fourth Black Paper (Cox and Boyson 
1975). 
25 Conservative Research Department Education Desk Officer, 1975- 
77, and Education Advisor to Conservative opposition, 1975-9 
respectively. 
26 As Knight (p. 113,1990) notes, all of these proposals, with the 
exception of schools of excellence (implemented by Baker 1986-7) 
would be implemented by Carlisle and Joseph from 1979-86. 
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state schools to the private sector on a subsidised 
basis, required schools to publish their examination 
results, and the right for parents to appeal against 
the LEA's school allocation for their children and to 
send children to schools across LEA boundaries. Though 
modest changes, this was the first time the system was 
opened up to the notion of consumer-driven parental 
choice. 
Boyson was marginalised increasingly from 1979. It was 
suggested that the appointment of Mark Carlisle 
(resistant to the pro-voucher arguments of Boyson and 
others) as Education Secretary was a clear indication 
of Thatcher's unwillingness to make radical 
experiments and desire to dilute the new right's 
influence (Stephenson 1980). Despite this pause, 
Sexton was able to establish himself (as Carlisle's 
Special Advisor) as a dominant force on the 
educational right. In September 1981, Carlisle was 
dismissed and replaced by Joseph, and Boyson was given 
greater prominence. Yet in general between 1981 and 
1983 the radicalism of new right proposals ran up 
against the substantial legacies of public education 
(partnership, the role of LEAs and the autonomy of 
professionals). 
It was during Joseph' s tenure as Secretary of State 
(1981-86) that 'excellence, really began to influence 
policy. Sound knowledge was promoted, meaning 
traditional basic subjects plus business studies and 
technology, to the exclusion of peace studies, 
sociology ' and politics. Between September 1981 and 
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June 1983 Joseph launched a series of initiatives - 
more rigorous teacher training, pupil records, the 
transformation of the exam system - and pursued 
agreement on a national curriculum (Knight, p. 156 
1990). A curriculum common to all pupils, (for 
secondary schools) was advocated in the DES's The 
School - Curriculum (DES 1981), but later retreated 
from. 
In its place, the 'new selection, (differentiation on 
what was taught to different pupils) came to be 
preferred. This again derived from the new right. 
Brian Cox's (p. 23,1981) diagnosis of the 'crisis, 
demanded discrimination between good and bad, and 
this: ',,.. involves selection, the choice of high 
standards, the rejection of the third-rate. Unless our 
school system reflects such hierarchies of value it 
will inevitably degenerate into relativism and 
impotence". Similarly, the NCES was reinforcing the 
case for selection (Cox, Marks and Pomian-Srzednicki 
1983, also CPS 1981). Hence though. Joseph did not 
pursue all of the new right's proposals, the main 
thrust of education policy was in keeping with its 
general philosophy. 
The main division concerned the voucher, which came to 
cause a four-way split within the Party and the right 
- between LEA Tories, the "wets', neoliberal 
voucherites and the Black Papex- traditionalists. 
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Joseph's own plan was rejected. 27 Beloff (chair of the 
Party policy group) argued that central government 
should accept more responsibility because LEAs were 
defying demands for more choice and higher standards. 
A report leaked to The Times revealed that vouchers 
were being considered for the 1983 manifesto, which 
lead to 'Beloff (an ex-Black Paperite) opposing the 
neoliberals with an essentially neoconservative 
report. As a result, the Party entered the 1983 
General Election undecided. 
5.3e 1983-87 
This is a crucial period to understanding the genesis 
of the ERA, and can be divided into iwo main phases. 
The f irst was marked by division within the 
educational new right, particularly with neoliberal 
disappointment at the rejection of the voucher, though 
progress was made on a common curriculum. The second 
saw the new right unify to an extent, intensify 
campaigning and produce more flexible proposals for 
reform. 
In the first phase, despite Joseph declaring the 
voucher dead, its advocates kept faith with the 
beneficial effects they claimed it would have on state 
27 Lord Tebbit has revealed that Joseph pressed f or the 
introduction of a voucher system, but was defeated in Cabinet and 
was personally very disappointed (interview, The Makers of Modern 
Politics, . 'Keith Joseph: Ideologist of the Right,, BBC Radio 4, 
Sunday 14th May, 1995). Publicly, .' he admitted that the 
introduction of a properly-tested voucher system would be too 
costly and time-consuming (Hansard, House Of Commons Debates, 
vol. 62, col. 290, written answers to questions, 22nd *June, 
1984). 
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education. Neoliberals and traditionalists re-grouped 
around their own ideas, by 1985 they were in direct 
rivalry. Boyson, who linked the right's campaigns and 
the Government, was dropped. This was seen as an 
attempt to free ministerial decisions from think-tanks 
and heal Party divisions. 
Joseph seemed to neglect the neoliberal right, and 
ideas were developing around a national curriculum. 
Significantly, the pursuit of excellence' came to 
mean the pursuit of clear objectives. In his speech to 
the 1984 North of England Education Conference, Joseph 
called for a broad consensus regarding the definition 
of objectives for the curriculum for, pupi. ls aged 8-16, 
including content of subjects and objectives for 
attainment. Better Schools (March 1985) downplayed 
parental choice with only modest increases in 
representation on governing boards, and emphasised 
education as a national public service with the need 
to raise standards judged by modern (industrial 
training) rather than past demands. Though it offered 
no hope to neoliberals, it did propose a full basic 
curHculum in all primary schools and a 'balanced 
curriculum, in all secondary schools, including an 
understanding and knowledge of the values and 
traditions of British society. Hence it has come to be 
regarded as the missing link between the earlier new 
right campaigns and the later development of the ERA 
(Johnson, CSB 1991). But despite Joseph claiming at 
the 1984 Conservative Party conference: "We now have a 
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vision of what education is about"28, there is no 
evidence at this stage of a broad Thatcherite 
initiative in education being assembled (such as the 
ERA package) . 29 
For this to happen, and f or the neoliberal new right 
in particular to regain the momentum, it took a secoxad 
phase. There were two main developments which re- 
energised the new right project in education. First, 
interest in the voucher, amongst the new right and 
government, revived in 1985-6 (Seldon 1986) . 30 This was 
helped by the appointment of Robert Dunn as Schools 
Minister in June 1983. He was linked to the pro- 
voucher new right by his earlier role as Parliamentary 
Private Secretary to Boyson and member of the Carlton 
Club (Knight, p. 167,1990). Second, new right 
campaigning revived between 1984 and 1987, with a 
plethora of think-tank reports and papers from groups 
28 Conservative Central office, Press Release (661/84). 
29 Though Knight (p. 181,1990) claims that during 1983-4 the Prime 
Minister's Policy Unit was seriously considering IEA and CPS 
proposals. 
30 Whether the voucher was blocked for administrative or political 
reasons is difficult to discover, since there are differing 
claims made. Seldon (1986) argues it was rýerely 'political' 
(meaning it was blocked by more powerful Cabinet members 
including Thatcher), because the administrative objections were 
either: ".. secondary, implausible or unconvincing" (p. 18, ibid), 
and because Joseph had announced his intellectual interest 
(letter from Joseph to FEVER, December 1981, quoted p. 36, ibid). 
But Nicholas Ridley (p. 93,1991): "Successive education 
secretaries were asked by Margaret Thatcher to study it again; 
they all came to the conclusion that it was undesirable. She 
remained convinced of the need to find some variant of the scheme 
which produced parental choice; indeed, just before she fell from 
office she talked of finding a way of making the money follow the 
pupil after she had won her fourth election. But she never 
persuaded any of her secretaries of state to produce a workable 
scheme. " 
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with overlapping memberships. 31 This generated 
intensive debate within the Party, from which the 
authors of the 1987 manifesto, and what was to become 
the ERA, drew upon. 
In 1984, Joseph re-emphasised the importance of 
differentiation within (comprehensive) schools and 
particularly in the context of a recent failure to 
reintroduce selection. 32 In 1985, Thatcher let it be 
known that: "I would like to bring back what are 
called direct grant schools. We are looking at that". 33 
Joseph admitted that the DES was considering the 
possibility of a limited experiment with the 
restoration of direct grant schools. 34 Joseph and 
Patten pushed these 'Crown schools, 35 as an alternative 
to vouchers, which Thatcher had re-iterated an 
interest in. Bob Dunn also argued for direct grant 
schools, but criticised Joseph's reliance on 
31 Cox and Scruton (1984), Flew (1987), Scruton et al. (1985), 
Seldon (1986), Brown et al. (1985,1986), Sexton (1987), and the 
Hillgate Group. 
32 "If it be so, as it is, that selection between schools is 
largely out, then I emphasise that there must be differentiation 
within schools", interview, 'Weekend World, programme, ITV, 
reported Times Educational Supplement (TES), 17th February, 1984. 
33 Reported TES, 19 July 1985. 
34 Reported TES, 2 August 1985. 
35 The first proposal for Crown Schools came in Cox (p. 22,1981). 
According to Pring (1986), the Crown schools proposal was 
promoted within the DES as an alternative to growing new right 
influence which was calling for the extension of the 
privatisation process to state education. Whether true or not, 
the Crown schools (primarily to serve inner city areas, as 
reported in The Times, Ist April 1986) which would act as opted- 
out centrally-controlled models of superior teaching to other LEA 
schools, or US-style magnet schools (Cox 1985), and the 
consideration given to funding a small number of direct grant 
primary schools, could be seen as precursors to CTCs and then GM 
schools. 
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management rather than the market. He argued the ideal 
destination of policy to be a system of independent 
schools accountable to parents, free to run their own 
affairs and budgets, achieved by diverse routes and in 
evolutionary steps. 36 Dunn was a committed neoliberal, 
advised by Sexton. 37 Johnson (ibid) speculates that 
with Oliver Letwin as well, who worked with Dunn and 
was education advisor to Joseph and Thatcher, Dunn was 
perhaps central to the formulating of a more practical 
neoliberal strategy for the Government. 
Instead of splitting, as Belof f and the neoliberals 
did in 1983, the new right factions now unified. 
Arguments for the traditional curriculum and choice 
were combined (for example, Hillgate 1986,1987, whose 
stance was traditionalist and anti-multiculturalist, 
but also anti-state pro-market). The new right 
tendency was now remarkably tightly-knit. 38 Schemes 
from these groups proliferated, and by the end of 1986 
a common approach was becoming apparent, including 
opting-out, open enrolment, financial deregulation39, 
the strengthening of parental involvement and model or 
36 TES, 2nd August 1985. To Uohnson (CSB 1991) this speech is the 
earliest example of flexible strategic thinking. Dunn took the 
logic of the voucher (the educational market) and suggested there 
were many ways to achieve it. Seldon (p. 15,1986) had always 
hoped that: ".. the principle of the voucher would not, after all, 
be abandoned but would perhaps be incorporated, possibly under a 
different name, into education policy. " 
37 TES, 5th March 1985. Sexton was now in the IEA Education Unit. 
38 See The Guardian, 30th December 1986. 
39 Per capita funding would not only increase accountability to 
parents but also give teachers professional and financial 
independence without 'interference' from local government (Marks 
1987, reiterating the Whose Schools ? proposal that schools be 
funded by direct per capita grants). 
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', magnet' schools. The proliferation of proposals led 
to Patten and Joseph facing greater pressure from the 
right. 
Neoliberals became more effective as they abandoned 
the dogmatic letter of the voucher scheme in favour of 
an array of free market strategies (Johnson, CSB 
1991). For example, the Adam Smith Institute (ASI, 
Butler 1985) was putting forward proposals to short- 
circuit obstacles towards a voucher-like scheme; 
effective choice between state schools via open entry 
encouraging incentives for expansion and quality, 
greater independence for schools via governing bodies, 
and the direct funding of schools from the centre on 
children enrolled. To the ASI, the combined effect of 
these schools would be to create a market in 
education. 40 In 1986, an almost identical scheme to 
that suggested by the ASI was proposed by the 'No 
Turning Back' Group (some of the members of which - 
Christopher Chope, Michael Fallon, Robert Jones and 
Michael Forsyth - had links with the ASI). The Group 
extended its earlier proposals (Brown et al. 1985) 
including a scheme to allow parents and teachers to 
start their own schools with state support, by 
proposing governing bodies should have responsibility 
for administering schools and determining educational 
priorities, direct funding from central government, 
and open entry/enrolment (Brown et al. 1986). As with 
40 The ASI's Education Study Group at this time included Digby 
Anderson, Baroness Cox, Professor Anthony Flew, Professor David 
Marsland, Lawrence Norcross, and James Pawsey MP. 
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the earlier ASI proposals, the direct voucher scheme 
was regarded as politically unrealistic and so 
unhelpful. Whose Schools ? (Hillgate 1986) argued that 
schools should be owned by individual trusts, subject 
to open enrolment, the right to control their own 
admissions, and the publication of information 
relevant to parental choice. 41 It also supported magnet 
schools, via the extension of the CTCs programme. 
Kenneth Baker replaced Joseph in May 1986 - the team 
included Dunn, balanced by George Walden (a 
traditionalist on curriculum matters) . One of Baker's 
first acts was to dismiss Sexton (who in October 1986 
was appointed Director of the IEA Education Unit), but 
the key is that the new right had provided more 
practical, incremental and politically plausible 
proposals for reform. 
5.4 The ERA Policy Process 
This pressure for reform is important to'understanding 
the development of the ERA. The new right's campaign 
continued through 1987 and 1988, as the ERA was being 
formulated. Sexton (1987), written in advance of the 
publication of the ERA proposals and based on a 
private paper prepared for Joseph, argued for 
vouchers, comparative testing, ' the publication of 
results, the abolition of teacher unions and fixed 
rates of pay, and the privatisation of LEA services. 
Though this meant the IEA was still committed to the 
41 The Hillgate Group included Caroline Cox, Jessica Douglas-Home, 
John Marks, Laurence Norcross and Roger Scruton. 
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eventual introduction of a voucher scheme, for 
tactical reasons (in common with other new right 
groups) it had moved to embracing a gradualist 
approach: first to a framework that was consumer-led, 
then some variant of the voucher. Hillgate (1987), a 
response to the proposals and developing the earlier 
Whose Schools ?, was more neoconservative in wishing 
to constrain parental choice by the prescription of 
aspects of the curriculum against progressivism and 
egalitarianism (also Palmer 1986). While allowing 
minority groups to run their own schools they wanted 
to integrate them fully into the 'national, culture 
and political allegiance. The group bridged the gap 
between neoliberal and neoconservative agendas. 42 For 
example, they argued that open enrolment and opting 
out were not just beneficial to make state education 
more responsive to its consumers', but could also be 
used as a force against progressivism. Other 
publications concentrated on the curriculum. Marenbon 
(1987) argued for simple imparted English teaching, 
42 Sometimes this left them appearing contradictory. For example, 
while a national curriculum is "alien to the British educational 
tradition" (Hillgate, p-10,1987) and "concentrates too much 
power in the hands of central government" (p. 11, ibid), it could 
be used in the short-term to re-educate consumers freeing them 
from dependency' on professionals and in the long-term render 
the NC unnecessary. This appeared a slight shift from Hillgate 
(p. 7, ibid): "We must first open schools to the demand for their 
product.. Until this is done-the attempt to impose a national 
curriculum by law will be construed as yet another exercise in 
arbitrary state control. " Sexton rejected the NC completely: 
%%.. the most effective national curriculum is that set by the 
market itself, that set by the consumers of the education 
service", (Sexton 1988d, also O'Keefe 1987,1988, McCrum 1987, 
Flew, in Green 1991). For O'Keefe (P. 105,1987) : "The school 
curriculum has to be denationalized.,, 
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Beattie (1987), Deuchar (1987) and Kedourie (1988), 
against the perceived denigration of facts in favour 
of empathy and evaluation in history, and Lawlor 
(1988c) had more generally suggested a simple core 
curricula of the three main subjects. 
There are three Cabinet level accounts of the process. 
In Baker's (1993a) account, on his appointment 
Thatcher made no request for a fundamental overhaul of 
the education system. 43 Thus Baker was not given the 
portfolio to enact already formulated proposals. He 
reveals that in July 1985, Joseph had proposed a 
scheme for a dozen government-maintained primary 
schools to be set, up by charitable trusts or sponsored 
by entrepreneurs which would charge fees. In March 
1986, the Cabinet's H Committee gave approval for a 
feasibility study, but (p. 162, ibid): "'.. by that time 
the scheme had become subsumed within. a much wider 
discussion of radical options. " As he states (p. 163, 
ibid): "There were.. other ways of delivering those 
objectives dear to the heart of the voucher 
enthusiasts. " He appeared to share the "anti-producer, 
bias of the neoliberal educationalists (p. 177, ibid), 
and also a Black Paperite concern with a particular 
conception of 'standards' (p. 164, ibid): "The English 
43 Baker (p. 161,1993): "1 told her (Thatcher] that within six 
months i would bring forward proposals for a fundamental reform 
of the educa tion system. Her reply was simply 'Get on with it'. 
margaret did not mention vouchers, selection, the curriculum or 
any of the other matters on which I knew she held strong views 
and I did not press her to express them.,, Baker has suggested 
subsequently she was inchoate in her own mind, but felt that 
something should be done (interview, Barber 1996). 
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education system had lost its way in the 1960s. 11 There 
was obviously some pressure to find an agenda for 
reform. Baker suggests, that he was the catalyst for a 
coherent reform programme (p. 164, ibid). 
The f irst initiative in this regard was the creation 
of the City Technology Colleges (CTCs), designed to be 
testbeds for new teaching and management methods 
(p. 178, ibid) . On June 16th, Baker held meetings with 
senior officials, to put the ideas into policy 
proposals. On 23rd June, Thatcher green-lighted the 
announcement of 12-20 technical schools. By September, 
the full CTC proposals were agreed collectively by 
Cabinet. The significance of the initiative is born 
out by Baker (p. 181,187-8, ibid): '**.. CTCs would 
establish the way forward beyond the next election, 
since they embodied three new principles: a direct 
link between these schools and the DES; per capita 
funding; and a centrally determined curriculum. City 
Technology Colleges were the first challenges to the 
LEAs monolpoly of free education. As prototypes, they 
laid the ground for the emergence of the grant- 
maintained schools.. [they] incorporaýed many of the 
changes that I wanted to introduce into the whole 
system parental choice, per capita funding, local 
managerial control, and independence from the LEA. "44 
44 It has been suggested that the design of CTCs was influenced by 
the American experience of magnet schools (Finegold et al. 1993, 
especially Green, 'Magnet Schools, Choice, and the Politics of 
Policy Borrowing'). Baker visited New York to study magnet 
schools in 1987, as did Wandsworth LEA in 1989, and in 1990 HmI 
published a report on teaching and learning in New York schools. 
The difference, as Green suggests, was that the idea of magnets 
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CTCs running, having incorporated the essence of the 
reform package, was thought to be a more effective way 
to progress than focusing on per capita funding and 
getting obstructed by the DES. 45 It is worth examining 
the development of the two main aspects of the ERA - 
GM schools and the NC - in more detail. 
5.4a Grant-Maintained Schools 
The notion of LEA-independent state schools had been 
suggested before46, but it was only in this period, and 
after the introduction of CTCs, that the idea came to 
fruition. Baker (p. 214, ibid): "Delegated budgets, per 
capita funding and open enrolment led to the 
possibility of schools becoming independent of the 
local education authority. This was the genesis of 
opting-out. "47 What is also made clear is that the idea 
was attractive because it maintained the values 
in Britain was used primarily to legitimate reform, and was more 
concerned with choice than the American desire to demonstrate 
programmes for the social inclusion of. minorities. In addition, 
Sir Cyril Taylor (CPS author and local government activist, see 
chapter four) was made Chairman of the CTCs Trust and advisor to 
the Secretary of State. 
45 But, there was some disagreement; at a meeting with the PM on 
25th September 1986 she stressed that the introduction of 
parental fees at a later stage should not be precluded, which 
Baker was unhappy at. 
46 For example, Sexton, 'Education by Choice', Cox and Boyson 
(p. 86-9,1977). 
47 Some commentators such as Flude and Hammer (1990) have also 
pointed here to the influence of the No Turning Back pamphlet, 
including a scheme to allow parents and teachers to start their 
own schools and receive money from the state for doing so (Brown 
et al. 1985). The proposals in the subsequent Save Our Schoojs 
(Brown et al. 1986) included newly- constituted school governing 
bodies which would have responsibility for administering schools 
and determining policy priorities, schools directly financed by 
central government, open enrolment, all as part of the 
inckementalist strategy for liberating consumer interests and 
establishing a form of internal market. 
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inherent in a voucher system, especially the -pressure 
on schools to improve, via per capita funding (Baker, 
p. 212-3, ibid) . In December 1986, Baker proposed the 
idea of opting-out to Thatcher (who was attracted to 
it) and with it the parental ballot to trigger the 
process. Over Christmas 1986, Baker drew up a 
blueprint for change, and formally minuted the PM in 
February 1987.48 Thatcher wanted to quicken the pace of 
devolution, which would have spelt the end of the LEAs 
in months, and Baker disagreed. Thatcher (p. 570,592, 
1993) herself suggests that Brian Griffiths was 
crucial in devising the elements of the ERA package in 
the process of writing the Manifesto, especially GM 
schools . 49 
Hence GM schools developed outside the DES, though 
officials did provide the administrative detail that 
made them possible (Fitz and Halpin 1991, Maclure 
1988). Hence despite the restriction of the 'policy 
loop,, there were pragmatic compromises made (on the 
size of schools allowed to opt out, the funding of GM 
schools, parental ballots, unchanged admission 
policies to the regret of the IEA and No Turning Back 
Group,. and the teaching of the NC in GM schools) . 50 one 
48 Baker (p. 479-482,1993a) reprints this blueprint. It reveals 
that the ERA plans in their early stages were self-consciously 
divided up into centralising and decentralising measures. 
49 Ridley (p. 94,1991) suggests that Baker was hesitant with the 
plan, and that it was Thatcher who pushed the education group 
further with its proposals. 
50 Fitz and Halpin (1991), suggest the DES reduced the effects of 
GM policy on local authority planning by insisting that the 
policy only apply to schools with over 500 pupils (until this was 
changed, see DES 1990), effectively excluding the majority of 
primary schools from seeking GM status. 
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of the drafting committees within the Party for the 
manifesto recommended three specific proposals - 
devolution of more resources and management 
responsibility to individual ' schools, additional 
opportunities for parents to choose schools of their 
choice,, and that schools should be allowed to opt-out 
of local authority control. The latter went forward as 
a simple idea, but there was some confusion as to how 
it might be realised, by Baker and Thatcher. Absent, 
noticeably, were any NC proposals, which may have been 
put forward by the DES, albeit supported by 
unidentified Conservative Party policy groups. 
In the Conservative Party manifesto, The Next Moves 
Fox-ward, the commitment to major changes in the 
education system was declared, including opting out. 51 
By the time of the 1987 Party Conference, Baker (1987) 
was preparing the way for the ERA by emphasising the 
%indoctrination, and 'mediocrity, of many LEAs, who 
were said to encourage anti-family, anti-police, and 
anti-competitive values. Consultation was kept to a 
minimum, reflecting the growing confidence of the 
Government (in new powers for the Secretary of State 
and the abolition of the ILEA) . The* continued but 
muted power of the 'educational establishment, came in 
most of the successful amendments (with the exception 
51 At the press conference to launch the manifesto, on 19th May 
1987, Thatcher said that if schools went GM they would be able to 
determine their admissions policy, but Baker (p. 194-5, '1993a) 
emphasises: "It had been clearly agreed in the discussions 
between us that grant -maintained schools could not change their 
character.. I suspect she was trying to keep open the option of 
fees and selection. " 
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of the House of Lords vote against the arrangements 
for ballots on GM status) and the Church of England, 
universities and paternalistic peers who sought to 
protect the interests of children with special needs. 
Baker suggests (p. 211, ibid) that the DES and its 
principal officials had to be slowly won round to the 
idea of allowing schools to become self-managed and 
independent of LEAs . 52 
Though during the passage of the Bill, Baker made 
reassurances that schools would have to retain their 
previous character and admissions policy. Thatcher's 
personal instincts have since been made clear (p. 579, 
1993), she was saddened by having to give the 
assurances during the 1987 Election campaign about not 
allowing selection'and fee-paying to be extended with 
GM schools. The pace of opting out became a difference 
between Baker and Thatcher. She had suggested that she 
thought most schools would opt out, but Baker thought 
that parents (via the ballots) not government should 
decide the pace. 53 
52 Ridley (p. 93-4,1.991), without evidence, claims: "I put forward 
the plan that was eventually adopted, which was to allow all 
schools eventually to opt out of local authority control and to 
be run by their governors. Margaret Thatcher liked the plan and 
eventually it was adopted, despite the unhappiness of Kenneth 
Baker's officials; he himself accepted it.. " 
53 Further (p. 220, Thatcher ibid): "The creation of grant- 
maintained schools, and the prospect of eventual large-scale 
opting out, did raise the whole question of whether the local 
education authorities should continue to exist. In discussions 
during 1986 and 1987, the Department of the Environment, led by 
Nick Ridley, wanted schools to be funded solely by a per capita 
grant to be topped up with fees. The Treasury was quite prepared 
to take on the funding of schools centrally. This would have been 
the nationalisation of the education service. " 
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In order to promote opting out, the Grant -Maintained 
Schools Trust was established in August 1988 (not so 
independent of the DES or Conservative Party as it 
claimed to be54), as well as a campaigning wing Choice 
in Education. In response to the initial low take-up 
of GM status, the Government decided to' offer 
additional incentives; at the Conservative Party 
Conference 1990 Education Secretary John MacGregor 
announced four measures to-facilitate opting out - the 
maximum level of transitional grant was doubled from 
f-30,000 to f-60,000, some special purpose grants and 
the formula allocation of capital grants were 
increased by fifty per cent, and the removal of the 
size limit on primary schools. 55 I 
5.4b National Curriculum 
As already noted, the Government's interest in a 
national curriculum grew though the 1980s (Ball 199o, 
also Boyson 1995), partly as a, result of the campaigns 
by the new right against educational progressivism and 
'indoctrination, . But, the 1986 Act still envisaged 
responsibility for determining and organising the 
curriculum as the headteacher's, though with an 
54 TES, 16th August 1988. 
55 As Rogers (1992) argues, there is no doubt that GM schools have 
been favourably treated - the main inducement lies in the 
allocation of capital grant for named projects, on which 
expenditure has been at a much higher rate compared with capital 
spending in the LEA sector. This has been admitted openly by John 
major in a letter to Doug MacAvoy, General Secretary of the NUT: 
"We have made no secret of the fact that grant-maintained schools 
get preferential treatment in allocating grants to capital 
expenditure", The Guardian, 7th August 1991. 
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increased role for the governors to whom the head 
would have to look for approval on curriculum maters. 
Baker states that in a meeting with the PM on 23rd 
June 1986 he raised the idea of a national curriculum 
and Thatcher was "encouraged, . On 18th September he 
secured support for delegating budgets to schools 
(p. 190,1993). The DES reportedly had 'sympathy, with 
the idea, and Baker was helped by Eric Bolton (then 
Senior Chief Inspector of Schools) . Baker announced 
the idea of the NC on 'Weekend World, (television 
programme) on 7th December 1986.56 
The plan was for a balanced curriculum of ten subjects 
covering ages five to sixteen, with achievement 
targets for each subject. Thatcher warned against the 
over- elaboration of the NC, and wanted to concentrate 
on the three core subjects of English, mathematics and 
science. 57 This was the key debate between Thatcher and 
Baker. Baker warned that the concentration on three 
core subjects would give less prominence to a broader 
range of subjects (such as history, technology and 
56 Baker (p. 192, ibid) claims the NC had five objectives: 
%%.. first, set a standard of knowledge which would give a clear 
incentive for all our schools to catch up with the best..; 
second, provide teachers with detailed and precise objectives to 
support their work; third, provide parents with clear, accurate 
information about their child and their school; fourth, ensure 
continuity and avoid the duplication which many children suffered 
when moving from one school to another; and fifth, help teachers 
concentrate on the task of getting the best possible results from 
each individual child. " 
57 Baker (interview, Barber 1996): "Now on the curriculum she did 
have views, which as far as I could see cam from her hairdresser 
or it may have been her cleaner who lived in Lambeth, who was 
worried that her children were going to be educated by a lot of 
Trots. '! 
254 
languages). The wider dispute within Government was 
primarily between two factions. 58 Lord Young, the 
Manpower Services Commission ana the DTI were 
concerned with developing an enterprise culture, via a 
skill rather than just knowledge-based curriculum, 
while those associated with the Black Papers and the 
Hillgate Group were preoccupied with a return to 
standards and traditional subject-based learning. 
Tests at ages seven, eleven, fourteen (leading to the 
GCSE at sixteen) were announced at the Young 
Conservatives Conference in February 1987. 
The ERA was thought to have set up a 'machinery of 
consensus' for the Secretary of State, with the 
working groups (WGs), the School Examinations and 
Assessment Council (SEAC) and the National Curriculum 
Council (NCC) being appointed by, and only advisory 
to, the Secretary of State. Further, the Secretary of 
State provided clear and extensive advice both before 
and during the process of establishing the Attainment 
Targets, Profile Components and Programmes of Study. 
Duncan Graham (1993) was appointed chairman and chief 
executive of the NCC by Baker from its inception in 
August 1988 (posts he held until his resignation in 
july 1991). According to Graham, the. NCC was created 
against the wishes of the DES, but civil servants 
changed in attitude once they realised it could give 
them their first chance of real power over state 
education. 
58 TES, 18th December 1987. 
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Conflict, often intense, did arise within and between 
the WGs, the NCC and the Secretary of State. 
Apparently clear political intentions encountered the 
complexity of implementation. Particularly revealing 
are the conflicts over two of the most contentious 
subject areas - English and History. 
Baker appointed ex-Black Paperite Professor Brian Cox 
(Manchester University) chair of the WG to draw up the 
English curriculum. "The unspoken brief was to undo 
Kingman" (Graham, p. 46 , 1993), the previous %too 
creative,, modern and unstructured report on English 
teaching. But both Baker (p. 191,1993a) and Thatcher 
(p. 593,1993) were critical of the WGIs report, 
especially on the teaching of grammar. Baker also 
thought the attainment targets for ages seven and 
eleven too vague, but welcomed the commitment to 
standard English. Baker asked the NCC to use the Cox 
report as the basis for wider consultation (Graham 
agreed with Baker on the criticisms of the teaching of 
English). The attainment targets were made more 
precise, to the resentment of Cox and the WG. 
Political and ideological interference (including from 
the Prime Minister) was clearest and most heightened 
with History. Baker . was sympathetic 
to the 
neoconservative attack on 'progressive' history and 
teaching methods, and according to Graham well-briefed 
from the right. 59 However, he clashed with Thatcher. 
59 "The programmes of study should have at the core the history of 
Britain, the record of its past and, in particular, its 
political, constitutional and cultural heritage', (Baker, The 
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The WG decided it would not be possible to have 
attainment targets based on facts. Early drafts of the 
curriculum were thought to be disappointing, since 
there was a lack of emphasis on facts and 
chronologies. Thatcher (p. 595,1993) was especially 
critical of Baker's (December 1988) proposal for the 
teaching of history and the composition of- the WG. 60 
Thatcher was appalled at the emphasis on 
interpretation rather than knowledge, as well as the 
insufficient weight given to British history. Despite 
the restrictive terms of reference that were set, the 
History WG eschewed 'patriotic history'. As well as 
advocating a broadly-based curriýulum comprising 
British history, European and world history and 
thematic studies (including local history), the WG 
distanced itself from the new right's narrow 
conception of British culture by stressing that 
Britain could not be perceived as an undifferentiated 
mass. 61 The new right countered that the process had 
Times, 14th January 1989). Baker suggested this to the NC History 
Working Group (DES, p. 15-16,1989b) . Similarly, Baker (p. 206, 
1993a) : "The teaching of history was seen as doubly important 
because it conditions children's attitudes to their own country 
and often to politics. Margaret Thatcher saw history as a pageant 
of glorious events and significant developments, with our small 
country having given the world parliamentary democracy, an 
independent judiciary and a tradition of incorrupt 
administration. The British Empire had been a civilising 
influence on mankind. " 
60 In particular, Graham (p. 64,1993) thought Baker's choice of 
chair, Commander Michael Saunders Watson (former chairman of the 
Heritage Education Trust), was extraordinary, and 'eccentric, . 
Thought initially to be. a 'right-wing amateur', he turned out to 
be a welcome surprise to history teachers. 
61 %%Individual people in these islands have much in common but 
they also have many individual characteristics specific to 
country, ethnic grouping, religion, gender and social class. We 
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been hijacked by the education establishment (for 
example, 'The History Debate', Lawlor 1995). 
Thatcher's exasperation at the direction of the WG 
eventually made her go public in April 1990 after the 
new Education Secretary MacGregor had defended the 
final report of the. History WG, though he too had 
earlier asked the WG to look again at ways of' 
including essential historical knowledge in the 
attainment targets . 62 The crisis which could have 
derailed the whole reform package came when Thatcher 
was clearly not going to approve the report, which 
provoked criticisms from the Opposition of direct 
political interference. Further, the WG expressed the 
fear that History was being taken over as a propaganda 
weapon (Graham, p. 67,1993). In a compromise, the 
report was published and MacGregor announced he would 
conduct his own investigation into History, largely by 
Nick Tate, the NCC's History officer, with Graham and 
MacGregor. Facts were not included in the attainment 
targets, but MacGregor was persuaded that they were 
integral to the course. MacGregor also excised much 
European and world history. Thatcher 'reluctantly, 
accepted the proposals. 63 
do not believe that school history 
6an be so f inely tuned so as 
to accommodate all of these details all of the time, but at least 
it can make pupils aware of the richness and variety of British 
culture and its historical origins. " DES (p. 17,1989b). 
62 MacGregor, in response to the Working Group Is Interim Report, 
said (on Thatcher's insistence) that he wanted 50 per cent more 
time devoted to British history in secondary schools compared to 
the just over a third envisaged for pupils aged 14-16 (The 
Obsez-ver 20th August 1989). 
63 However, when Kenneth Clarke became Secretary of State he 
criticised the generally-accepted notion that history encompassed 
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In the summer and autumn of 1987, another area of 
dispute between Baker and Thatcher was over the time 
the NC would take up. Baker believed the prescribed 
curriculum should take up 80-85 per cent of teaching 
time, Thatcher 70 per cent. The issue came to a head 
at E (EP) committee on 28th October, with Baker 
arguing that the (his) broad-based curriculum (more 
than the three core subjects) was already being 
drafted into the ERA which was to be introduced in 
three weeks' time. 64 Further conflict occurred over the 
question of the 'whole curriculum,, which would 
include subjects such as the classics, economics, 
business studies, as well as personal and social 
education, health and careers. This was seen as of 
secondary importance to the priority of the ten core 
subjects by DES civil servants and ministers, but many 
members of the NCC wanted to consider it from the 
beginning (Graham, p. 19-21,1993). The establishment 
of working groups on the five themes identified by the 
NCC as essential to all education (citizenship, the 
environment, economic and industrial understanding, 
careers and health) and the publication of (non-' 
statutory) guidance booklets, though thought 
events up to the present day. Eventually, modern history ran from 
1900 to a time twenty years before the present, to be changed in 
five-year periods. 
64 Later, LToseph was to move an amendment to make the NC 
discretionary rather than mandatory (which failed), and which led 
to further attempts by Sexton and colleagues to make the 
Government make only the list of subjects mandatory and' the 





uncontentious caused criticism from the DES. 65 Civil 
servants stressed that these were a 'dangerous 
distraction' , funds were not available, and work on 
them would have to be delayed until 1993 when the NC 
was due to be fully implemented. But Baker and Graham 
came to agree on the usefulness of the themes, and the 
curriculum for, 14-16 year-olds became an 'extended 
core,, or the 170/301 solution. But Clarke reopened 
the' issue of over-prescriptiveness after becoming 
Secretary of State, and the NCC rejected his 'advice, 
(children would only have to take mathematics, science 
and English to GCSE) . There were also conflicts over 
assessment and testing. 66 
It is clear that Thatcher (P-593,1993) was very 
disappointed with the development of the curriculum 
the original simplicity was lost, and she saw the 
influence of the teacher unions and the Inspectors 
become more prominent. 67 Consequently, there is the 
need to differentiate the eventual form of the ERA and 
65 Though as Graham (P. 105,199,3) notes, the Home Office under 
David Waddington and John Patten, as well as MacGregor, seemed to 
be particularly worried about what the citizenship document would 
say, in terms of participation, and did not want it to turn into 
a piece of ýleft propaganda, as some on the right thought the 
speaker, s Commission on citizenship had. 
66 Again, the prime Minister was seen to intervene over the Task 
Group on Assessment and Testing Report's (TGAT 1987) 
re 6ommendat ions. She feared it would lead, to costly teaching 
apparatus, leave authority with teachers, and allow LEAs a major 
role in the implementation of the system. 
67 (p. 597, ibid) : "There was no need for the national curriculum 
proposals and the testing which accompanied them to have 
developed as they did. Ken Baker paid too much attention to the 
DES, the HMI and progressive educational theorists in his 
appointments and early decisions; and once the bureaucratic 
momentum had begun it was difficult to stop. n 
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its effects from the intended form. A process of 
curriculum proliferation occurred, especially obvious 
under the themes proposed by the NCC (NCC 1990b), 
which included education for citizenship, economic and 
industrial understanding, careers education health 
education and environmental education. The overcrowded 
curriculum points to the contradiction between the 
simplicity of Baker's model and the curriculum 
entitlement for all pupils 5-16, versus. the complexity 
of the knowledge which schools, parents and employers 
want to be available. 68 
5.5 The ERA and Citizenship 
Analysing the ERA reforms from the perspective of 
citizenship, in the sense of "universal membership', 
focuses on two main areas. The first concerns 
equality, equal opportunity and selection within the 
new system, the second race, culture and national 
identity. 
I 
First, education has been seen as a crucial foundation 
f or a more egalitarian society by the lef t, f or two 
main reasons. It may increase the opportunities for 
children from less privileged backgrounds, and also 
act politically on them to increase their critical 
awareness of the society around them. - of course, as 
previously noted, it was this approach to education 
which the new right fought against, because: "If 
68 Clarke later abandoned an 'entitlement curriculum, for 14-16, 
again complicating the curriculum, meaning the possibility of 14- 
16 being split into two-tiers, the high-status academic and the 
low-status vocational subjects. 
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equali: ty in education is sought at the expense of 
quality, how can the poisons created help but filter 
down ? "69 
Critics suggested (David, p. 104,1991): ".. the effects 
of the educational reforms are likely to be to widen 
social differences between schools and therefore 
social inequalities. 1170 Gewirtz et al. (1993) suggested 
that the disciplining structure of the ERA's 
educational market has implications for the values and 
cultures which, operate within schools. It would foster 
particular cultural forms and socio-psychological 
dispositions and marginalise others, most obviously 
the universalism and collectivism that in theory 
underpinned comprehensivism. Funding constraints 
threaten other aspects of comprehensivism because 
adequate mixed-ability teaching and the integration of 
children with special needs are expensive ways of 
org anising learning. The process may work against the 
selection of children for whom English is a second 
language, who, along with less able children, will be 
more expensive to educate than children proficient in 
English. Test results will lead to a pressure to 
select students on ability, depending generally on the 
69' Keith Joseph, The Times, 21st October 1974. Hillgate (p. 3-4, 
1986): ".. education is not an instrument' but an end in itself. 
To treat education as a means to an 'egalitarian society, is to 
destroy both the possibility of learning, and the only kind of 
equality that is either desired by parents or obtainable through 
school: equality of opportunity. " 
70 it is also worth noting that if the ERA does lead to a more 
divisive system, it will be easier for governments to satisfy the 
more influential constituency if middle-class services are 
clearly separated from those for weaker groups (Taylor-Gooby and 
Lawson 1993). 
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market position of the school. Hence the market 
introduced by the ERA is not an apolitical neutral 
mechanism of resource allocation, but a form of 
'ordered competition' with particular social and 
economic goals embedded in it which erode social 
justice. 
In particular, critics suggested the ERA would 
increase selection. Selection is seen by the lef t as 
an important defence of inequalities. 71 During the 
passage of the Bill, Baker gave assurances that: 
grant -maintained schools will continue to form part 
of a local system serving local people. A school which 
becomes grant-maintained will retain its previous 
character. 1172 This %character' (size, selection 
criteria and religious basis) was guaranteed for five 
years. However, - these guarantees were not included in 
the Bill or Act but in a DES circular, which even then 
seemed to give only qualified support for the five- 
year period. 73 Hence while in the short-term protecting 
existing selective provision (grammar schools opting- 
out), the long-term introduction of selection was left 
71 Boudon (1974) argued that in societies structured by class and 
other inequalities the greater the variety of different routes 
through the education system, the greater the likelihood that 
differential class expectations (engendered from outside the 
education system) will structure student choices, and therefore 
educational opportunities will be structured along class lines. 
of course, the new right disagrees, seeing selection as 
increasing equality of opportunity (Hillgate Group 1986). 
72 Speech to North of England Conference, reported TEs, 8th 
January, 1988. 
73 DES (1988): ".. the Secretary of State would not normally 
approve proposals for a change of char*acter within five years of 
its acquiring grant-maintained status. " 
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open. Consequently, fears of creeping selection 
persist. Monitoring is difficult, given that the only 
safeguards are the approval of admission arrangements 
by the Secretary of State and the ability of 
dissatisfied parents to refer to a supposedly 
independent appeals committee, established by, and 
including, the governors of the school in question 
(DES 1988). Meanwhile, LEAs will continue to have the 
duty to educate pupils rejected by or excluded from GM 
schools. 
Further, Rogers (p. 31,1992) has suggested that the 
LMS reforms have: ".. brought about a fundamental shift 
in the distribution of powers and responsibilities for 
the management of education service, away from the LEA 
to individual school level. " The combination of 
formula funding (where each pupil has a cash value to 
the school) and open enrolment (where admission levels 
are restricted only by the capacity of schools) 
creates, in effect, a voucher scheme within the state 
sector. The proportion of LMS budget that can be 
allocated according to need (a maximum of 20 per cent) 
is not seen as sufficient to reflect the differences 
in circumstances of schools within an authority, hence 
(p. 47, ibid): ".. the whole system works against a 
school that is struggling with problems, and favours 
the already advantaged. 11 
Second, with regard to race, culture and national 
identity, there are two ways in which critics see the 
ERA reforms acting divisively. The first concerns the 
content of the NC. Most obviously, it represents the 
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desire to control what is taught in schools, 
dismissing the professional common-curriculum approach 
favoured by'part of the HMI, which reflects a genuine 
concern with the quality of the teaching process and 
the needs of individuai children (Chitty 1989). 74 Hence 
the focus on output and testing. 
Kenneth Baker claimed: "I see the National Curriculum 
as a way of increasing our social coherence-The 
cohesive role of the national curriculum will provide 
our society with a greater sense of identity. 1175 
Critics saw this attempted imposition of identity as a 
form of anti-multiculturalism - it was a 'nationalist 
curriculum' (Coulby, in Bash and Coulby 1991), its 
culturally specific character most detectable in four 
subject areas - English, Modern Foreign Languages, 
History and Religious Education (RE) It represents 
the curriculum of the dead' (Ball 1994) in its 
restorationism, an attempt to (re)inforce popular 
memory especially in the the field of history. Without 
compromise or relativism, it signals its 'curricular 
fundamentalism'. In particular (Tomlinson, p. 461, 
1989): ".. despite the presence in the education system 
of over half a million children and young people 
74 Consequently (Whitty, p. 23, Flude and Hammer 1990): ".. the 
exercise of choice and responsibility was to be denied to the 
majority of parents in the field of the curriculum, where (given 
the exclusion of independent schools from the legislative 
imposition of a national curriculum'and a system of testing), 
6nly the wealthy would continue to have choice. " 
75 Speech at Manchester University, The Guardian, 16th September 
1987. Also the NC: ".. will be very helpful in holding together a 
multiracial and multicultural society", The Guardian, 17th August 
1988. 
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perceived as racially or ethnically different to a 
white norm, there was no mention in the Act or race, 
ethnicity or even multicultural education", a 
reflection of the new right's 'educational 
nationalism' . 76 To Troyna and Carrington 
(p. 96,1990) 
the ERA represents the return to a 'colour-blind, 
perspective, but as Gillborn (1992) argues through the 
operation of the 'hidden curriculum,, many black 
people are left in little doubt as to the second-class 
nature of the citizenship rights accorded their 
communities. Coulby (Bash and Coulby 1991) 
characterises the decision of the Modern Foreign 
Languages WG as revealing that schools may only teach 
'black languages, if 'white languages' are taught 
first. Hence it is suggested that testing and 
assessment is likely to enhance and institutionalise 
the labelling Of 'failure,, especially the denigration 
of non-white groups. Further, the NC relates to the 
anti-egalitarian project of the ERA, revealing an 
overall model of the citizen as individual and 
nationalist, rather than social and internationalist 
(Cole, Clay and Hill 1991). Thus it seeks to provide a 
popular education within an ideological framework 
which is individualistic, competitive and racist. Its 
, 76 See Gordon (1988), for a review of the new right's attack on 
multiculturalism, its argument that anti-racism is a form of 
racism (for example, Honeyford 1983,1984, Palmer 1986) and that 
'non-standard' language forms (that is, non-Standard English) 
encourage anti-authority behaviour (Honey 1983). Hence (Gordon, 
p. lol, * ibid): "The project of the New Right is to individualise 
the concept of racism, to detach it f rom the social arena and to 
relocate it in the realm of personal morality. " 'Culture, 
replaces racism (also Seidel, in Levitas 1986). 
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notion of individual choice is, in an unequal society, 
heavily ideological. 
The second relates to the structure of the system. 
Critics suggested it would lead to the social and 
racial polarisation of the best, (popular) schools 
against the others, where parents may see multi-racial 
schools as bad schools, as well as eroding LEA anti- 
racism strategies. It has also been alleged that the 
ERA (through GM schools) is a '-charter for racist 
parents' (Weekes 1987, and Hugill 1990). This has been 
denied (Lawlor 1988b). 
In addition, citizenship itself has become a 
developing theme in the curriculum, though the 
analysis here suggests this is not where the real 
significance of the ERA's project in citizenship 
lies. 77 However, it is right to note that because it 
presents British politics and society according to the 
pluralist model (assuming equality before the law and 
equal access to decision-making processes) , it cannot 
be said to be politically neutral (Carr 1991). As such 
it constructs a particular discourse itself. 
However, it must also be noted that in the process of 
eroding citizenship in education for some, the ERA 
used citizenship discourses and concepts to achieve 
77 Fogelman (1.991) . It mainly appears under 'Personal and Social 
Education' (DES 1989c). It has also been referred to in 
Cux-ricujum Guidance 3 (NCC 1990a) , which outlines the content of 
citizenship education as knowledge about electoral procedures, 
local and national government, social civil and political 
entitlements, obligations and responsibilities, and the 
importance of participation. 
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its ends. First, it utilised highly structured forms 
of participation - the role of school governorS78, 
parental ballots for opting-out (Rogers 1992), and 
greater choice' for parents in choosing schools. 
These were useful for two reasons: they displaced 
forms of expert participation, and also attempted to 
use the interests of parents and governors with-regard 
to individual schools to further the Government's 
strategic aims for the whole system (though there may 
be some unexpected results). 79 
Further, governors are 
not representative of the population as a whole, nor 
necessarily of the schools they govern (Brehony 1992), 
and initiatives in local participation have tended to 
preserve rather than alter existing power relations 
(Vincent 1993b). The left allowed these forms of 
participation to defeat its own visions for 
democratising schools. " Second, the NC, ignoring its 
78 The governing body of GM schools includes five parent 
governors, one or two teacher governors, the head teacher, and a 
majority of governors appointed by the 'existing governing body 
from members of the local community. The Education (No. 2) Act and 
the ERA changed significantly both the composition of school 
governing bodies and their functions, 'and under LMS governors 
became responsible for school budgets and many personnel matters. 
79 Savage, Robins, Atkinson, (p. 220,1994): "It is not necessarily 
the case that these developments will lead in the direction the 
Government wished or anticipated. It may well be, for example, 
that increased parental power will work against the Government's 
wishes as was shown in 1993 in the reaction against tests for 14 
year olds, where there was an alliance between Parent Teacher 
Associations, school governing bodies and the teaching unions 
against the Secretary of State's plans. " 
80 Hall (p. 2, Wolpe and Donald 1983): "The right have temporarily 
defined the terms and won the struggle because they are willing 
to engage. For a brief period in the 1960s and 1970s the 
involvement of parents with the school was the left's most 
democratic trump card. The dismantling of this into 'parental 
choice' and its expropriation by the right is one of their most 
significant victories. They stole an idea designed to increase 
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biases, could be characterised as an 'entitlement 
curriculum,, guaranteeing the content of teaching 
across all state schools. 81 These reforms, then, could 
be seen as enhancing citizenship (and could be 
manipulated to do so), but in their present form have 
a very different purpose. 
5.6 The ERA as a Mechanism of Control 
This approach reveals the EPA to be a mechanism of 
control, but which cannot be captured by the either 
centralising or decentralising charact eri sat ions. The 
NC is undoubtedly centralising, GM schools and LMS 
decentralising, but more importantly, both decrease 
the scope for non-new right projects in education. It 
is a form of largely indirect social engineering 
(Whitty and Menter, p. 60,1989) "In moving education 
to the centre of contemporary politics the Government 
has revealed a grasp of both its structural and its 
ideological significance.. Along with the media, 
education is a key route to the thoughts and values of 
people within nations. " As a result (Ball, p. 43, 
1990): ,.. analytically, education is no longer 
separated off from other. areas of social and economic 
policy. it is no longer a backwater of policy. It is 
popular power in education and transformed it into an idea of an 
educational supermarket. " 
81 Simon (p. 76,1992): ".. we must remember that the concept of a 
common curriculum for all -a set of structured experiences 
covering the main fields of knowledge and culture - was a major 
objective of the whole comprehensive reform movement of the 1960s 
and 1970s (and earlier).. it was necessary to combat the official 
ideology that children with different types of mind required 
basically different forms of education. " 
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now in the mainstream of the political ideology and 
policies of Thatcherism. " 
The ERA represents a (Johnson, p. 268, CSB 1991): 
system of market provis ion, policed in the spirit 
of cultural absolutism [of] separated provision and 
pretended cultural unity. " It intended to close down 
the spaces education offers to alternative social 
values ý and discourses. Hence the new right leads not 
freedom but a deepening coercive regulation of civil 
society. The 'educational market, is not the end in 
itself, but a route to this, and a powerful discourse 
to marginalise other concerns. 82 It is a massive 
political experiment attempting to educate citizens in 
market practices and tie them into new right 
parameters of discourse (Cole et al. 1.9.91). 83 
Alongside the directives of the NC, then, GM schools 
(and their preferential financial treatment) also can 
be interpreted as increasing state control of 
education (Halpin, Power and Fitz 1993). While they 
are supposedly. self-governing, their autonomy is 
strictly regulated (mediating government policy 
undiluted) , and teachers are reoriented away 
from the 
a public service ethic into competitive self- 
82 Thus the NC also plays another role in providing the 'consumer 
quality tags, necessary for the market, (see Murphy's analysis 
of the simple market indicator, national assessment proposals, 
chapter 3, Flude and Hammer 1990). 
83 Hence it is ironic that some conservative/new right 
educationalists have complained that subsequent Conservative 
reforms have been 'Meddling' and dirigiste (Lawlor 1996). 
270 
interest. 84 Hence (p. 13, ibid) : "The discursive trick 
played on them entails the proposition that 
educational reform is being done b_v their schools 
when, in reality, it is mostly being done to them. " In 
this sense, they are genuine '*state schools' for the 
f irst time. 85 
Given this characterisation of the general thrust of 
the educational new right, and the influence it had 
over the ERA, the differences between factions (for 
example, the neoliberal dislike of the NC)' become less 
important, because they represent only differences on 
means to the same end - the reinforcement of the 
'market society' . This 
is why suggesting 'that there 
were significant ideological contradictions within 
Thatcherite education reform which derived from 
different factions of the new right (Kenyon 1995), 
neglects the overall purpose of those reforms. The 
notion of the 'market society, is developed further 
[chapter nine). 
84 Hence the new right attack on existing forms of teacher 
training (Lawlor 1990) can be understood, as another part of the 
project to close down other projects in education. Other reforms 
have subsequently been made - greater emphasis on academic 
specialisms, and the Teacher Training Agency (established by the 
Education Act 1994). 
85 These reforms were not concerned with efficiency as such, 
because in some respects they make running an efficient system 
more difficult. For example, LEAs face the problem of how they 
respond to the need to rationalise school provision at a time of 
falling secondary numbers and per capita-led financing, in the 
context of GM schools. They will not propose schools for closure 
if they suspect those schools will then try to opt-out, and unit 
costs will rise as more schools opt-out. In addition, given the 
problems in predicting provision needed, LEAs may have to 
maintain a large and expensive surplus capacity in schools. 
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This characterisation of the ERA's purpose is be being 
born out by its effects. Research shows the 
replacement of compreh. ensivism and civic virtue in 
education by market values, producing a more socially- 
divisive and differentiated system. 86 No schools can 
afford to ignore the local market, and are 
increasingly keen to attract enrolments from 
'motivated' parents and 'able' children who are likely 
to enhance their relative position. Middle-class 
parents in particular are exploiting the market in 
education and bringing their social and cultural 
advantages to bear. And despite the Government's 
supposed desire for ', diversity,, there is (Tomlinson, 
p. 23,1994): ".. a greater 'dull uniformity' among 
schools as they sought to play safe, emulate 'popular, 
rivals and compete for the same desirable students.,, 
Fitz, Halpin and Power (1993) concur. Because opting- 
out only allows schools to innovate within strict 
limits, as well as the competition of the 'market', it 
has not led to the development of a plurality of 
distinctive and mould-breaking schools. Rather, it has 
tended to produce- a reinvigorated traditionalism, . 
Hence (p. 74, ibid): ".. at, the point of implementation, 
the GM schools policy confirms, rather than 
challenges, the assumption that extra resources are -a 
necessary condition for school improvement, but in a 
way that articulates with traditional conceptions of 
86 Ball, Bowe and Gewirtz, 'Market Forces and Parental Choice: 
Self-Interest and Competitive Advantage in Education', chapter 
one, Tomlinson (1994). 1 
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schooling which mimic the government's implicit view 
of what counts as 'good, education.,, 
Further, it contributes little to improvements in 
parental participation, nor widens choice. In areas 
where GM status pý: eserves selective education, it may 
lead to a restriction of choice for parents as a 
whole. It also has a considerable impact on some LEAs, 
particularly in the frustration of planning functions. 
Their research revealed that at the time, of 225 GM 
secondary schools, only 8 per cent served" areas of 
'social disadvantage', supporting the suspicion that 
GM policy is also keenly designed with a key electoral 
constituency - the middle classes, - interests at 
heart, and in doing so compounds previous educational 
inequalities. often, expectations of 'choice' are 
unrealistic, leading to the rise in appeals. 
Bush, Coleman and Glover (1993) reveal that a third of 
GM comprehensives in their survey were using covert 
selection methods, many grammar schools using GM 
status as an opportunity to raise entry requirements, 
and 'specialization, has encouraged a particular form 
of selection. Further exclusions have increased in all 
types of school, partly as a result of league tables. 
OFSTED's '(p. 6,1993) report on the progress of' GM 
schools revealed that there were significant 
differences emerging between the LEA and the GM sector 
in three main ways - the proportion of selective 
schools was four times greater in the GM sector (20 
per cent as opposed to 4.5 per cent), the geographical 
spread was uneven (in over f if ty LEAs there was no GM 
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school at all, but in others there were growing 
numbers), and before becoming GM some 40 of the 
schools (out of just below 300 at that time) had been 
the subject of recent proposals for reorganisation (a 
proportion much higher than for other maintained 
schools). Hence there is more division between 
schools, more selection, and pressure to opt-out if 
another school in the same area has. 87 
5.7 The Post-ERA Reforms 
Although the main focus here is the ERA, it is worth 
noting that the subsequent development of Conservative 
education policy reinforces this analysis. The main 
themes of reform have been extended - reinforcing the 
'market society',, marginalising other projects in 
education, and making it difficult for the left to 
propose reform without appearing to stand against 
'freedom, standards and choice,. 
The requirement 'that primary schools seeking GM status 
should have at least 300 pupils was withdrawn in late 
1990, and the five-year embargo on proposing a change 
of character to a school was removed in 1991. The 
White Paper published in July 
6 
1992 (DfE 1992) proposed 
to allow schools to apply for a change of character at 
the same time as becoming GM where there were 
proposals from the LEA to reorganise education in the 
87 Also (p. 23, ibid) : "Growing competition has led to vigorous 
marketing and LEA schools are now publicising their achievements 
more energetically than before. in some cases the production of 
publicity materials makes in roads into schools, resources, and 
marketing is making heavy demands on the time of senior 
management. " 
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same area concerned, and to allow special schools to 
apply for GM status. It also increased the potential 
for central control further. 88 The then new Secretary 
of State John Patten stated in the Paper that he 
wished to see GM status become the norm in secondary 
schooling and expected GO per cent of schools to have 
opted out by 1995.89 GM schools were allowed to select 
a minority of pupils on the basis of ability and 
aptitude. In September 1995, the Prime minister 
announced that he wanted church schools (4,032 
voluntary schools) to be able to go GM without 
balloting parents. In a, consultation paper in October 
this was included along with proposals for shortening 
statutory time limits for objections to opting-out, 
removing the requirement for ballots if the process 
could be 'unnecessarily stressful,, and removing 
council-appointed governors- There wete suggestions 
this would be first step to a manifesto pledge to take 
all schools out of LEA control. However, these 
measures were not included in -the Nursery Education 
and Grant Maintained Schools Bill published in 
88 It proposed the creation of a new statutory body, the Funding 
Agency for Schools (FAS), to be responsible for funding and 
auditing all GM schools, and in some circumstances for providing 
either alongside or independent of LEAS sufficient school places 
for an area. Hence LEAS will lose, incrementally, many of their 
statutory functions as the FAS assumes its planning powers. This 
was confirmed in the 1993 Education Act - another significant 
centralisation. If 75 per cent of secondary or primary school 
pupils in an area- are educated in GM schools, the unaccountable 
(except to the Secretary of State) FAS effectively takes over all 
planning functions. 
89 By October 1995, of about 24,500 schools, 1,081 in England were 
GM, 16 in Wales and one in Scotland. Momentum was greatest 'in 
academic year after 1992 election when 555 schools voted to opt- 
out in parental ballots. 
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January, prompting speculation that Gillian Shephard, 
the Education and Employment Secretary (the 
departments had been merged in 1995), had resisted the 
measures. There were reports of ad eveloping rift 
between Shephard and the Prime Minister, given the 
iatter's desire to increase the pace of reform (the 
nursery voucher scheme, GM schools, and the schools 
sports initiative) . Shephard was seen to favour a 
focus on improving standards. 
The issue of the over -prescriptive nature of the NC 
returned. In July 1991, the chairs of both the NCC 
(Graham) and SEAC (Philip Halsey) suddenly left their 
posts, and were replaced by, respectively, David 
Pascall, former member of Thatcher's Downing Street 
Polcy Unit, and Lord Griffiths, former head of the 
Policy Unit and chairman of the CPS. The new 
appointments were more ideologically compatible with 
the Government's aims. Griffiths in particular shared 
the desire, ' continued by Major after Thatcher, to 
simplify the NC back to its original conception. In 
1993 the NCC and SEAC were abolished and replaced by 
the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA), 
under Sir Ron Dearing. Though Dearing was not a new 
right figure, the Dearing Report (1994) sought to 
simplify, and promised a moratorium on further 
detailed curriculum changes until 
. 
2000, representing a 
move away from the framework for an attainment target 
curriculum. Further, tests for five-year-olds were 
delayed until September 1998. 
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In the 1996 Education White Paper, the potential for 
selection was proposed to be increased in LEA (to 20 
per cent), GM (to 50 per cent) and CTC schools (to 30 
per cent), enabling in effect 'grammar school 
streams', and GM schools being allowed to open sixth 
forms and offer boarding places without formal 
approval. Yet there would be no more money for a 
grammar school in every town, (in Major's phrase), and 
a stated rejection to the re-introduction of the 
, eleven-plus', implying this as a largely 
presentational project, at least for the time being. 
Proposals to grant all state schools greater devolved 
powers (up to 90 per cent of their budgets, leaving a 
further reduced role for LEAs) were left, possibly to 
wait until after the election. It appeared that these 
proposals were formulated to embarrass Labour rather 
than being based on research on what admissions 
policies work best, or a strong support for the 
policies amongst voters. However, in December 1996, 
the Government was defeated in committe stage in the 
Commons on the expansion of GM schools, and in January 
1997 it appeared to lose the vote on the floor of the 
House. Despite the latter being a miscount, the clause 
was lost. 
In December 199G the Government published its white 
paper on education and training for 14-19 year-olds, 
including a proposal for paying state secondary 
schools by exam success and increasing competition 
between schools (DfE 199G). It was thought that a 
voucher system for post-1G education would be included 
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in the Conservative election manifesto, despite the 
difficulties the introduction of a voucher scheme for 
nursery education had encountered. Chris Woodhead, 
Chief Inspector and head of OFSTED, became 
increasingly visible and was accused of supporting the 
new right agenda. 90 
Dearing's report on education and training for young 
people, publicised widely in spring 1996, suggested a 
national framework at four levels (GCSE, A Level, 
General National Vocational Qualifications renamed 
Applied A Levels, and National Vocational 
Qualifications), and applied and vocational courses 
open to 14-year-olds who were becoming disaffected 
with school. Though praised widely, there were some 
fears (particularly from local authorities) that the 
option of early school-leaving might in effect 
dismantle comprehensive education. 91 Less surprisingly, 
it was supported strongly by the right, -some of whom 
called for an end to compulsory education at 14.92 In 
February 1997, the Government announced plans for 
reform of the A-Level system - the increased use of AS 
90 Woodhead (1996), in a pamphlet for the new right-wing think- 
tank Politea, questioned the need for LEAs. He had suggested 
previously that there were 15,, 000 incompetent teachers in 
schools, questioned the link between class size and quality of 
teaching, and campaigned on standards' against 'progressive 
teaching methods'. 
91 'Early School-Leaving Idea Dooms Comprehensives', The Guardian, 
8th March 1996. 
92 Lord Skidelsky, chairman of the Social Market Foundation (, Call 
to End Compulsory Education at 14', The Guardian, 21st June 1996) 
suggested a means-tested voucher scheme, and Alfred Sherman (, Why 
Raising the School Leaving Age was Wrong', The Guardian, 
Education, 12th March 1996). 
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exams, reduction in the number of boards, and exam 
league tables at seven and fourteen as well as eleven, 
sixteen and eighteen as part of the project for 
'parent power'. 
5.8 Summary 
There are two apparent ironies to the educational new 
right. The first is that despite their desire to 
depoliticize education, they have highlighted its 
political importance. They may have lamented that 
(O'Hear, p. 35,1991): "Education is no longer seen as 
an end in itself, but rather as an instrument of 
social engineering. " Yet their projects came to seem 
like efforts in social engineering themselves. The 
second is that despite claiming to be interested in 
, standards, freedom and choice,, their real project 
was to marginalise other projects in education, and 
secure their own for the 'market society'. Hence these 
are not ironies at all, once it is accepted that the 
new right's project to Idepoliticizel and promote 
%standards, freedom and choice', were discourses to 
aid this fundamentally political project. In the terms 
of discourse analysis, the new right articulation 
represented the attempt to enforce a closed model, but 
this antagonism revealed the limits of objectivity 
with regard to education. As part of its project, the 
new right appropriated some popular-democratic 
interpel lat ions, including those of citizenship, even 
though the results were corrosive of citizenship. 
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Because of the failure explicitly to implement a 
voucher scheme, and the persistence of a state-funded 
system, it is sometimes suggested that the new right 
has not achieved much influence in education. 93 This 
interpretation of the ERA suggests the opposite. The 
purpose of the educational new right was not the means 
(vouchers, a national curriculum), but. the end - 
reinforcing the market society' via education. Hence 
the ERA can be regarded as marking a fundamental 
breakthough. Citizenship in education is turned from a 
public towards a private good (Englund 1994, Gutmann 
1987). There is no necessary incoherence in the ERA. 
Though the previous educational settlement should not 
be regarded as a post-war golden age of citizenship in 
education (Ranson 1988), the ERA certainly represents 
its subversion. 
93 For example, Cockett (p. 308-9,1994). 
280 
Chapter Six 
The Conununity Charge 
6.0 Introduction 
The Community Charge (CC) was justified by the 
Government as an initiative designed to empower 
citizenship, in the form of greater public 
participation in and control over the mechanisms of 
local democracy, expenditure and services. It would 
abolish the supposed inequities of the rating 
system, make local councils more responsive and 
accountable to their electors, and provide "badly 
needed protection, for business ratepayers via a 
uniform business rate. It was designed to solve the 
historically difficult problem of local government 
finance and democracy, and its relationship to 
central government. Aside from turning into the most 
notorious example of policy f ailure in contemporary 
domestic British politics, it also represents a 
valuable case study in Thatcherite citizenship. 
6.1 Policy Outline 
The Local Government Finance Act 1988 (LGFA) 
contained three main reforms - the change from 
domestic rates to a flat-rate Community Charge (with 
limited rebate system), the introduction of a 
uniform business rate, and change to the central 
government grant system. The charge element is the 
main focus here, though the cumulative effects of 
the. two other reforms are noted. 
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6.2 Policy Process' 
To understand fully the development of the CC, it is 
necessary to place it within the context of previous 
attempts to reform local government finance, 
beginning in the 1970s. 
After having proposed new structures for local 
authorities, the Heath Government set up a review of 
funding, which led to Peter Walker's Green Paper 
(DoE 1971) . While this did not propose a new local 
tax, it did discuss a number of possible reforms. It 
recognised the deficiencies of rates (little 
relationship to ability to pay, and- non-paying 
earners) and discussed brief ly (and dismissed) the 
notion of af ixed surcharge for each earning non- 
householder - it would raise relatively little and 
be administratively costly. 







the Layf ield Report recommended retaining 
and business rates and. introducing in 
a local income tax. 2 Layfield (p. 72,1976) 
the inherent weakness of local 
bility: 
3- This is an account which draws upon the most recent and 
authoritative study 'by Butler, Adonis and Travers (1994) as 
well as Crick and van Klaveren (1991), Stoker (1991), Thatcher 
(1993), Baker (1993a), Ridley (1991), Lawson (1992), and in 
particular, John Gibson's work (1987a, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b, 
1989a, 1989b, 1990) which had been predicting since 1985 that 
a 'poll tax' would be a disaster in terms of political, 
popularity and local government accountability. 
2 The Layfield Committee was set up to review the whole issue 
of local government finance in the wake of the hostile 
response to rating revaluation, which, as well as the 1974 
structural reorganisation and redistributed local tax burdens 
led to large rate increases (30 per cent on average). 
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"Effective control of expenditure cannot be ensured 
I. na system where local accountability has been 
seriously weakened, unless central accountability 
provides that control. Centralisation of expenditure 
decisions is the inevitable end to which a system 
depending on high and increasing grants, and 
associated with an inflexible and politically 
sensitive local tax, must lead. There is an 
alternative - namely to revive local accountability. 
Local councils would be responsible to their 
electorates for both the expenditure they incurred 
and the revenue they raised and, above all, for 
increases in either. It need not be incompaýible 
with the government's proper concern over the totals 
of local expenditure. " 
Enlarging the share of local taxation in total local 
revenue - the alternative - was the only way to 
'sustain a vital local democracy, (Layfield, p. 300- 
1,. 1976). Hence a local income tax was proposed. A 
flat-rate charge was not considered seriously as a 
rep lacement for the rating system (and only 
mentioned when the 'problem, of the earning non- 
householder was discussed, p. 163, ibid). It was 
thought regressive, easy to evade payment of, 
administratively costly, and would not be justified 
by increased accountability. But there were no 
significant developments from the Report. 3 
3 The Government response was a weak Green Paper (DoE 1977), 
proposing only a move to capital valuation for domestic rates 
and the replacement of the 'needs' and 'resources' grant of 
the rate support grant with a single unitary grant (eventually 
realised in the 'block grant' reform in 1981), but neither 
were enacted because of the loss of the Parliamentary majority 
after 1977. 
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Within the Conservative Party, there was increasing 
disenchantment with the existing system of local 
taxation. As a result of the rise in council 
spending, rates raised less local revenue and 
central government grants more. The October 1974 
manifesto had promised the abolition of domestic 
rates, and a local income tax was seen as the most 
plausible replacement. By 1979, the abolition 
commitment had been weakened because of the promise 
to reduce direct taxation. In 1975 a policy group 
chaired by Keith Speed was established, and Mrs 
Thatcher had made it clear that she preferred a 
local sales tax as the replacement. 
After 1979, with Michael Heseltine as Secretary of 
State for the Environment, central government 
support for local authority spending was reduced, 
and successive initiatives were introduced to reduce 
local government spending. The new block grant 
system included penalties for authorities which 
spent over their 'grant-related expenditure'. But 
local authorities failed to cut spending to match 
cuts in their grants. This marked the beginning of 
the growth in intense conflict between central and 
local government. This was not wholly the result'of 
the ideological imperatives of Thatcherism. 
Political reaction against the rates increased as 
they rose rapidly with local authority spending (and 
the rise of the 'new urban left, after 1981), 
decreasing central government grant and recession 
and unemployment. Pressure grew within the 
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Conservative Party to deliver on the 1974 pledge to 
abolish the rates. 4 
6.2b Alternatives to Domestic Rates 
The Government's response was the Green Paper 
Alte. rnatives to Domestic Rates in December 1981 (DoE 
1981). Its significance here was its discussion of a 
flat-rate charge on the same basis as the familiar 
options of local income tax, sales tax and property 
taxes (Butler et al., p. 29,1994). It admitted a 
flat-rate charge was technically feasible, but hard 
to enforce. It was conscious of the negative 
connotations of using the electoral register as a 
basis for liability, but a new register would be 
expensive. 5 It scored well on some of the Paper's 
criteria (perceptibility, close financial control 
and suitability for all tiers of government). Also, 
it recognised the important 'problem, of the earning 
non-householder from the start (Butler et al., p. 32, 
ibid). 6 
At the same time, there were other outings f or some 
form of flat-rate charge. In 1980 a Conservative 
Political Centre pamphlet (Heddle 1980) suggested a 
poll tax would enable a direct contribution to be 
4 For example, in December 1981 Sir Hugh Fraser's Rating 
System (Abolition) Bill, introduced under the 10 Minute Rule, 
gained support from all sides of the Party. 
5 According to reports at the time, the Home Office was 
particularly effective in arguing against because of the civil 
liberties aspect (Robin Pauley, Financial Times, 17th 
December, 1981). 
6 It noted (DoE, p. 1,1981): "-dissatisfaction with the way 
in which local people contributed to the cost of local 
services through the present system of domestic rates. Some 
domestic ratepayers believe that they pay too large a share of 
that cost, pointing out that other people who are not 
householders are not required to pay rates at all. " 
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made by earning non-householders to the cost of 
local services, but be regressive, difficult to 
administer, and a low revenue-raiser. Sir John 
Grugeon (then leader of Kent County Council), who 
had been influential in Party policy groups during 
the 1970s, advocated a poll tax in a letter to the 
Financial Times in 1981 and proposed it (plus a 
rebate scheme and nationally set business rate) at 
the conference of the Rating and Valuers. Association 
in Torquay, to improve accountability. 7 Madsen Pirie 
(President of the Adam Smith Institute) wrote an 
article in The Daily Mail in October 1981 which 
proposed a flat-rate charge. 
More comprehensively, Christopher Foster8, Richard 
Jackman and Morris Perlman from the London School of 
Economics published Local Government: Finance in a 
Unitary State (1980) gave greater intellectual 
respectability to a poll tax. This can be seen as 
the source of many of the arguments later used to 
justify the charge. The reason for the rising 
proportion of grant financing local expenditure was 
the reluctance to give local authorities any other 
tax source, combined with their rising expenditure. 9 
This reduced the price of local services to the 
7 Pinancial Times, 26 November, 1981. 
8 Foster's ideas were known to DoE officials (Crick and 
Klaveren, p. 412,1991), and he was later -invited to serve as 
an assessor to the key departmental studies team which 
produced the CC. 
9 Also Jackman, chapter seven, 'Local Government Finance', in 
Loughlin et al. (1985) - lack of accountability was the main 
cause of high spending, and if local autonomy was to be 
revived, the extent of redistribution in local government 
services would need to be reduced, with local authorities 
charging for more services. 
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domestic ratepayer, and weakened the 'electoral 
discipline on expenditure'. Redistribution was an 
unsuitable activity for local government. The 
authors argued for the restoration of the 'benefit 
principle, - that people contribute according to the 
benefits received, as opposed to according to 
ability to pay - which had been eroded. The value of 
property was inadequate as a guide to the amount of 
services - benefits - received. Hence (p. 165, ibid): 
"One of the criteria for a good tax to finance local 
expenditure is that it should be a local tax and 
there should be a close link between the expenditure 
undertaken locally and the tax collected locally. 11 
Local citizens should be free to express preferences 
for higher (or lower) levels of service - than in 
other locales, but without claim on the general 
taxpayer. To finance beneficial services (p. 233, 
1980): "The most efficient tax is a poll tax.. The 
main disadvantage of such a tax is that it off ends 
against common perceptions of equity while not as 
efficient as a specific charge. " Ultimately, they 
proposed a local income tax as a full replacement 
for rates (rather than as in Layfield a partial 
replacement) . 10 
The Treasury opposed a local income tax, Heseltine 
disliked a poll tax, and a sales tax was considered 
10 Further, Foster and Jackman (1982) argued that weaknesses 
in local accountability (non-voting ratepayers especially 
local businesses, the variation in domestic marginal 
contribution, non-ratepaying voters, and disproportionate 
benefits) would disable attempts to reduce local authority 
expenditure. Some voters would vote rationally for higher 
rates. It was impossible both to protect those on low incomes 
f rom having to pay rates, and at the same time to have a 
financial discipline bearing upon low-income voters. 
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impractical. Hence despite the intention to ref orm, 
the rates proved resilient again. This led to rate- 
capping rather than abolition emerging as the 1983 
Manifesto commitment. . 
The newly-established. 
Environment Committee of the House of Commons used 
the Green Paper as a basis f or its own examination 
of the issue (Environment Committee, 1982), which 
again rejected a poll tax. 
6.2c Rates 
The Government's White Paper Rates (1983) rejected a 
f lat-rate charge on the grounds that it would be 
difficult to enforce, expensive and complicated. 
Without a rebate scheme it would bear harshly on 
people with low incomes. It concluded that the 
rating system had to stay. Patrick Jenkin replaced 
Tom King as Secretary of State for the Environment 
after the 1983 General Election, in what become an 
increasingly fraught period. The Rates Act was 
passed in 1984 and rate limitation was imposed for 
the first time in the 1985-6 financial year. Local 
authority spending was still increasing, and 
expensive legal challenges were being brought by 
councils. 
6.2d The Department of Environment Review 
The summer of 1984 was the crucial starting-point 
f or the charge as a serious option because of the 
state of local government (Butler et al., p. 44, 
ibid). " There was increasing resentment in local 
13- The anarchy' in local government included the running 
battle over plans to abolish the GLC and metropolitan county 
councils, embarrassment for Jenkin over the defeat of his 
paving bill to cancel the council's elections in 1985 in the 
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government and both main parties. Senior DoE 
officials decided there should be a detailed review 
of the grant system. On Sunday September 2nd in a 
Chequers meeting, and then at Number 10 on 27th 
September, Jenkin presented his case for a full 
departmental review of local government finance 
(announced at the Party conference of that year) . 
12 
There was likely to be greater internal and external 
pressure anyway for significant action on the 
rates. 13 
The crisis over the revaluation in Scotland f inally 
galvanised the Government into action. Revaluations 
that had been postponed in England in and Wales in 
1978 and 1983 had by law to proceed in Scotland, and 
led to substantial increases in rates payable by 
households in larger owner-occupied homes and by 
some smaller businesses (this impacted on 'natural' 
Conservative supporters and produced a considerable 
outcry) . It gave the review greater urgency, aided 
by the conversion of Willie Whitelaw. and George 
Younger, Secretary of State f or Scotland. 14 This led 
to the Government announcing transitional relief for 
House of Lords and the July 1984 financial settlement with 
Militant-dominated Liverpool council. 
12 Lawson objected to a review, Keith Joseph and Nicholas 
Ridley supported one (Baker, p. 114,1993a). Jenkins had 
persuaded the Treasury against Lawson's wishes to abandon 
expenditure targets which had become inexplicable, but the 
Treasury still wanted to retain rates. Thatcher (p. 646,1993) 
was 'cautious' since it could raise unmeetable expectations, 
but after the Conference (Chequers, 28th October) was 
convinced of the inadequacies of rates (p. 646, ibid). 
13 In August, the Audit Commission (1984) published a critical 
report on the block grant redistribution system. 
14 Peter Riddell pointed at the time to Whitelaw's key role in 
convincing the Prime Minister of the need to quicken the 
decision on reform, Financial Times, 28th March, 1985. 
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rate-payers in the short-term, and the abolition of 
domestic rates in the long-run. Having promised to 
abolish rates in Scotland, it became diffigult to 
resist their abolition in England and Wales. 
Ministerial control over the review was passed f rom 
Jenkin to two junior ministers, Kenneth Baker, 
Minister of. State, and William Waldegrave, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary. Terry Heiser, DoE 
permanent secretary after 1984, pushed for external 
experts as assessors. Lord Rothschild, Leonard 
Hoffman, Tom Wilson, and Christopher Foster were 
chosen (these were involved from November 1984 to 
August 1985). 15 Foster, one of the authors of Local 
Government Finance in a Unitary State, was the only 
one with specialised knowledge of local government 
finance, and brought in knowledge of the feasibility 
of a poll tax and ' the importance of the 
accountability problem' . While he did not . push 
immediately for a per capita tax, he was pivotal in 
providing justification for one. 
The terms of reference of the review were local 
government finance and structure (at first) with the 
aim of increasing accountability. Two ideas guided 
it:. if local electors were informed of the true cost 
of their local authority (which the complexities of 
responsibility at the present stopped) , they would 
15 There were also several DoE officials - Roger Bright, John 
Smith, David Lewis - and other civil servants - Jill Rutter 
f rom the Treasury, and Don Brereton f rom the DHSS, and Peter 
Owen, Heiser's Under- Secretary. They worked under Anthony 
mayer, an assistant secretary. David King (1984) an academic 
economist from Stirling University was appointed to work -with DoE officials from February 1987. 
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seek to influence its spending decisions through the 
ballot-box, and if all electors received a bill, 
accountability would work properly (the spectre of 
the earning non-householder again) . 16 According to 
Baker (p. 116-7,1993a): "The review group identified 
three main possibilities for reform: to change the 
structure of local government; to increase central 
control by the Treasury; or to design a system that 
would improve local accountability. They opted for 
the last proposal, and from this the community 
charge developed. All the possible ways of raising 
money locally were looked at. " 
Another aspect of the accountability question was of 
particular concern to Foster - inconsistencies 
caused by the grant system and non-domestic 
contributions to the rates. The review accepted his 
earlier proposal - setting local authorities, grant 
entitlements each year and nationally fixing a 
uniform non-domestic rate. This would make sure the 
full impact of marginal changes in local authority 
spending would be reflected in the local taxation 
system (Foster and Jackman 1982). 
Each of the main alternatives to rates came to be 
unacceptable. Politically, it was not possible to 
have reduced national income tax and then introduce 
a local income tax, and the others (property and 
sales taxes) would not have satisfied the 
accountability criteria. Given the review's decision 
to focus on promoting accountability, to make -sure 
16 Butler et al. (P-51, ibid), also Thatcher (p. 644,1993), 
Baker (p. 115,1993a). 
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the full marginal effect of changes in a council's 
spending should fall on local taxpayers, and solve 
the problem of voting non-payers (Butler et al., 
p. 58, ibid), then (Crick and van Klaveten, p. 405, 
ibid) "Christopher Foster apparently told 
Waldegrave that-the poll tax was probably what they 
were looking for. "17 
By the end of 1984, a per capita tax was considered 
but only as a supplement to the rates. By March 1985 
it moved to being a possible replacement (Butler et 
al., p. 56, ibid). Partly this was justified because 
the nature of local services had changed, from being 
provided primarily for properties, to people and 
personal services (Baker, p. 118,1993a, Ridley, 
p. 120,1991). 
By January 1985, three clear policies had emerged: 
the (Foster-Jackman) national non-domestic 
rate/fixed grants, a poll tax as supplement to 
rates, and the creation of unitary authorities. They 
were all seen to promote accountability. 18 
17 Also, the prospect of a normal rating revaluation 
threatened. By completion, the revaluation gap would have been 
fourteen years: "Margaret was also clear about the dangers of 
revaluation, and at one early meeting she said, 'We can't have 
,a revaluation 
in England, it would wipe us out"' (Baker, 
p. 116, ibid). 
18 The system would force local authorities to make public 
decisions to increase the charge figure each year, rather than 
revenue rising automatically each year with inflation and 
growth, as with a sales or income tax: "It was this aspect 
that most appealed to Oliver Letwin and John Redwood, the two 
members of the Downing Street Policy Unit who acted as go- 
betweens with the Waldegrave team and the Prime Minister" 
(Crick and van Klaveren, p. 406, ibid) . Redwood was rather 
sceptical', Letwin 'extremely keen', and kept chivvying the 
Prime minister. 
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even with Thatcher's approval was not inevitable. 
Lawson was the most notable opponent. While he 
accepted the national non-domestic rate, he rejected 
the charge on political grounds - he thought that it 
would have disastrous effects, and prefered a 
reformed rating system (Lawson 1992). 21 Baker now 
took personal charge of the project. 
The Scottish Conservative conference May 1985 was 
dominated by the rates question and the amount of 
relief available for the revaluation (Kelly 1989) . 
Younger announced reform plans for Scotland in his 
speech. After this public commitment, the first 
Cabinet committee met on 20th May. In September 
1985, Baker replaced Jenkin as Secretary of State, 
Waldegrave from Under-Secretary to Minister of 
State, which reinforced progress. By autumn 1985, it 
remained only for the Cabinet committee to approve a 
specific reform of the rating system, and Baker was 
anxious to have it agreed by the Party conference. 
At the Cabinet committee meetings on 23rd September 
and 3rd October, Baker won endorsement. The charge 
would start at E50 per person in the first year and 
run in parallel with a reformed property tax (with 
the poll tax element raising 70 per cent of local 
income), but Lawson managed to retain Treasury 
capping. B aker and the DoE felt this would undermine 
local accountability (Butler et al., p. 85, ibid). 
on the same day as the Chequers meeting stated 'Poll tax plan 
to ease rates', 31st March, 1985. 
21 The Treasury was proposing instead that central government 
should take over responsibility for financing education. Its 
concern was that the charge would give local government a tax 
base which weakened Treasury control (Baker, p. 125,1993a) . 
But Lawson's objections were dismissed. 
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The next major development was the meeting at 
Chequers, on 31st March 1985.19 Soon after a limited 
airing of the study team's ideas at the Capital 
Hotel on 3rd February, they had decided for an 
(either partial or full) poll tax. At Chequers, the 
plan was for the charge and a modernised property 
tax to replace domestic rates, with the charge 
element to gradually take an increased share (it was 
estimated that E140 per adult would be enough to 
fully replace domestic rates). Here, rather 
inaccurately given the work of the review, it was 
said that the charge was born (Thatcher, p. 648, 
1993). Though concerned about the number of gainers 
and losers, she was attracted to the discipline it 
would impose on local authorities (Baker, p. 122, 
1993a) . They would be severely restrained by their 
own electors using comparisons between areas, and 
Conservative authorities would gain electorally 
(Ridley, p. 15,33,1988). The unpopularity and 
visibility of such a regressive tax (now dubbed 
'resident's charge') would be used to work for 
central government's aims. Local authorities would 
have to, use it in order to spend beyond their 
centrally-determined allocations. 
Waldegrave was the first to be convinced that a 
simple poll tax was the best answer. 20 But progress 
19 Nearly half of the Cabinet were there (Whitelaw, Jenkin, 
Younger, Nicholas Edwards (Welsh Secretary) , Douglas Hurd 
(Northern Ireland Secretary) , Leon Brittan (Home Secretary) , 
Peter Rees (Chief Secretary to the Treasury) , and Lord Young 
(Minister without Portfolio) , Party Chairman John Gummer and 
junior Scottish'Office Minister Michael Ancram. 
20 Baker (p. 118-9,1993a) however still envisaged that it 
would come in at a low level (E50) and run alongside rates for 
a period of up to ten years (, dual-running'). The Sunday Times 
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It was agreed to publish a Green Paper in the new 
year. Younger pushed for Scottish legislation before 
the 1987 General Election, and wanted to take out 
the property element. Baker decided to wait for 
England and Wales (p. 125,1993a) Drafts of the 
Green Paper circulated in autumn 1985 Pcommunity 
charge' was now used). During October and November, 
it became clear that the introduction of a new 
property tax just to raise 3 per cent of local tax 
income would be expensive and unpopular, so rates 
should be kept and gradually phased out, with a 
safety-net to limit transfers between north and 
south in the first years. The Green Paper was 
approved by Cabinet committee E(LF) on 12th 
December, 1985. 
6.2e Paying for Local Government 
On January 9th 1986, for the first time the full 
Cabinet discussed and approved formally the reforms. 
The Green Paper was published on 28th January 1986. 
There were four main parts. The centrepiece was the 
replacement of domestic rates. Non-domestic rates 
levied by local authorities on commercial and 
industrial properties were to be replaced by a 
National Non-Domestic Rate (NNDR), set each year by 
the government, collected on the basis of a single 
common rate poundage, and reallocated to local 
authorities by central government on the basis of 
their adult populations. The introduction of the 
NNDR was to be accompanied by a revaluation of all 
commercial and industrial properties. There was to 
be a new system of central government support to 
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local authorities, with Revenue Support Grant (RSG) 
replacing the Rate Support Grant, allocated on the 
basis of Standard Spending Assessments (SSAs). 22 
Last, there was a new system of capital spending 
controls, giving government the power to make 
credits approvals to local authorities to cover 
their capital spending needs (but taking into 
account capital receipts available to local 
authorities) . 
23 
The paper gave three main reasons for abandoning the 
existing system - the malfunctioning of the grant 
system, the extent to which local authorities, 
marginal spending was funded by non-domestic 
ratepayers, - and the mismatch between those who were 
entitled to vote in local elections, those who 
benefited from local services and those who paid 
domestic rates. The existing ýources of local 
authority income - non-domestic rates, domestic 
rates and central government grant - encouraged weak 
accountability. It was impossible for local electors 
to relate what they paid to the services provided, 
and consequently authorities would increase spending 
on services for the voting domestic ratepayer 
22 SSAs are the assessment of spending that would be required 
to provide a common standard of service across all 
authorities, determined by the government in the light of 
economic and other circumstances. The assessment is built 
around separate major service blocks and is refined for each 
authority by a formula containing factors reflecting the 
physical, social and demographic characteristics of the local 
authority and relevant to the costs of providing the service 
concerned. 
23 This measure was later blamed for causing higher capital 
spending by local authorities in 1989/90 in order to spend 
their receipts before the new system was introduced in April 
1990. 
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largely at the expense of the non-voting, non- 
domestic ratepayer (DoE, paragraph 1.32,1986). The 
reforms would (DoE, p. 9, ibid): 
". guarantee the continued existence of a healthy 
system of 1-ocal government. It should reduce the 
tension between central Government and local 
authorities. In the longer term it should help to 
ensure that services are provided more efficiently. 
And it strengthens the link between the local 
authority and those who live in the areas. "24 
Local domestic taxes were judged according to three 
criteria - technical adequacy, fairness and (most 
importantly) local democratic accountability. The 
familiar alternatives - rates, local income tax and 
local sales tax -f ailed to spread the burden of 
local taxation more widely, and provide a clear link 
between changes in expenditure and the local tax 
bill. The new system would ensure (p. vii, ibid) : 
". local electors know what the* costs of their 
services are, so that armed with this knowledge they 
can influence the spending decisions of their 
24 more prescient commentators noted faulty logic. Gibson 
(p. 44-5,1990) : "The Green Paper is guilty of making 
assertions about voting behaviour and presenting them as 
truths.. The assertions amount to maintaining both W that 
non-ratepayers are at least as, and probably more, active 
voters in local elections as full ratepayers and (ii) that the 
60% of the local electorate who literally make no direct rate 
payment put much greater emphasis on their zero direct payment 
of a rates bill than on the rate bill paid in their 
household. " Not only does this appear not to provide any 
reason why local authority spending does not just keep rising 
and rising, but it is empirically deficient (Miller, p. 232, 
1988): "Almost universally it is rich taxpayers who turn out 
to vote more readily than poor non- taxpayers. " Rate changes 
did have an important role in local elections (1988). The 
Widdicombe Committee (paragraph 2.78,1986a) found that 94 per 
cent of all electors thought of themselves as rate-payers. 
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councils through the ballot-box. " Everybody would 
pay regardless of income, but a system of rebates 
for the less well-off would continue. 25 
There was a long period of consultation (January to 
October 1987). Local authorities reacted 
unfavourably, most favoured the retention of 
domestic rates. The Queen's Speech in autumn 1986 
announced Scottish legislation for that session, -the 
Bill was brought forward and enacted in time for the 
General Election. In May 1986, Baker was moved to 
Education and Science, and replaced by Nicholas 
Ridley (from Transport). 26 Towards the end of 1986, 
the transition time was cut down from ten years to 
four, a compromise between Ridley's argument for 
three and the Treasury's for five, but this can be 
seen as logical given the supposed advantages in 
accountability. In Scotland, where Malcolm-Rifkind 
had replaced Younger as Scottish Secretary, 
officials became increasingly worried about 
implementation problems (and derived 'solutions' 
which were used in England and Wales, Baker, p. 127, 
1993a). The Abolition of Domestic Rates Etc. 
25 Everybody would pay at least 20 per cent but benefits would 
be raised in line with the average cost of this minimum 20 per 
cent figure. The reason for this figure was that: ".. Norman 
Fowler had already decided that his Housing Benefit changes 
would require every ratepayer to contribute at least 20 per 
cent towards local rates, thus scrapping the 100 per cent 
rebate" (Baker, p. 121,1993a). It was decided later against 
Baker's wishes (p. 127, ibid) that 20 per cent would be levied 
on students. 
26 Four months after Ridley's appointment, the junior 
ministers changed. Waldegrave was replaced by Rhodes Boyson as 
local government minister (replaced later by Michael Howard), 
and Christopher Chope made under-secretary. After 1987, 
Charles Brearly and Neil Summerton became civil servants in 
charge of legislation and implementation. 
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(Scotland) Bill was the last maj or measure 
introduced into Parliament before the 1987 Election 
(it received its House of Commons second reading on 
9th December). Two significant Government amendments 
were made. The phasing-in period (April 1989 to 
March 1992) was scrapped it would now come into 
force in April 1989. Further, individuals, rather 
than the head of the household, became liable for 
their own tax. 
officials at the DoE were urging an end to the 
(administratively complex) dual running, and Ridley 
realised it would diminish accountability (Butler et 
al., p. 108, ibid). Heiser and Brearly pushed for an 
immediate change-over, Ridley agreed. The Cabinet 
committee agreed to a transitional period of four 
years and an initial charge of E100 (announced 
months later, on 30th July 1987). But the 1987 Party 
Conference reopened the issue - there was 
overwhelming support for the new tax, and some calls 
for its immediate int roduc ti on. 27 In Cabinet 
committee, Howard and Ridley pushed this, while 
Lawson argued against. Thatcher sided with Ridley. 
On 17th November 1987, Ridley announced that the 
charge would be introduced in most places without 
dual running, except in areas spending E130 or more 
per head above needs assessment where there would be 
27 Baker (p. 129,1993a) reveals that Gerry Malone, one of the 
most vocal speakers against dual-running at the Conference: 
".. now says he was encouraged to do this not by Ministers in 
the Department, of the Environment but by Leon Brittan. Nick 
Ridley, shortly before his death, strenuously denied that he 
had arranged the intervention. However, Nigel Lawson was in no 
doubt whatsoever, and he believes that the Conference debate 
was rigged. " 
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four years of transition, as well as changes to the 
saf ety net (many Conservatives felt these would 
effectively subsidise "high spending, Labour 
authorities). 
6.2f Legislation 
The Local, Government Bill for England and Wales was 
presented to Parliament on 16th December 1987. The 
second reading of the Bill on 16th and 17th December 
19.87, saw the beginning of the long Parliamentary 
battle (Raison, p. 156-9,1990). The focus of 
objections was the flat-rate charge. There was an 
attempt by over 40 Conservatives to obtain a debate 
on an instruction to the standing committee on the 
Bill that it should examine the desirability of 
linking the charge to the ability to pay (this was 
ruled out of order) . 28 The Bill was defended along 
familiar lines, particularly the linkage between 
those using, paying and voting for local services. 29 
17 Conservatives voted against the Government, more 
abstained. The Bill went into Standing Committee, 
guided by Howard, then back to the f loor of the- 
House for the Report stage. There, on 18th April, 
there was the battle over the Mates amendment. 30 
28 A scheme had been evolved in conjunction with the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy by which the 
charge should be levied at different rates for different bands 
of income. 
29 House of commons, Parliamentary Debates, 17th December, 
1987. 
30 This was 'a new banded scheme made possible by the recent 
Budget. For those who did not pay income tax, the rate would 
be half the normal level (they would also still be eligible 
for rebates). Those on the standard rate of tax would pay the 
standard charge rate, and those on the higher rate would pay 
50 per cent above the standard charge. The Government began to 
argue (bizarrely) in itýs defence, against the principle of the 
local fairness and accountability of the charge, that the new 
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Just before the debate Ridley announced more 
generous rebates, claiming they would reach 9 
million people, a blow to Treasury attempts to 
reduce housing benefit. The Government defeated the 
Mates amendment by more than it had gained at the 
Second Reading (36 Conservatives voted for the 
amendment) . 31 In the -Lords (at report stage) , dual 
running was finally done away with by a Government 
amendment (on 30th June 1988). The Government 
obtained its Bill in essentially the form it wanted, 
and the Local Government Finance Bill received Royal 
Assent on 29th July, 1988. 
During summer 1989, three factots exacerbated 
tensions - Conservative backbenchers became 
increasingly angry about the safety nets, rising 
inflation was undercutting the local government 
financial settlement, and the first detailed 
predictions of the effects of the charge on key 
marginal voters and households were made (Butler et 
al., p. 137, ibid) . This increased pressure on the 
Treasury for more money - the package announced on 
19th July 1988 included additional local authority 
grants of f-2bn. Immediately after the July 
settlement, Chris Patten replaced Ridley as 
Environment Secretary and David Hunt replaced Gummer 
as local government minister. Apparently, Patten 
realised immediately that the level of grant for 
local government for 1990-1 was too low and that 
system was fair because most local authority 'revenue was 
derived from progressive national taxation and so higher 
income taxpayers would still be contributing more. 
31 The Government had obtained a second Reading by 341 voted 
to 269, and defeated the Mates amendment by 320 to 295. 
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estimated charge levels were not realistic (he 
demanded an additional E2bn) , but this brought him 
into conflict with Lawson. Patten eventually got 
EI. 2bn over three years, but realised disaster could 
not be averted. 
In November 1989, ministers made an announcement of 
what each local authority should levy if keeping to 
the SSA set by government. The average charge per 
head in England and Wales was estimated to be E278. 
The aim was to put pressure on local authorities to 
meet this target. But in early 1990 local 
authorities began to announce intended charges. 
Labour-controlled authorities were on average 36 per 
cent above, Conservative-controlled 31 per cent 
above. The party political advantage was largely 
blown. Many Conservative councillors complained that 
their SSAs were gross underestimates. Only 3 out of 
39 county councils in England were able to set 
budgets at or below Government guidelines despite 
the majority of such authorities being under 
Conservative control. The impact of their precepts 
pushed up bills sent out by many district councils. 
Remedial measures were adopted - the phasing-in 
system for local authority revenue support was 
altered, and in October 1989 a scheme of 
transitional relief to households was announced. In 
addition to the established rebate system, this 
provided further help to some low-income households 
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who faced a major increase in their bills compared 
to the rates. 32 
6.2g Implementation (1990 Onwards) 
There were five main -stages to the disastrous 
implementation (Stoker 1991). First, local 
authorities proved themselves willing to challenge 
Government spending guidelines in the run-up to the 
1990/1 fiscal year. 33 The Government lost the 
propaganda battle, especially with regard to the 
administrative costs of reform which it had 
miscalculated. 34 It received the blame because it 
had directed public attention towards the E278 
figure whilst at the same time introducing a grant 
settlement which guaranteed that nearly all local 
authorities would fail to achieve it. Public opinion 
polls signalled the increasing unpopularity of the 
reform. Small businesses protested against 
substantial increases due to the revaluation 
accompanying introduction of, the NNDR. Transitional 
measures were adopted. The Secretary of State for 
the Environment's response to higher charges set by 
local authorities was to invoke powers contained in 
the LGFA to cap the charges of twenty authorities 
32 Baker (p. 135,1993a) : "The problem was that every Eibn of 
extra grant would only reduce individual community charge 
bills by about E30. ' We had created a monster whose appetite 
was insatiable. " The Downing Street Policy Unit considered 
more rebates, taking education expenditure out of local 
government, and large increases in central government grants, 
but these were rejected by then Treasury Chief Secretary John 
Major (Butler et al., p. 147, ibid). 
33 Ridley attacked Lawson for failing to provide sufficient 
central funds to underwrite the first year of implementation 
('Lawson Killed My Baby,, The Times, 27th March, p. 16, ). 
34 This was unforgivable given the Government's huge media 
campaign for the charge (Deacon and Golding 1994, Golding 
1992). 
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who he f elt were overspending (def ined by af ormula 
as authorities whose budget exceeded its SSA by 12.5 
per cent and E75 per adult). None of these were 
under Conservative control, although a number of 
Conservative authorities had exceeded -targets by 
more than capped authorities. At a cabinet . meeting 
on 5th April, Thatcher apparently proposed universal 
capping for all local authorities, but Patten and 
Major opposed this and pointed to practical 
difficulties (Baker, p. 137, ibid). Capping amounted 
to an admission that one rationale of reform - that 
it would impose sufficient restraints on local 
authority expenditure to make central government 
intervention unnecessary - had failed. In mid-April, 
Patten created two committees of ministers and civil 
servants from the Treasury and DoE in order to 
examine options for reform. They considered 
universal capping, a mor6 generous rebate system, 
and giving the Audit Commission the power to limit 
local authority spending. A Cabinet committee was 
set up to discuss the proposals from these 
committees, which Thatcher chaired. 35 
Second, the May 1990 Local Elections were 
disastrous. In some cases, the increased 
participation worked to the Government's advantage - 
Wandsworth and Westminster increased their 
Conservative majorities - but generally the 1990 
35 This committee included Patten, Hunt, Major, dohn McGregor 
(Education Secretary), David Waddington (Home Secretary), 
Malcolm Rifkind (Scottish Secretary), and Peter Walker (Welsh 
Secretary) (Butler et al., p. 160, ibid). 
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results confirmed the charge's massive electoral 
liability. 36 
Third, further damage limitations exercises were 
launched. Patten, Secretary of State for the 
Environment, was privately highly critical of the 
political consequences of the charge, but led the 
damage limitation exercise aided by Michael 
Portillo, who was appointed to oversee the review 
and replace Hunt as local government minister. The 
Prime Minister was not prepared to abolish or 
radically restructure it, and the administrative 
costs were against these. In July 1990, additional 
Government support (approximately E3 billion) was 
provided to underwrite local authority spending, the 
cost of the inter-authority safety-net and increased 
general funding to , local authorities; (implicitly 
accepting the actual budgets of councils in 1990/1 
as a baseline, despite the previous criticisms of 
high spending in the first year), which would 
hopefully help down the increases in charges for 
1991/2. In addition there were a range of measures 
aimed at easing the burden on particular groups and 
individuals. Around E30 million was available 
through an extended and- enhanced system of 
transitional relief, increased* benefits to low- 
36 Ivor Crewe (1990) wrote at the time: "The tax does appear 
to have increased local accountability, making the elections 
the most genuinely local in living memory. Turnout exceeded 50 
per cent, equalling the post-war record. Swings varied 
markedly between and within regions. " Similarly, The Economist 
(12th May, 1990) - "Judged by its first outing in England and 
Wales the poll tax could yet achieve the principal aim for 
which it was designed.. It does look likely that the poll tax 
was taken by a sizeable number of voters as a reliable guide 
to the efficiency and competence of the local. council. " 
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income households which f aced ma'ssive increases in 
the changeover, and local authorities were required 
to present their bills in a way that made clear how 
much of the charge was due to each tier of local 
government. The financial discipline the reform was 
supposed to impose, and the direct relationship 
between paying for and receiving a service, was 
undermined further. The Government now claimed that 
one in four charge-payers would have some reduction 
in the amount to pay. Political survival was 
paramount. 
Fourth, problems of collection from April 1990 
onwards proved considerable. Many local authorities 
faced considerable non-payment, especially charge- 
capped authorities with particular problems. Last, 
in the wake of Thatcher's fall from the leadership 
the death of the CC was announced on 21st March 
1991. Heseltine, as the new Secretary of State for 
the Environment, adopted two new strategies. In the 
short-term, he sought additional money to cushion 
the impact in the financial year 1991/2, via 
additional targeted funds being found. In January 
1991 the Government announced 4 revised system of 
relief (the 'Community Charge reduction scheme'), 
again targeting primarily households particularly 
hit by the transition. Local authorities were to be 
forced to use the extra grant to reduce proposed 
bills by approximately E140 per head, but it emerged 
that those in receipt of benefit under the reduction 
scheme would not receive the full f: 140 discount. 
This was rushed through Parliament and created 
administrative chaos. In the long-term, to maintain 
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the charge was, no longer a viable option. In a 
parallel announcement to abolition, spending 
responsibility for further education and sixth form 
colleges was taken away from local authorities, seen 
to indicate the Government's need to shift more of 
the burden from local to central government (this 
removed E2.2 billion from local authority budgets) . 
In May 1991, legislation was introduced to extend 
capping powers to all local authorities including 
those with budgets of less than E15 million. 
6.3 The Commýinity Charge and the New Right 
The above account of the policy process does not 
appear to reveal any noticeable new right influence, 
and this is supported by the other analyses637 It is 
the case that the significant new right publications 
arguing for a poll tax were not published until the 
DoE review was under way, and the above account of 
the development of the charge shows that other 
factors were important in forcing a reform of local 
government. finance to be made. However, the new 
right did contribute to the case for change.. 
Mason (1985) in an Adam Smith Institute study argued 
that the rating system encouraged fiscal 
37 Crick and van Klaveren (1991), Butler et al. (1994), and 
Stoker (1991), for whom the new right supplied only 
, ideological window dressing'. However, Butler et al. (p. 72, 
ibid) also suggest confusingly: ".. is not to say that the pro- 
poll tax lobby was unimportant, still less that the motivation 
of Whitelaw and the others was unideological. All the 
ministers involved agreed on the same overriding priority: to 
reduce the rates burden on Tory supporters quickly, and to do 
so without increasing income tax. The poll tax appeared the 
ideal vehicle for the job, and the fact that it did owed much 
to the popularisation of the idea in Tory circles by the ASI 
and others. " 
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irresponsibility . 38 This increased urban dereliction 
and unemployment by driving out industry and 
commerce to less highly-rated areas. Hence (p. 22-3, 
ibid): ".. a per capita tax [E180 per head] has such 
manifest advantages that it merits more serious 
consideration than it has, to date, been given. It 
shares the burden equally. It is directly related to 
the council which levies it. -Its yield is clearly 
predictable. In addition, a per capita tax would 
have the enormous advantage over all other forms of 
taxes, in that it would involve everyone in paying 
for the services they had chosen through the ballot 
box. The two-thirds of voters who currently enjoy 
immunity from the consequences of their electoral 
actions would no longer be able to exploit the 
ratepaying minority. " Again, the issue of non-paying 
voters was central (p. 44, ibid) : 11. these proposals 
provide the basis on which a substantial measure of 
autonomy could be restored to local government in 
the secure knowledge that the non-voting r4tepayer 
could no longer be penalised to pay for the 
profligacy of ambitious or partisan local 
politicians.. " 
In April of the same year, Forsyth (1985) in a 
Conservative Political Centre pamphlet (which 
Tackman) 39 obviously drew on Mason, and Foster and L 
38 An earlier ASI study - Omega Report, Local Government: 
Policy, published August 1983 (Mason was among the 
contributors) had referred to a 'simple per capita tax' and 
proposed new powers for local referendum on rate reductions, 
compulsory competitive tendering, the abolition of the GLC and 
six metropolitan county councils, new transport authorities, 
and direct central funding of education and police forces. 
39 Indeed, Crick and van Klaveren (p. 407,1991) claim that 
Mason 'drafted' Forsyth's pamphlet. 
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reiterated the familiar arguments for a flat-rate 
charge. Also, Taylor (1985) in a Centre for Policy 
Studies pamphlet argued the case for a 'residents 
tax' on all adults (alongside rates), producing a 
greater incentive tolvote and awareness of the costs 
of local government. 40 Commercial ratepayers should 
be given a second vote in local elections, and the 
block grant phased-out, allowing cuts in income tax. 
All these arguments-were remarkably similar to those 
used by the review team and the Government, and 
derivative of Foster and Jackman's analysis. 41 
However., a broader discussion is needed to show how 
the CC was inf luenced profoundly by the new right. 
The charge was highly ideological. This does not 
seek to deny political contingency, since the reform 
process could easily have been derailed at many 
points. 42 13Ut the new right constructed the purpose 
40 Taylor was GLC Deputy Opposition Leader and member of the 
Advisory Panel to Baker, then Minister for Local Government. 
41 Gibson (p. 41-2,1990): "The Green Paper can be interpreted 
as taking the earlier analysis of Foster and Jackman of 
discrepancies between the marginal cost of services provided 
and the cost of or benefits received from services. to its 
logical conclusion. Fundamentally, it was such discrepancies 
which led to weaknesses in local accountability according to 
both Foster and Jackman and the Green Paper. " 
42 These included: the scepticism of two of the four outside 
'assessors' in the DoE review (Wilson and Hoffman), Lawson's 
continued rejection, the May 1985 CIPFA report analysing its 
distributional impact (Hale 1985), Gibson's research (1987b, 
199o), the rejection garned during in 'consultation' period, 
worries over implementation at the Scottish office, a leading 
member of the Institute of Revenues, Rating and Revaluation 
warning of the extra costs (Longden 1986), CIPFA1s (1986) 
hostile official response, the campaign in Parliament by 
Conservative backbenchers to modify it (beginning with Sir 
George Young's group of sceptics, Heseltine's ominous warnings 
of the 'Tory tax', Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams, committee stage 
attempts to reduce the weight of local spending it would have 
to bear by nationalising expenditure of education, police fire 
and civil defence, the Mates amendment, the repeated self- 
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of the reforms in local government, and more 
specifically the need for some mechanism which would 
solve its 'problems, of accountability, 
representation, and the role of local government. 
First, the new right constructed a general macro 
level picture of local government and its 
relationship to central government concerns. Public 
expenditure had to be reduced, and many of the 
services provided by local government were on the 
front-line. Local 'overspending, was merely a 
symptom of the general deficiencies of the social 
democratic welfare state. Consequently it encouraged 
the maximisation of local choice, accountability and 
fiscal management, welcoming variation in choice and 
standards (King, chapter 10, 'The New Right, the New 
Left and Local Government', Stewar. t and Stoker 
1989) . It draws on the 'Tiebout hypothesis' (1956), 
which suggests that for each unit of local 
government there is a natural 'optimum community 
size, pertaining to the efficient allocation of 
services toward which all should strive. The size 
will be achieved as a consequence of individual 
consumers searching to find which community suits 
their needs best. Such Pvoice', and particularly 
'exit') rational behaviour forces local government 
to be cost-efficient in its provision of services 
and to maintain a prosperous (low-tax) local 
economy. Whether or not an accurate analysis of 
local citizenship, as King notes politically this is 
delusion over charge levels, and the experience in Scotland of 
early stages of implementation. 
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appealing to the new right because it promotes 
inter-regional inequality by imposing costs on local 
authorities who pursue redistributive policies. 
Local government becomes concerned with liberal 
political economic allocative efficiency, not social 
justice. 43 
This vision for local government can be seen in much 
new right literature. Nicholas Ridley (1988) 
sketched out the 'enabling not providing' local 
authority, achieved by the privatisation of assets, 
the introduction of 'market discipline, into service 
delivery, and the encouragement of private and 
voluntary services. The new right identified 
correctly how local democracy was illusory because 
local autonomy was limited severely by its reliance 
on central grants and ineffectively accquntable 
local tax system of its own (Seldon et al. 1980) . 
Public choice-derived analysis claimed to show the 
'disproportionate, influence of pressure groups 
(Pirie, p. 11, Butler and Pirie 1981): "Each service 
provided creates its class of beneficiaries which 
sees itself as a distinct interest groups and will 
campaign for its privileges. The taxpayer and 
ratepayer, by contrast, are a more amorphous mass, 
not acting as a self-conscious interest group-" 
Charging for local services would increase 
efficiency, erode the influence of interest groups, 
43 Peterson (p. 37,1981): ".. efficiency in local government 
promotes city (capital] interests. [The] closer any locality 
moves toward this ideal match between taxes and services, the 
more attractive its land becomes. It is thus in the interest 
of local government to operate as efficiently as possible. 
operating efficiently hardly means operating as to enhance 
equality. " 
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reduce the dependence on central government, and so 
revitalise local democracy (Harris and Seldon 1976, 
Institute of Economic Affairs' evidence to the 
Layfield Committee). 
This type of local government would stop the 
, threat' from the local left. 44 This form of local 
'democracy' would not allow a platform for citizens 
on broader issues of social and political 
inequality, only efficient provision of services 
(MacGregor 1988). Many moves were made in stripping 
away the direct functions of local authorities.. 45 
The charge was to be the central mechanism to secure 
this vision. 
Other studies, most notably Foster, Jackman and 
Perlman (1980) and Foster and Jackman (1982) took up 
new right priorities with regard to local government 
and provided more complete diagnoses. The particular 
construction of the problems of local government - 
the weakening of electoral discipline on 
expenditure, inefficient provision of services, and 
irresponsibility of the earning non-householder - 
were given intellectual respectability beyond the 
taint of polemicism. They came to dominate the 
Government's thinking. But only the new right, 
44 Another CPS pamphlet by David Regan (1987) identified the 
local left with four principal characteristics -a readiness 
to flout the law, involvement in issues well beyond the 
responsibilities of local government, - a politicisation of 
career officials, and use of local government as an instrument 
of radical social engineering. 
45 in particular there was sustained lobbying activity by the 
Adam Smith Institute and Conservative MPs Michael Forsyth and 
Christopher Chope for privatising/contracting-out local 
government services. The Local Government, Planning and Land 
Act 1980, and Local Government Acts in 1988 and 1992 have all 
extended compulsory competitive tendering. 
312 
having constructed the problem of local government, 
had the will and imagination to seek to solve it. 
Part of this imagination was provided by the 
insights of public choice analysis, which had 
emphasised that orthodox democratic arrangements 
were very poor predictors of citizens, 
preferences. 46 
Second, and more specifically, these new right- 
constructed principles and assumptions were 
incorporated into the work of the review from 1984-5 
which eventually developed the charge. They aimed to 
f ind a way to increase local accountability. They 
were guided by this notion of the weakness of local 
accountability and the importance of all local 
electors receiving a tax bill f or its enhancement 
(here again, the earning non-householder was a 
problem) . They also thought it important that 
increases in marginal spending would be reflected in 
bills. They rejected a redistributive role for local 
government, implicitly accepted Tieboutian local 
efficiency, and its behavioural assumptions with 
regard to local electors. This was to be the f orce 
which would make the whole mechanism act downwards 
on local expenditure. Otherwise, the reform makes no 
sense. other options for local taxation were 
rejected because they contradicted Thatcherite-new 
right ideology, by either granting local authorities 
too much (especially fiscal) autonomy and 
threatening to raise general tax levels. Indeed, the 
46 Dunleavy and O'Leary (p. 98,1987): "They profess to -be 
mystified that liberal democracies have experimented so little 
with alternative arrangements. " Also Waldegrave (1993). 
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review team came to think of themselves as a kind of 
think-tank (Butler et al., p. 214, ibid) , 'thinking 
the unthinkable, became possible outside the 
traditional policy-making processes, particularly 
with the exclusion for ideological reasons of local 
government representatives (1producerinterests'). 
The extent to which construction of concepts was 
important can 'be seen with reference , to 
'accountability,. The Government claimed that the 
charge empowered citizens by enhancing the 
democratic accountability of local authorities to 
the wishes of local tax-payers. But thýs 
accountability, the key to the reform, had a 
specific and overriding focus - the mobilisation of 
electors around the issue of 'paying for local 
services'. This was premised on market concepts, 
particularly that there should be a close 
relationship between paying and receiving. Further, 
the accountability mechanism was not neutral. There 
was a gearing'effect. All marginal spending (above 
centrally assessed needs) was to fall on the charge, 
and because it was designed originally to constitute 
on average twenty-five per cent of average revenue 
income, the system of accountability was geared. An 
increase in spending of for example one per cent 
would lead to an increase in the charge of four per 
cent. 47 The effect was even worse for those with 
rebates. 48 
47 Stewart and Stoker (p. 3,1988) : "That is not genuine local 
accountability, but distorted accountability designed to 
produce the answer that the Government wants. " Similarly, 
Bellamy (p. 32,1994): ".. the accountability arrived at by the 
government was not so much' that. of local authorities to 
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Ironically though, given the central importance of 
this conception of accountability, in operation it 
was highly defective. Because of the complexities of 
all the reforms, 1990 charge bills bore no obvious 
relationship to 1989 rates bills. An average of 
three-quarters of revenue income was still derived 
from central sources (NNDR and RSG) . With both of 
these undergoing year-on-year changes, 
accountability was further eroded. Further, there 
remained a high level of confusion -and ignorance as 
to the charge, and local government in general. As a 
result, only central government got called to 
account. 
Third, during the legislative process and 
implementation, 'these principles shaped key 
decisions. The central concept of accountability 
inherent in the charge influenced practical 
decisions. The move from dual-running, for example, 
was a logical decision, given that -clear and 
immediate accountability was the aim of the 
reform. 49 This, with other amendments, made the 
charge more radical than in the form first proposed, 
citizens, as that of citizens to the Treasury for -the 
financial costs of the policies they enacted. The extent to 
which the charge was aimed at empowering citizens was 
distinctly limited, therefore. " 
48 Since Income Support covered only 20t of the average 
charge, individuals living in authorities with higher than 
average charges made a net payment from their own income (from 
sources other than the Income Support allocated f or that 
purpose) . This was exacerbated by the large gap which 
developed between actual CC levels and the Governmentl. s 
planned average, which were included in the uprating of scales 
in advance of CC levels being known. 
49 For example, Thatcher: ".. the transition period is flatly 
contradictory to the basic philosophy, so we have got to f ind 
a way through" (Daily Express, 7th September, 1989, p. 9). 
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but more in keeping with its underlying principles. 
As a result, the charge is inconceivable without the 
new right. It represented the opportunity for the 
Government to achieve its national new right aims 
via local 'citizenship' and 'accountability'. 
6.4 The Community Charge and Citizenship 
6.4a Accountability and Participation 
However distorted the accountability mechanism at 
the heart of the ref orm was (and all f orms of 
representation are to some extent designed for 
specific purposes), it depended crucially on the, 
mobilisation of local electors,. In this sense, it 
manipulated citizenship. As suggested, citizenship 
is a concept, not a theory, and can be appropriated 
for different ideological ends in different 
particular contexts. In this case, a limited form of 
citizenship was intended to produce selected 
strategic ef f ects. But it was * still a genuine f orm 
of 'accountability' , in the sense that all forms of 
accountability are ideologically-loaded. The 
operating system would have enhanced a form of 
citizenship, but one which would have deliberately 
marginalised others. Further, it was not 
inconceivable that the mechanism, in making ýan 
explicit link between local expenditure and 
electors' responsibility, could in some areas have 
produced demands for greater spending. 
. 
In a sense, the charge widened local citizenship by 
reformulating the linkage between voting and paying 
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f or local services. -50 However, in another respect it 
narrowed it significantly. Despite Government 
assurances, the charge detered many people from 
registering to vote (one study has estimated around 
600,000) . 51 This represents a considerable erosion 
of citizenship. 
6.4b PoVerty 
Flat-rate charges neglect that both patterns of use 
and benefit vary with income. The distorted 
accountability of the charge ignored deliberately 
that the poor were harder hit by any reduction in 
local spending, but also by significant increases in 
bills. Further, this was likely to be exacerbated in 
deprived areas. Yet the Government claimed 
continually that it was less regressive than the 
rates. 52 Gibson (chapter f ive, 1990) and Bramley et 
50 Thatcher (p. 661,1993): "For the first time a government 
had declared that anyone who could reasonably afford to do so 
should at least pay something towards the upkeep of the 
facilities and the provision of the services from which they 
benefited. A whole class of people - an 'underclass' if you 
will - had been dragged back into the ranks of responsible 
society and asked to become not just dependants but citizens. " 
51 Smith and McLean (p. 240,1994), on the assumption that 
evaders were from social groups disproportionately unlikely to 
vote Conservative, suggested that but for deregistration the 
Conservatives would not have an overall majority in 1993 given 
subsequent by-election losses. It has been Thatcher's personal 
contention that a million Labour supporters had failed to 
register (The Sunday Telegraph, 12th April 1992). Over the 
three year period between 1988 and 1991,, the proportion of 
adults who registered from those eligible to vote fell from 
97.9 per cent to 95.6 per cent, with the decline evident 
particularly amongst young people who had just attained the 
right to vote (Population Trends, 64,1991). 
52 DoE (para. 3.37,1986): ".. at the lowest income levels, 
householders would face lower average bills with a full 
community charge than with 'domestic rates. " Ridley (p. 127, 
1991) : "If the standard tax or charge is set at quite a high 
level, and generots rebates are provided for those with lower 
incomes, the desired result can be achieved. rebated poll 
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al. (1989) have shown that the charge actually had 
the effect of increasing substantially the relative 
benefit shares of upper income gr oups and lowering 
that of - poorer groups, thereby providing an 
incentive for the inefficient underprovision of 
local authority services. The Government assumed an 
over-optimistic take-up rate for rebates, and did 
not include the additional redistribution in favour 
of higher income households which would follow the 
removal of safety nets. The charge introduced a 
substantial inequity between taxpayers in different 
areas because of different non-collection rates and 
because tax rates were necessarily higher in high 
needs areas for equal improvements in services than 
in lower need areas. 53 one further aspect of the 
poverty exacerbated by the introduction of the 
charge was racial. Since the main factors 
determining whether a household would be worse off 
would be the size of the household, its area and the 
type of housing occupied, and that ethnic minorities 
were worse-off in all three respects, it would 
disadvantage them to an - even greater degree (ALA 
19,88). These effects on deregistration and lower- 
income groups further consolidated the 'underclass" 
taxes are the only form of local taxation that can be related 
to ability to pay. " 
53 Further, Esam and Oppenheim (1.98.9) noted that the 
regressive effects were exacerbated by the 1988 Social 
Security Act. Both shared the principle of means-testing 
('targeting'), the supposed empowerment of individuals and the 
reduction of state expenditure. Both narrowed the notion of 
'need' (whatever actual conditions) , and hence widened the 
divide between the 'self-reliant, and responsible, citizen 
who relied on private provision, and the state dependent'. 
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(MacGregor 1991). Given this context, high levels of 
non-payment were unsurprising. 54 
6.5 Thatcherism and Local Government 
". local government found itself embroiled not only 
in arguments about public expenditure but also in a 
wider debate about the appropriate role of the 
state. 1155 
The Thatcher Governments presided over many changes 
in local government, of which the charge was only 
the most notable. Previous measures had reduced 
successively the autonomy of local government. 
Inevitably then, the charge has come to be seen as 
the next measure to further undermine it, if not 
destroy it in effect altogether. However, the above 
account of the development of the policy, the new 
right's conception of local government, and the 
charge's use of citizenship concepts to achieve its 
ends,, suggest a slightly different analysis. It was 
not meant to destroy local government, but transform 
it in line with greater strategic purposes. 
54 It has been suggested that liberal conceptions of political 
obligation, undermined by the tendency to stress the 
individualistic moral autonomy of agents, were inadequate as 
reasons to pay the charge (Bellamy 1994). The liberal- 
individualist reasoning behind the tax weakened the appeals to 
obligation to non-payers, and further it is claimed that since 
the charge did not align properly with the public choice model 
which Bellamy sees as being its ethos, its mechanisms did not 
reflect accurately individual rational voter choices, dissent 
was possible through this perspective as well (though as 
Bellamy admits, this 'probably wasn't, the motivation for non- 
payment for most of the dissenters). 
-55 Gyford (p. 90, chapter four, 'The Politicisation of Local 
Government', Loughlin et al. 1985). This came from the rise of 
local socialism as well as the new right. 
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Local government became a key problematic area f or 
Thatcherism. The Conservatives had an organisational 
dilemma in that to restructure public expenditure 
patterns (more resources to defence, law and order, 
social security, less to housing, education, social 
services) they had to restrict expenditure in areas 
not directly under central ' government control 
(Travers 1986). From the mid-1980s the Government's 
concern about local government became further- 
reaching in its implications, beyond public 
expenditure restraint to a broader attempt at 
restructuring (Stewart and Stoker 1989) . -56 It has 
fragmented local institutions, by-passed directly- 
elected local authorities (and consequently 
political representation, control and 
accountability), via organisations such as urban 
development corporations, TECs, and HATs. 57 
'Efficiency' was to exert a continuous downward 
pressure on the system.. 58 The relationship between 
units of local governance was disrupted. Yet despite 
successes in steadily undermining the functions and 
autonomy of local authorities, the Government was 
56 other measures included the imposition of cash limits 
(particularly public sector pay restraint) , the systematic 
reduction of subsidies to local public services (especially 
housing and public transport) , increased charges for services 
(particularly council house-rents and public transport fares), 
and the erosion of functions (such as the removal of housing 
benefit administration from local authorities in 1982, GM 
schools and others) , the growth of single-purpose non-elected 
bodies (such as Urban Development Corporations), and 
contracting-out services (Edgell and Duke, chapter five, 
'Central-Local Government Relations', 1991). 
57 This is seen as an embryonic form of a new system of 
'government by contract' (Mather 1988). 
58 The revamped Audit Commission forcing efficiency savings' 
can be seen as an attempt to provide a countervailing force to 
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exasperated that the problem of 'excessive, local 
authority spending 'had not been solved. In this 
sense, there was not enough obtrusive intervention 
earlier on such a scale which dealt effectively with 
the issue. 
The principal attraction of the charge to its 
converts was that it offered the possibility of 
ending such obtrusive intervention, breaking with 
the draining repetitive cycle of legislation, while 
retaining a specif ic f orm of central control. 59 But 
it should not be characterised simply as 
', centralising, in line with previous measures. It 
was a new kind of policy approach, which selectively 
undermined the sphere of local autonomy while 
simultaneously capitalising on a revitalised form of 
accountability via local participation. Hence 
although the charge has been shown to be highly 
ideological, it was also meant to be more flexible 
and less explicitly dogmatic than the previous 
measures of the early to mid 1980s. 
The broader strategic aims of Thatcherism in which 
local government became caught-up are analysed later 
[chapter nine]. But the consequences for local 
the budget -maximising tendencies, of local authorities 
(Stoker 1991). 
-5-9 As Ridley wrote (p. 13,1988): ".. what is clear.. is that the 
more effectively and efficiently local authorities operate in 
providing services in an accountable way, responsive to needs 
of their local communities and competing effectively with 
other providers where that is relevant, the less need there is 
likely to be for central government and detailed 
control.. Conversely, where local responsibility breaks down 
there is inevitably stronger pressure for central 
intervention. " Also Rhodes (chapter three, 'Changing 
Intergovernmental Relations', Cloke 1992), the charge 
represented a break from the failed 'bureaucratic command' 
governing code. 
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democracy can be noted here. It had to be made 
compatible with the 'flexible' economic structures, 
the two-tier welfare system and the 'enterprise 
culture' (Stewart and Stoker 1989). of course, the 
charge did reduce significantly local financial 
discretion, and the national uniform business rate 
in effect halved the local tax-base immediately. But 
it is not sufficient to regard the charge and other 
reforms as merely representing the Government's 
desire to cut back public expenditure or roll back 
the state. Rather, it should be seen as a device to 
limit the scope of local democracy, alter the 
behaviour of local electors and representatives, and 
make local government a pillar of the 'market 
society' rather than a threat to it. 60 
A too-benign image of local democracy, should be 
avoided. However, it is also important within this 
argument to understand the way in which it contained 
the potential to threaten the market society, as a 
resource for local pluralism and communal 
responsibility for the relief of poverty. 61 Local 
government, ideally, is a training ground for 
citizenship. 62 This represents the Ilocalist' 
approach, which must logically resist unwarranted 
intervention from central government. But of course, 
60 Indeed, in this conception, given Municipal Toryiam's 
historically consistent strategy for the protection of 
'propertied interests', the new right-led Thatcherite approach 
to local government can be seen to be within the tradition 
though certain strategies changed (Butcher et al. 1990). 
61 Bains Committee (para 2.12,1972): "Local government is 
not, in our view, limited to the narrow provision of 
services. It has within its purview the overall economic, 
cultural, and physical well-being of that community. " 
62 Widdicombe Report (p. 48,1986a), Layfield (p. 53,1976). 
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local government's position is undermined by its 
lack of explicit authority within the British 
constitution, which forces it to justify itself as 
efficient and productive (Widdicombe 198Ga). Its 
role in enhancing citizenship is necessarily made 
secondary. 
This makes the community charge (MacGregor, p. 34, 
1991): ".. a powerful illustration and symbol of 
Thatcherite social policy. It encapsulated the key 
choices faced by contemporary British society and 
politics. As financial and administrative 
instruments, the new rules defied all the 
conventional principles of good taxation and good 
public administration. Rather they were an 
instrument of policy, a tool of social engineering, 
aimed at altering social relationships, ideas and 
values. " 
The charge's purpose was to asphyxiate a particular 
vision of local democracy as many alternative 
centres of power and ideas. 63 of course, it failed 
in implementation, but this analysis may also show 
how it has broadly succeeded in that purpose. First, 
local fiscal autonomy has been substantially 
eroded. 64 -Second, there are no other significant 
63 Sexual politics was used to depict projects for local 
autonomy as 'extremist, and 'dangerous', representing the 
'homosexualization of local government autonomy' (Smith 1994). 
ý4 one legacy of the charge was that the share of local 
government expenditure that was met out of locally-raised 
revenue had increased, hence if rates were re-introduced they 
would be higher than previously. Yet if parts of local 
government expenditure were removed and borne by central 
government, they would have to be funded out of increased 
taxation or cuts elsewhere. The Government's solution was to 
increase central government grants so as to reduce the charge 
by E140, the additional burden on central government met by an 
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competing strategies f or local government (as there 
appeared to be in the first half of the 1980s) . The 
charge may have collapsed, but the market society 
has been reinforced . 
65 
6.6 Summary 
Local democracy has never realised the ideal of 
'participatory education' , but at times it retained 
the potential as an alternative source of power 
(Butcher et al., p. 15,1990): 
"If elected local authorities were as useless as 
some of their critics have alleged, there would be 
little point in bothering to weaken or destroy them. 
It is because they do provide some kind of check on 
the far-reaching plans of the Thatcher Government to 
transform the whole character of Britain's political 
economy, culture and society, and because their 
elective character gives them a degree of legitimacy 
in asserting and maintaining an alternative approach 
to public intervention, that the government has 
taken them on. " 
The charge, a limited form of radical statecraft, 
represented a wholly new attempt to restructure 
local government, and disable this threat. Despite 
increase of 2.5 per cent on the rate of VAT. As a result, 
local government became even more dependent - on Whitehall 
for 
its finances (only 14 per cent of revenue was raised locally). 
The Council Tax raises only 20 per cent of local authority 
revenue (before the charge, the f igure was 55 per cent of net 
revenue in England, 44 per cent in Scotland, 33 per cent in 
Wales),. 
Butler et al. (p. 4, ibid) , the impotence of opponents: 
f lowed, in large measure, f rom. . their inability to of f er a 
convincing alternative vision of the function and funding of 
local government to the one set out by the Thatcher 
government. " 
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its of ten ad hoc and contingent development, it was 
guided by principles constructed highly 
ideologically by the new right. It failed as a 
measure because people concentrated on its 
regressive aspects rather than attempting to use the 
mechanism as the Government intended. Its 
perceptibility, thought a strength by its 
formulatorst turned out to be a weakness, its 
flexibility turned into inflexibility. It attempted 
selectively to use citizens, mobilisation around the 
issue of 'paying for local services', for broader 
strategic ends. - Its 
implicit vision of the future 
was the production of 'popular', low spending high 
'efficiency, local authorities, restrained by 
calculating local citizens. Hence paradoxically, 
citizenship in this form of limited and directed 
participation was designed to produce largely 
passive local government and local citizens, rather 






Thatcherite social security policy has been 
characterised as a steady move away f rom the supposed 
ideal welfare state of universal benefits founded on 
'common citizenship, towards a minimal selective 
market-oriented 'subsistence'-level system' (Flynn 
1989, Alcock 1989b). Social security has been on the 
front-line of the effort to. reduce the state. Yet 
initially, legislation was of a piecemeal nature, and 
frustrated by general macroeconomic problems 
(particularly rises in unemployment). 
However, since the mid-1980s a more strategic reform 
process may be seen to have been followed. According 
to Wikeley (1989), the four main tactics used to 
reduce the role of unemployment benefit have been the 
extension of means-testing, the stigmatisation of the 
unemployed, the extension of disqualifications from 
benefit, and measures which promote industrial 
discipline' against strike action. As a result, the 
role of unemployment benefit has been reduced 
steadily, to the point when two-thirds of the 
unemployed rely on income support. It has been 
suggested by critics that there has been an 
abandonment of the 'social insurance, principle in 
favour of the 'social assistance, principle. 
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Current debate on social security has come to concern 
the development of 'workfare,. These are programmes 
for 'work, which are imposed on benefit recipients as 
a condition of receiving those benefits. Various 
schemes have been proposed over the last twenty years, 
almost exclusively from the (new) right. However, 
elements of workfare have already been introduced to 
Britain since the mid-1980s, in the form of 
Itrainingfare, (the term used by Jones 1996, first 
deployed by Howell 1991), that is under the guise of 
training schemes. 
7.1 Policy Outline 
The move towards such schemes has been made under 
numerous pieces of complex legislation. 
In 1980, the Rayner report questioned the status of 
unemployment as a separate benefit, but noted the 
political difficulties which would occur if it was 
abolished immediately. The Social Security Act (no. 2) 
1980 resulted in the first direct cuts in the levels 
of benefits . since the 1930s. 
It severed the link 
between pension levels and wage levels and cut short- 
term National Insurance benefits by uprating them 
below the level of price inflation. The creation of 
Statutory Sick Pay transferred the support for short- 
term sickness and disability to private employers. In 
1982 the earnings-related supplement was abolished and 
social security taxed. A simple registering system for 
benefit was abolished, and a (lax at first) test for 
availability for work was introduced. In 1983, 
327 
temporary training schemes, such as the six month 
Youth Opportunities Programme, were replaced by the 
Youth Training Scheme (YTS) , designed as a one year 
permanent bridge between school and work for all 
school leavers and the first British universal 
training scheme. ' It was extended to two years in 1986. 
It was a right to training for 16- and 17-year-olds. 2 
From the end of 1983, Norman Fowler, Secretary of 
State for Health and Social Security, announced a 
series of reviews on various aspects of social 
security (pensions, Housing Benefit, benefits for 
children and young people, and Supplementary Benefit). 3 
Neither the evidence submitted nor the reports (except 
one) of the reviews were published, but in mid-1985 
the Government published a Green Paper for the reform 
of social security. 
The Social Security Act 1986 introduced a tighter and 
more detailed availability for work questionnaire, and 
'Restart' interviews every six months. 4 Generally, the 
1 Jones (1986) characterises this period, 1982-86, as the 'new 
training initiative,, but his periodisation of the Conservative 
reforms may imply a greater strategic coherence than actually 
existed, particularly in the early to mid-19806. 
2 YTS was replaced by Youth Training (YT) in 1990, linked 
organisationally to Employment Training. 
3 Fowler claimed these reviews: ".. constitute the most 
substantial examination of the social security system since the 
Beveridge Report 40 years ago. " (Ransard, 2nd April, 1984, 
col. 252-60). 
4 Hill (p. 247, Savage et al. 1994): "The 1980 changes [Social 
Security Act 1980] may perhaps, with the benefit of hindsight, be 
described as a victory for welfare rights. Whilst it did involve 
the elimination of some kinds of discretionary payments it did 
enshrine in regulations rights to many others. In contrast, the 
1986 Act can therefore be seen as a backlash against that 
victory, with rights to additional single payments largely 
eliminated. The success of welfare rights 'take up' campaigns in 
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aim was to divert claimants to 'training, programmes. 
YTS was extended to two. years, and the Job Training 
Scheme introduced. Against industrial action, the 
maximum period of 'voluntary unemployed' 
disqualification from benefit was raised from 6 to 13 
weeks. 5 It renamed Supplementary Benefit as "Income 
Support', introduced a structure which discriminated 
much less elaborately between different categories of 
claimants, replaced specific additions to individuals' 
weekly benefits by a uniform structure of premiums, 
abolished entitlements to single payments and replaced 
it with a discretionary cash-limited Social Fund 
(providing most - 70 per cent - of its assistance 
through loans reclaimable from weekly benefits) .6 
Further, the Employment Secretary commissioned a study 
of workfare in America [7.21. 
The Social Security Act 1988 tightened the eligibility 
rules (requiring 'two tax years contribution, not any 
one year) , and incentives to contract out of SERPS, 
with incentive paid out from the public National 
Insurance Fund. The former measure made it especially 
difficult for women to return to work. In addition, 
means-tested unemployment benefit for occupational 
exploiting the loopholes in the 1980 Act may well have 
contributed to this subsequent backlash. " 
5A subsequent report (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 1994) claimed 
that almost half (46 percent) of the poorest (20 per cent) of 
households, especially the unemployed and people without 
children, were made worse off by the reforms between 1986-8. They 
were supposed to focus state help on 'those in need'. 
6 There are many research studies on the operation of the 
discretionary Social Fund since 1988 which conclude critically 
(for example Becker and Silburn 1990). 
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pensioners was extended to 55 year-olds and older. 
Further, the maximum period of 'voluntary unemployed' 
disqualification raised again to 26 weeks. 
It was suggested that recipients should be actively 
seeking employment, not just available for work. This 
was probably the first time the aim of extracting an 
activity from recipients in exchange for benefits was 
achieved. Young people (under 18 years) had to 
participate in a training scheme, refusal leading to 
loss of benefits. 7 From 1988 onwards, benefits were 
linked more clearly to training allowances (E15 per 
week 'bridging allowance,, for a maximum of eight 
weeks) while young persons waited for a training 
place. In the face of mounting criticism, the 
Government introduced means-tested 'severe hardship' 
payments. 
The Employment Act 1988 extended disqualification from 
benef it to those not participating in or withdrawing 
from training schemes 'without good cause, (the scheme 
did not have to be 'suitable' for the claimant 
anymore). The statutory framework necessary for proto- 
workfare schemes was, to some commentators, thus put 
in place. Additionally, income support for unemployed 
16-18 year olds was abolished, and a YTS place made 
mandatory. 
7 This was estimated to have deprived 90,000 young people from 
claiming benefit (Jones and Wallace, p. 61,1992). The report of 
the Social Services Committee on the 1988 social security reforms 
revealed a 10 per cent fall in income support claimants 
immediately after the introduction of the Act, due to losses in 
eligibility. 
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The MSC was abolished in 1988. This facilitated the 
integration of training programmes with benefits. ET 
(see below) was to be administrated by Training and 
Enterprise Councils (TECs). About ninety per cent of a 
TEC's budget is linked to the number of trainee weeks 
delivered, while ten per cent is related to output, 
measured in terms of '-positive outcomes, into which 
trainees enter after they leave training. Positive 
outcomes are defined to include employment, full time 
education or further full-time training three months 
after training. 
The Social Security Act 1989 enshrined the actively 
seeking work, rule. It required unemployed persons to 
provide evidence at-their Restart interviews that they 
were 'seeking employment actively', by producing 
evidence such as letters and records of telephone 
calls. The 'employment not suitable, rule was 
abolished - the emphasis became the duty to find work, 
even if at a lower wage or in another area. The then 
Minister for Social Security Nicholas Scott stated: 
'".. surely the unemployed person has a duty, as his 
part of the contract, not to sit passively waiting for 
a job to turn up but to take active steps to seek 
work. 118 The Restart 'programme provided an interview for 
all people unemployed for six months, often followed 
by attendance on an 'Options' course or participation 
in a 'Job Club'. Claimants unable to demonstrate this 
were in danger of having their benefit suspended for 
Hansard, 26th January, 1989, col. 134. 
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one or two weeks. Similarly, people who had been 
unemployed for two or more years and refused to attend 
an Options course stood to lose a proportion of their 
benefit for a period equivalent to the length of the 
course. Young people who refused places on Youth 
Training might lose their right to receive income 
support. 9 In addition, the Social Fund budget was 
frozen. 
In 1990, under an amendment to Regulation 22 of the 
1987 Income Support (General) Regulations effective 
from December 17,1990, if a claimant failed to attend 
the whole or part of a Restart Course (normally 
lasting a week) the claimant advisor was able to 
reduce, the income support payment by up to 40 per 
cent. In July, training courses became compulsory for 
those unemployed for two years or more and who 
rejected offers of help at their Restart interview. In 
May 1990, Youth Training replaced the YTS scheme. Most 
16 and 17 year olds could not get Tncome Support, and 
instead the Government guaranteed a place on YT (if 
unemployed, it could be the only way to get an 
income). , 
Employment Training (ET) combined the existing 
training programmes of the MSC and targeted the long- 
term unemployed many of whom had never worked, and 
-9 The harshest clause in the Social Security Bill, which became 
the Act of 1989, was abandoned by the Government. it proposed 
denying unemployed people their benefits if they turned down a 
job of less than twenty-four hours a week. But the Act did reduce 
the time that a claimant could hold out for terms and conditions 
similar to his or her last job to thirteen weeks. 
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middle-aged people made redundant. Participants had to 
attend twelve-month training courses, after which they 
entered work. 10 ET replaced the Job Training Scheme, 
Voluntary Projects Programme and the opportunities 
Training Programme. 
Youth Training and Employment Training schemes 
provided primary on the job training for 360,000 and 
230,000 people respectively at any one time. Claimants 
for unemployment benefits must provide proof of 
involuntary unemployment, demonstrate availability for 
work, must not refuse to take a suitable job opening, 
and must not have lost their job through misconduct. 
After the Social Security Act 1986, those unemployed 
for more than sik months. had to attend Restart 
interviews at Jobcentres, and demonstrate their 
availability to work. From autumn 1990, Restart 
courses became compulsory for claimants who have 
either been unemployed for two years or rejected 
offers of help at their Restart interview. ']Back to 
work, plans are agreed with all people signing on as 
unemployed. There is a systematic following-up and 
reinterviewing of people who do not take a place on an 
employment or training programme when they had agreed 
to do so. An 'advisory interview' takes place after 13 
10 (King, p. 170,1995): "ET was fostered by the changes in the 
social security rules in Acts passed in 1985,1986,1988, and 
1989, themselves complemented by changes in the Employment Act of 
1989. The amendments retain the basic distinction between 
contributory based benefits (paid for fifty-two weeks and 
requiring an additional thirteen weeks to requalify) and means- 
tested non-contributory income support (previously called 
supplementary benefits) consolidated in the post-war Labour 
administration. " 
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weeks of unemployment with selected clients who ar6 
unable to f ind work when their skills are in demand 
locally. 3-1 
7.2 American Versions of Workfare 
The United States has been seen as the source of 
workf are. 12 Burton (1987), the commissioned study, 
noted the high costs associated typically with the 
programmes (suggesting that full workfare could cost 
E850 million in Britain) . Walker (1991) examined how 
the American experience could help the debate in 
Britain. Workfare did not assume a single form, and 
the compulsory work-for-benefit model (a feature in 
the rhetoric of conservative American politicians) - is 
but one element in the plethora of work-welfare 
schemes that have been tried with varying degrees of 
success. 13 He suggests (p. 47, ibid): ".. where 
3-1 In addition the Training Agency experimented with action 
credit', a system in which the long-term unemployed take 
temporary jobs while continuing to receive benefit and seek 
permanent employment. They earn the rate for the job but earnings 
in excess of income support levels are retained and paid 
(together with accrued interest) only when the recipient begins 
permanent employment. Temporary employment can last up to nine 
months at which point, if permanent employment has not been 
secured, earnings are paid and benefit reassessed, using an 
enhanced disregard. 'Excess' payments of income support are then 
clawed back by reducing future benefit income. Participation in 
the scheme , was voluntary. 12 For example, King (1995). He notes (footnote 78, p. 284-5, 
ibid): "That [Norman] Fowler was aware of and studied American 
schemes is widely known. The Employment Secretary visited several 
United States, schemes, including the trumpeted Massachýsetts ET 
Choices program [sic], which he examined in Boston in February 
1988. " 
13 However, it should be noted that American workfare has many 
variants because schemes have had many different goals as well as 
institutional foundations, and sometimes have developed as 
compromises between those who wish to reduce the role of 
government and bolster individual self-reliance and those who 
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[workfare] does exist it would appear possible' to 
enforce the mandatory components. The majority of 
participants in the work programmes appear to accept 
the nature of the social contract inherent in workfare 
although many opine that employers gain most from the 
system [but] .. the employment and financial gains for 
workfare participants are small.. [mandatory] workfare 
does not generate greater returns to the taxpayer than 
other forms of work-welfare programmes. The 
justification for workfare derives from a set of moral 
values not from financial expediency. " Hence it is 
suggested workfare works best as an ideology. There 
appears to be relatively little support for more 
authoritarian forms of workfare among politicians and 
administrators at local level, either because of 
recognition of the limited real work options available 
or the difficulties of enforcement. "True' workfare, 
that type where welfare recipients are required to 
perform unpaid work with a useful purpose (but not to 
the cost of 'regular' workers) in exchange for 
benefit, account for only a relatively small number of 
schemes. Many variants are possible (p. 22, ibid), 
often depending on assumptions about the job readiness 
of individuals. 
7.3 The New Right and Workfare 
Workfare arises out of, among other things, a concern 
for the duties of citizenship and in particular of 
would prefer to take forward the values of the Great Society 
programmes, against the background of a pervasive antipathy 
towards welfare and overriding commitment to the work ethic. 
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those who receive from the state/community in the form 
of highly-visible welfare benefits. As such, 
neoconservatives have been the main proponents of 
workfare and related schemes. 
7.3a The Problematic Nature of Workfare 
Given the arguments criticising the state welfare 
system from both the neoliberal [2.5c] and 
neoconservative [2.4a] new right, radical proposals 
for reform are thought necessary. This is why workfare 
becomes such an option. 
often, it is assumed that workfare is a divisive issue 
f or the new right, despite being having been promoted 
by sections of it. For neoliberals there is the 
problem of the cost of such schemes and the level of 
government intervention necessary, and for 
neoconservatives, if workfare programmes are targetted 
at single mothers, how they may effect the social duty 
of raising children and the presumed 'proper role, of 
women within the household. In particular, having 
spread the notion of the incompetence of state 
intervention, the new right, especially neoliberals, 
would seem to have to suggest that implementing 
mandatory workfare would be beyond the state (Novak 
1987a). The state as the 'employer of the last resort' 
appears to jar with the neoliberal vision for the 
state. 
There are two main reasons why a workfare programme 
would be expensive. First, if real work is being done, 
then the rates of return to labour are likely to be 
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higher than the current level of unemployment benefit. 
Second, the work itself will have to be organised, 
involving direct government intervention, or state 
resources granted to other bodies to do so. Either 
way, it is likely to be more expensive than paying 
unemployment benef it through an existing bureaucratic 
system. Further, if workfare or learnfare was designed 
to include groups such as single parents the 
programmes would be likely to be even more expensive. 
The state would have to provide child day-care 
facilities, or fund others to do so privately. 
As a result, Mead (p. 68,1986) suggested that workfare 
represents 'big government conservatism', not a policy 
to cut back assistance but change the character of the 
help given. To critics *as well, the illogicality would 
seem clear (Hoover and Plant, p. 74,1989) "A state 
which gears its policies to the maintenance of certain 
values will be. a long way from the limited government 
prefigured by Adam Smith and his individualist 
conservative followers. It is not a path that would 
attract the advocation of a neutral stance regarding 
economic behaviour as well as social and personal 
behaviour in a wider context. " 
7.3b Workfare as a New Right Project 
Despite-these difficulties, it also might be suggested 
that the new right might unite around aspects of a 
workfare programme. 14 
14 Genuine libertarians may be excluded here (2.6]. Workfare 
schemes contravene both a minimal role for the state, especially 
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First, neoliberals should not only be regarded as 
proposing low rates of welfare benefit, that is basing 
their reforms on financial incentives. They have also 
reinforced the notion of a clear work requirement. As 
some neoliberals have recognised, the error in the 
financial incentives approach is that it seeks to 
'persuade, people to work but it does not require them 
to. To work effectively,. intolerably low basic welfare 
payments would be necessary. 15 Instead, it is thought 
that a person should get welf are only if he or she 
qualifies for it by being incapable of self-support. 
If a person can earn part of what they need, they have 
an obligation to work to that extent. 16 
Second, a ', successful' workfare programme, from the 
neoconservative perspective, would satisfy the 
neoliberal end of former benef it recipients entering 
low-paid or part-time employment. 
Third, the common interests shared by different 
strands of the new right are complimented by shared 
ideological aspects. I Liberal -conservatism' [2.81, for 
example, particularly in its British hybrid, has been 
concerned with individual morality and codes of 
since any workfare programme would have to be funded from 
taxation, and non-intervention in matters of individual 
behaviour. 
15 Indeed, Friedman (p. 157,1980) has admitted since that a 
negative income tax is not possible. 
3-6 For example, Minford (1983,1984) proposed that as well as an 
increased financial incentive to work (a 'benefit cap' 
restricting unemployment benefit at 70 per cent of the previous 
in-work income), payment of benefit be contingent on accepting a 
job from a 'workfare pool' if no other work is found by the 
claimant within a specified time limit. 
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behaviour as well as limiting state intervention. As 
noted, it has claimed that there is a particular set 
of moral values or personal responsibilities which 
individuals should acquire. In particular, they should 
leave behind 'statism', and orientate themselves 
towards market and civil society-based 'independence'. 
Such an element of the new right might be more prone 
to investigate workfare schemes than isolated pure 
neoliberal or neoconservative strands. 
Fourth, as has been suggested, the new right may be 
characterised as a project in citizenship which paid 
great attention to discursive construction. In 
particular, it may be regarded as a project for a 
closed 'discursive order,, for the 'market society' 
[3.11,9.8d]. If this is accepted, the highly- 
interventionist nature of the new right is recognised. 
An important aspect of the new right project is 
attempting to construct the forms of understanding of 
citizenship, and banish others. An important aspect to 
this has been shown to be the discursive construction 
of the centrality of 'work, to citizenship. 
As a consequence, it is possible that part of this 
project will include an important role for the state 
in 'supporting' and 'nurturing' these forms of 
citizenship. The value of the dependency, theory in 
this project is the distinction which can then be 
drawn between poverty caused by insufficient revenue 
and poverty caused by unacceptable' or 
'inappropriate, individual behaviour. Hence projects 
in workfare, connected to the new right project, may 
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be regarded as initiatives in "surveillance , social 
discipline and order. Typically, as proposed, they are 
not structured and funded in such ways in which they 
might be accepted as genuinely useful re-training for 
the unemployed, or confidence-enhancing measures. They 
are re-integrative in terms of discourses (the 
centrality of 'productive work, to 'genuine 
citizenship') more than they might be actually re- 
integrating in terms of enabling citizens into well- 
paid challenging work. 
of course, some elements within the new right, 
particularly some 'purer, forms of neoliberalism, will 
reject the efficacy of workfare for basic reasons 
(especially cost and the level of state intervention 
involved) . However, -it is suggested here that other 
elements have returned to the issue of workfare 
because it represents a possibly valuable reform in 
the project for the 'market society',. The new right's 
arguments for forms of workfare are worth exploring in 
more depth. 
7.3c Compulsion in Beveridge 
First, it has been suggested by elements of the 
British new right that Beveridge himself recommendeded 
a work test (Green, D. G. 1987, . Howell 1991) and felt 
that the state, in providing welfare, is entitled to 
require certain forms of behaviour in return by 
recipients (Willetts et al. 1987). 17 They have tried to 
17 Beveridge (para. 130,1942): "Men and women in receipt of 
unemployment benefit cannot be allowed to hold out indefinitely 
0 
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characterise Beveridge as a non-egalitarian non- 
redistributioniSt (Davies 1986). 18 
7.3d Plans for Workfare 
Second, the new right has proposed specif ic plans for 
workfare or related schemes. As has been noted, 
Lawrence Mead (198G) is probably the most well-known 
proponent of workfare programmes which seek to '*set 
the standards' for recipients [2.4a] He suggests, 
such is the importance of work (p. 47,1988): '***.. what 
could citizenship mean if it does not, first of all, 
expect the dependent to do more to help themselves ? 
Those who merely make demands on others are not fully 
citizens. " The New Consensus (1987b) report argued 
that all able recipients of welfare should be enrolled 
f or work of the type to which they are used or in their present 
place of residence if there is work they could do available at 
the standard wage for that work. Men and women who have been 
unemployed for a certain period should be required as a condition 
of continued benefit to attend work or a training centre-The 
period after which attendance should be required should not be 
the same at all times and for all persons. It might be extended 
in times of high unemployment and reduced in times of good 
employment; six months for adults would perhaps be a reasonable 
average period of benefit without conditions-But for young 
persoris who have not yet the habit of continuous work the period 
should be shorter; for boys and girls there should ideally be no 
unconditional benefit at all; their enforced abstention from work 
should be made an occasion of further training. " 
18 Parker (p. 29,1984) in a Social Affairs Unit pamphlet agrees, 
but: "It is not however feasible to try and impose a Beveridge 
style work test now. A work requirement only makes sense if there 
are jobs to go to. That is why Beveridge included full employment 
as one of the basic assumptions to his Plan. What he did not 
foresee was that the unemployment benefit he proposed (flat rate 
with dependency additions tailored to meet the basic needs of 
families large and small) would act as a floor for wages, and 
eventually price British goods and British workers out of world 
markets. Experience now shows that the Beveridge Plan, with or 
withodt the work test, contained the seeds of its own 
destruction. " 
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in work, or duration- limited education, or short-term 
training programmes in return for collecting welf are 
benefits. Hence (p. 113, ibid): ".. an effort to work by 
recipients is worthwhile if it establishes throughout 
society the essential notion that an individual's 
benefits are conditioned upon the meeting of social 
obligations. " As a result, it is supposed that the 
poor will be treated with the same dignity and respect 
as other citizens. The community can best help the 
needy by including them in its own productive 
activities, and treating them with the same dignity'. 
Novak (1987b) even proposes that single mothers on 
welfare should be put on workfare programmes. 
In Britain, Conservative MP Ralph Howell has been one 
of the most prominent supporters of a form of 
workfare. Howell (1991) in an Adam Smith Institute 
pamphlet draws on the Swedish ', employment principle', 
and argues that there is a consensus of opinion in 
Britain that people receiving unemployment benefit 
should 'give something back' to the community in 
return for the 'help' (though a simple 'work for 
benefits' programme might meet a great deal of 
political opposition). A politically feasible 
approach, according to Howell, must go beyond the 
workfare principle and provide real jobs, at realistic 
wages well above the basic unemployment rate (hence he 
presumes it could be introduced as a voluntary 
scheme). He suggests such a scheme would also 
inculcate good work habits as well as new work skills. 
Relief work as a last resort against youth 
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unemployment, as in Sweden, might also be a 
practicable programme for Britain and would prevent 
many school leavers from being drawn into the 
dependency culture. Michael Heseltine (1987) suggested 
that welf are recipients should engage in paid work or 
further training as a condition of obtaining benefits. 
The SAU study From Cradle to Grave (Segalman and 
Marsland 1989) discussed with approval the Swiss 
system of welfare in which locally-based workers 
(acting social wbrkers and sources of social security) 
work with welfare claimants to draw up individual 
contracts specifying what the claimant and the social 
worker will do to restore the claimant to 
independence. For Britain, Segalman and Marsland 
proposed the abolition of national rates of relief and 
the localisation of welfare. This would enhance 
accountability, reciprocity and social obligation. 
Again, they focussed on the importance of work to 
'citizenship, (p. 33, ibid) : "The sense of being a 
productive participant in society promotes the 
individual's investment in community life, promotion 
of social order and fulfilment of the norm of 
reciprocity. It keeps the person in touch with both 
material and social reality. Without work, one has no 
tie to the community except perhaps as a low-valued 
dependent. Our freedom to be ourselves depends on our 
work. " Most citizens see welfare as temporary aid, but 
the welfare bureaucracy was accused of constructing 
longer-term recipient assumptions and hence a 'welfare 
apartheid, 
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7.4 The Institutional and Ideological Roots of British 
'Work-Welfare' 
The most incisive studies of the rise of workfare-type 
programmes in Britain have been made by Desmond King 
(1992,1993,1995, King and Ward 1992). King argues 
that Iwork-welfare' programmes have failed to serve 
the needs of many citizens, especially those at the 
margin of the labour market. 1.9 From King's perspective, 
the resilience of liberal tenets (especially narrow 
'independence') and the 'inadequacies of these 
programmes is primarily a result of their political 
origins and the way in which they were 
institutionalised. They emphasise the punitive 
experience of receiving public assistance while 
failing simultaneously to equip participants for 
effective entry into the labour market. They 
prioritise the exclusion of the 'undeserving, from 
public assistance, distinguishing them from 'worthy' 
recipients, and imposing work-requirements on 
beneficiaries. 
To King, the def ining f eLure of British and American 
work-welfare programmes has been the integration of 
the receipt of benefits initially with placement and 
subsequently with the discharge of either work or 
19 King uses the term 'work-welfare' to describe three different 
types of government policy for the unemployed - placement 
policies to marry jobseekers with vacancies, training schemes 
intended to augment skills, and workfare programmes imposed upon 
jobseekers as a condition of receiving benefits. It is the last 
type, 'proper' or full workfare, that this chapter is concerned 
with primarily. 
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training activities, which has. created an 
organisational bias towards the monitoring of labour 
and away from the enhancement of work opportunities. 
The 'work-test' administered through labour exchanges 
distributing benefits had its precursor in the 
', workhouse test' of genuine impoverishment (the 1834 
reform established the principle of 'less eligibility' 
for receipt of assistance) . The integration of job 
placement with the administration of unemployment 
insurance through labour exchanges resulted in 
institutional patterns harmful to placement and 
training. It reinforced the focus upon excluding 
undeserving appplicants. Historically, labour has 
lacked the resources to modify the 
institutionalisation of work-welfare. The system has 
emphasised divisions within the workforce, hierarchies 
based on power in the labour market derived from 
skills (possessed disproportionately by white males) 
and being in work. The the relief image and wc, 3ýk-test 
legacy of the 1930s was not eroded by war. The 
employment service has remained principally the 
reserve of the unemployed. The 'genuinely seeking 
work' requirement (introduced in 1921) undermined 
further the exchanges' placement role and politicised 
them. This 'is the root of the emphasis on "abuse' 
within the system. Consequently, this is important to 
understand why the right-wing offensive of punitive 
workfare programmes has been made possible and why 
other radical initiatives have failed. 
7.5 Aspects of Thatcherite Workfare 
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There is, of course, a natural bias against the 
introduction 6f a workfare programme, given its 
probable cost and political controversy. Typically, 
the more prosperous a state is, and so the more able 
to fund a costly mandatory workfare programme, the 
less willing it will be to do so and instead be more 
content to rely on unconditional benefits. Yet 
significant progress towards such a system has been 
made in Britain. 
The Conservative reforms towards workfare had to be 
incremental, given some perceived public, as well as 
trade union and Manpower Services Commission 
resistance. After the 1987 General Election victory, 
the Government was in the right position to proceed. 
In particular, training policy entailed integrating it 
with social security schemes and minimising costs. The 
first move was to revert to the familiar integration 
of placement and benefit activities (in the form of 
JobCentres) with the ongoing consequences for the 
former. There ate some important aspects of 
Thatcherite workfare which should be brought out., 
7.5a ', Deserving' and 'Undeserving' 
The f irst is that the system as it has developed has 
been focused on identifying the 'deserving' and 
'undeserving, benefit recipients/poor. This is 
difficult to construct in simple terms, so the new 
right and Government have tended to rely on the notion 
of 'actively seeking work,, and most importantly that 
there is a significant section of citizens who are 
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resisting doing so. of course, these discourses have a 
long history (Ditch 1989). 
The Government has drawn on other new right discourses 
in order to reinforce this message. The February 1988 
Employment Training White Paper, for example, 
emphasised the three characteristics of the 
unemployed: low motivation and the erosion of labour 
market incentives by state benefits, as well as skills 
inadequacies. one of the driving concerns running 
through the reforms of the 1980s, and intensified with 
t he acceleration of the strategy in the third term, 
was the fear of abuse, of the system by this section 
of citizens. Hence, as Minister 'for Social Security 
Nicholas Scott suggested: "The principle at the heart 
of the [Social Security Act 19891 . is that the State 
rightly accepts a duty to provide benefit for the 
unemployed under an insurance 6cheme.. the State is 
entitled in return to expect individuals to take the 
trouble to actively seek work.. Both the Government and 
claimants can be active. 1120 
By the end of the 1980s, the benefit system was 
organised to distinguish between 'deserving' and 
'undeserving, applicants. This is why King regards the 
ref orms as representing above all a reversion to the 
basic principles of liberal. work-welf are - they 
emphasise excluding the 'undeserving, and use 
discourses associated with citizenship (rights linked 
20 House of Commons Official Report, Standing Committee F, 31st 
January, 1989, col. 164. 
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to duties) as justification. It is seen as a return to 
the 'genuinely seeking work, policy of the 1920s. 
7.5b The Voluntariness of British Programmes 
The Government have been coy about the 'policing, 
aspects of the programmes, particularly their 
voluntariness. 21 When Employment Secretary Norman 
Fowler argued that benefits would be withdrawn only on 
the basis of a range of evidence (refusal of jobs and 
places on training programmes) and denied that Restart 
interviews constituted af orm of compulsion. 22 But as 
King (p. 171,185,1995) has argued: "Despite the 
government's denials, the linkage of training and 
benefits has moved in a work-welfare direction.. ET has 
been linked with the distribution of social security 
benefits, and it enables the government to dovetail 
training programs [sic] with *social security benefits 
to create a work-welfare program not dissimilar to 
American compulsory workfare programs. " The 1988 
21 For example, with regard to the 1987 Social Security Bill, the 
then Under Secretary of State for Health and Social Security 
Michael Portillo argued: %%I entirely rebut the-repeated 
allegation about compulsion. It is true that we are withdrawing 
income support from 16 and 17-year-olds who have left school, are 
not in work and have not taken up a YTS place, but the choices 
for young people are still there. They can btay at school. They 
can go to college. They can, if they are lucky, take a job. or 
they can take the YTS place that is on offer to them. I persist 
in saying, therefore, that there is no compulsion. We are talking 
about the guaranteed option of a place on a YTS and the response 
of the Government and the taxpayer to that new situation. " ist 
December 1987, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons 
Official Report, Standing Committee E, Col. 313. Also Finn and 
Ball (1991). 
22 Parliamentary Debates, Hansard Official Report House of Commons 
Standing Committee F, 21st January, 1988, Col. 639. But, 
according to the Unemployment Unit, the scheme was originally to 
be compulsory (Working Brief, November 1989). 
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Social Security Act makes participation in a YTS 
scheme virtually compulsory since refusal to 
participate* or leaving a scheme without "good cause' 
can result in the loss of benefits. Further, the 
entitlement to supplementary benefits for 16-18 year- 
olds who have been guaranteed a YTS place was removed. 
Part II of the Employment Act (1988) disqualifies from 
receipt of benefits persons withdrawing from training 
schemes without "good cause' . In the post-ET period, 
the switch to the system of income support (under 
which claimants receive a basic rate of benefit to 
meet regular weekly needs with premiums added for 
families, single parents, pensioners, the long-term 
sick and those with disabilities) complements those 
measures requiring participation in the Youth Training 
programme and disqualifying from unemployment benefits 
for six months those persons leaving a job voluntarily 
(King, p. 170,1995). 
Further, the reintegration of Jobcentre placement work 
(including Aestart interviews) with unemployment 
benefit offices, effected by returning the former to 
the Department of Employment in 1988, enables them to 
perform a traditional work-test role. In this sense 
they have resumed their historic policing function, 
certainly felt by claimants. 23 
23 "The experience of compulsory Restart interviews has shown that 
the interview programme has had little success in placing people 
into jobs and that a significant minority of claimants have 
experienced 'creeping compulsion, to participate in schemes or 
otherwise leave the unemployment register. " Working Brief, 
Unemployment Unit, August/September, 1991, p. 5. 
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7.5c Marginalising Political Conflict 
In other respects, the reforms to the system help 
circumvent the governing problems encountered 
previously. TECs are unthreatening devolved 
authorities, unelected and dominated if need be by the 
centre, comparable with GM schools [chapter f ivel or 
the new right ideal of local government [chapter 
Six] . 24 King (p. 239-40,1992) has also suggested that 
TECs represent another example of the American 
influence on Thatcherite policy, because they are 
modelled on the American Private Industry Councils. 
Further, it should be remembered that the whole 
concern with youth, and the riots and civil 
disturbances of the early 1980s in particular, were 
the starting-point for the Thatcherite initiatives in 
the form of training schemes and educational reforms 
of the mid-1980s (Finn 1987). The fear of a 
disaffected, potentially massively destructive, youth 
must have provoked many of the initiatives of the era. 
7.5d Comparison with America 
Yet it is not necessary to see the ref orms so far as 
being weaker versions of American workfare. Since as 
has been noted, American schemes very rarely embody 
'pure' workfare, British programmes now may be seen to 
go beyond them in terms of compulsion. Walker (p . 25, 
49,1991) suggests: "In some respects the current 
combination of employment and social security policies 
24 Also Farnham and Lupton, 'Employment Relations and Training 
Policy', Savage, Robins and Atkinson (1994). 
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places Britain further along the road towards workfare 
than many states in America-Moreover, it is not 
without significance that responsibilities for 
training and benef it administration, separated in the 
mid-1970s, have been reunited in the formation of 
Employment Service-Many of the schemes which have 
been experimented with locally in the United States 
are available nationally in Britain. " This might 
surprise the neoliberal sceptics who had presumed that 
the state could not manage such programmes. 
The sheer scale of Employment and Youth Training 
schemes may work against the individualised 
interventions which have been shown to be so important 
in the United States (for example, in monitoring cases 
and outcomes). Further, an important difference 
between the two countries has been that whereas in the 
United States the main target f or such programmes has 
been women, in Britain it, has been unemployed males 
and young single people. But, again, if the projects 
for workfare are regarded as, at least in part, as 
elements in projects for the market society, the 
practical effect of such programmes is in a sense less 
important for their proposers than the discursive 
effect. They identify and marginalise groups of 
citizens in order to reinforce particular discourses 
about behaviour and citizenship'. In an environment 
of greater 'flexibility' in the labour market, it has 
been thought necessary to impose stricter controls on 
non-participants, in order that they will accept the 
same structure of inequalities and 'rules'. 
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These are deliberately narrow. For example, the 
evaluative criteria used of TECs - 'positive outcomes, 
- do not appear to include measures of the quality of 
either the training or the employment obtained, the 
well-being of participants, the nature of the link 
between the training provided and the employment 
actually gained, or the stability of the employment 
entered. 25 They have reduced the cost of 'training' the 
young, *-well below the cost of a 'full, workfare 
programme, favouring low-cost low-grade training, and 
necessarily discriminating against those with special 
needs. 
7.5e Influence of the New Right 
As has been suggested, new right discourses have 
dominated the debate over welfare, and in particular 
benefits for the unemployed. Though 'concern' over the 
'motivations, of the economically- inactive were always 
part of the discourse of the right, from the mid-1908s 
onwards discourses on 'dependency', the 'work-shy' and 
the supposed behavioural deficiencies of the 
unemployed increased. 
As a result, the changes to the social security system 
in general, and to unemployment benefits in 
particular, are thought to have been informed 
signf icantly by new right arguments for minimal state 
welfare, low-wage employment and individual and work- 
based protection (Alcock 1989a, Wikeley 1989, Bradshaw 
in Marsh and Rhodes 1992) . King (1995), of course, 
25 Walker (p. 51-2,1991). 
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regards the enactment of work-welfare programmes in 
Britain as a triumph f or the new r ight, despite being 
mediated by the problem of unemployment and the legacy 
of the post-war framework. 26 It is thought that there 
have been four new right-inspired elements of the 
Governments training objectives: the weakening of the 
trade unions and the apprenticeship system, the 
linking the receipt of unemployment benefit with 
participation in training or work activity, the 
advantaging of employer preferences in the 
implementation of training programmes, and the 
minimising of government intervention to acting only 
in response to unemployment (King 1993). Hence the 
Conservatives have effected a strategic shift away 
from a national tripartite regime to a local, 
employer-dominated neoliberal training one. 
7.5f Thatcherite Workfare and Citizenship 
In terms of citizenship, then, the conclusion is that 
the Thatcherite workfare reforms have been 
detrimental. They *have been marginalising and 
stigmatising. In particular, their effect on the young 
unemployed has been negative. Because leading to an 
increased reliance on parents, it. has been noted that 
(Jones and Wallace p. 78,1992) "While claiming to 
remove state control from the lives of young people, 
26 And further sees (p. 169, ibid) , in the presence of Cay 
Stratton, former assistant secretary of economic affairs for 
employment and training in Massachusetts, in the Department of 
Employment in London, the considerable influence of American 
programmes. Stratton designed the British ET programme which 
integrates the receipt of benefits and training. 
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the 'New Right' are in practice increasing the state 
control of family relationships (and of course 
continuing to maintain power over the young if only 
indirectly via their parents). " Increasingly, young 
people are left in an intermediate status between 
economic dependence and independence. 
7.6 Workfare and Citizenship 
Inevitably, there exists the danger of over-theorising 
the development of workfare programmes. Many of these 
hese initiatives may have been driven by the short- 
term political need to reduce numbers on the 
unemployment register. However, it should also be 
noted that the Government began to realise it had 
greater leeway in reforming the system by the third 
term, after winning elections with historically high 
levels of official unemployment. And, as examinations 
of the remarkable consistencies in such complex 
legislation imply, the system emerging is more 
coherent in terms of its aims than it has been f or 
some decades. 
A full national workfare system would alter 
substantially the nature of the rights and duties of 
citizenship in one of the most important, if not 
central, areas of welfare. The Thatcher Government's 
work-welfare has been marginalising for the already- 
marginalised, thus undermining 'universal membership'. 
But whether the latter was ever established is worth 
criticising. 
7. Ga Post-War Citizenship and Beveridge 
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The reliance on Beveridge as the enshrinement of post- 
war citizenship is problematic. 27 Beveridge was 
significant because he saw social welfare as related 
to ideas about good citizenship, in the sense of a 
particular vision of political and social behaviour 
economic independence, moral virtue, self -discipline, 
active participation in the polity (Harris, 
'Beveridge's Social and Political Thought', chapter 
three, Hills et al. 1994) . He 
desired to protect and 
nurture the ethic of private citizenship, not to 
replace it with mechanistic state provision - hence 
the emphasis on the contributory principle, the 
citizen as 'contributory participant', which is of 
course potentially exclusionary given the emphasis on 
contribution. 28 The assumption that there was a viable 
and agreeable citizenship of work before 1979 which 
has then been eroded steadily is too crude. But, as in 
education and local government, this notion sometimes 
seems to be implicit in left reactions to the reforms, 
and workfare in general. 
27 Cutler et al. (1986), Melling (1991), Veit-Wilson (1992). King 
(1995) suggests that the Beveridgean distinction made between 
contributory, non-means-tested insurance and noncontributory 
means-tested assistance provided the appropriate institutional 
framework for reforms towards a neoliberal minimalist, safety-net 
system. 
28 Glennerster and Evans ('Beveridge and His Assumptive Worlds: 
The incompatibilities of a Flawed Design', chapter five, Hills et 
al. 1994, p. 58) -. "At the heart of Beveridge's thinking was a 
contradictory struggle between his deep desire to cover 
everything and everyone without a means test and his choice of 
method, contributory insurance through employment. He wished to 
give security to all, but to base this security, apart from 
family allowances, on participation in the labour market. Why did 
Beveridge not choose a citizenship basis for benefits ?" 
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7.6b The Left's Response to Workfare 
The lef t has tended to oppose workfare in principle 
and practice. It has been concerned more with the 
creation of ', full employment, and the protection of 
the full array of 'rights, associated with the welfare 
state. A typical response has been to denounce 
workfare programmes for being inherently inequitable 
and hypocritical. They are regarded as increasing the 
regulation of the poor on grounds of moral values' in 
the context of laissez-faire for the more fortunate 
(Hoover and Plant 1989). It is thought even worse that 
it is the notion of "citizenship' (obligations) which 
is used as a cover for this imposition of unfair 
restrictions on rights to welfare, indeed to support 
the notion that benefit recipients in effect 'give-up' 
their rights (King 1995, Pixley 1993). Further, it is 
thought that workfare does not even make sense in new 
right terms. If 'jobs' are to be provided or at least 
funded by the state via workfare programmes, these are 
not then jobs acquired in the normal labour market. 
They are forms of 'make-work' for those who would 
otherwise be unemployed. They cannot 'then enhance 
, independence, or self-esteem, because they do not 
avoid the taint of 'parasitism', the very notion that 
the new right has popularised (Elster 1988) . Without 
suitable macroeconomic conditions, workfare programmes 
designed to re-skill and re-moralise the unemployed 
are doubly hypocritical. Workfare against a background 
of persistently high unemployment is an unjust policy 
against the poor and the unemployed (Plant 1992, 
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Walker 1991). Compulsion is likely to hamper the 
development of more effective welfare-to-work 
measures, in which genuine work is offered (Finn 
1996). 
7.6c The Problem of the Left and obligations 
The left has problems in dealing convincingly with 
obligations [explored further in chapter eight]. It 
tends to be somewhat squeamish about them. The 
preference found towards 'general obligations, belies 
a reticence over details and enforcement. 
Understandably, it has prioritised rights. 
Left arguments which deny the legitimacy of imposed or 
enforced obligations are example of this. 29 But if 
obligations are thought important to citizenship, and 
citizens resist them, on what grounds might they not 
be enforced (accepting of course that the degree of 
their enforcement does not reduce citizenship to a 
status of servitude) ? And if some obligations are 
enforced (such as taxes), why not more specific ones ? 
A too-benign conception of citizenship, it has been 
suggested, may blinker the lef t to regressive uses of 
the discourse [chapter three] , as here. Thatcherite 
versions of workfare, 'legitimated, with reference to 
discourses of citizenship on 'duties' and 
'obligations', are regressive. But this does not mean 
29 For example Pixley (1993) attempts to construct a difference 
between duties, and 'freely assumed obligations'. 'Proper' 
obligations involve choice, which in turn must rely on the 
availability of full rights and employment opportunities. 
Workfare then devalues genuine voluntary work. 
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that more progressive schemes might not be possible. 
It is conceivable that workfare might be justifiable 
from the perspective of discourses of citizenship. 
Whether it is useful in practical terms for the 
unemployed is a different matter, dependent on 
context. Hence the theoretical citizenship 
justification for workfare may be at odds with the 
practical citizenship one. This may be the case with 
regard to the developing workfare system described 
here. 
7.6d Why Not Workfare ? 
Both left and right tend to agree on the importance of 
work for citizenship (only post- industrial. theorists 
might disaggree). The context of the type of welfare 
state system into which the workfare programme is 
incorporated is important. In a 'full' welfare state, 
workfare may be accepted more happily than in a 
welfare state moving to a more punitive and limited 
position, as in Britain. But if workfare programmes 
could be designed and developed which did re-skill and 
re-integrate the unemployed into the kinds of jobs 
they found appropriate, they would seem to be the 
embodiment of measures to enhance citizenship rather 
than undermine it. 
7.7 Further Reforms 
The notion that a workfare system was being introduced 
incrimentally has been vindicated by more recent 
measures. An expression of interest in workfare has, 
as with the educational voucher, become a symbol 
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useful for bolstering an image of Thatcherite 
ideological 'purity'. It is supposed to prove that 
they are willing to solve the problem of the 'abuse' 
of the welfare system. For example, John Major 
suggested in a speech to the Carlton Club in 1993 
(P. 34,1993): "Increasingly, I wonder whether paying 
unemployment benefit, without offering or requiring 
any activity in return, serves unemployed people or 
society well. " Yet underlying this teasing of the 
right, such a system is being established. 
The deliberate shift away from earlier initiatives has 
continued. The number of places for Youth Training 
fell between March 1988 and 1993 from 389,224 to 
274,000, a cut in the budget of E1.5 billion in real 
terms. 30 Employment Action was established in 1991 - 
enabling work experience on projects on benefit plus 
E10, targeted at the six month unemployed. The 
claimant interviewer process was intensified in this 
period, with five compulsory interviews. 
Under Gillian Shephard, Secretary of State for 
Employment, in August 1992 a review was undertaken of 
government spending on anti-unemployment programmes to 
sharpen the linkage between receipt of benefits and 
return to employment. Apparently, workfare was 
rejected, but it was reported that Shephard considered 
a merger of ET and Employment Action to create 
community work projects, imposed on the unemployed. 
Perhaps not unrelatedly, in March 1993 the Government 
30 Hansard, 2nd December, 1994, col. 931, written answers. 
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announced a Community Action programme for the 
unemployed (benefit plus E10 for 60,000 people who 
wish to work part-time). 
On 20th November 1992 Sir Ralph Howell put forward a 
Private Member's Bill on his proposals, which was 
defeated. 31 This was the first Parliamentary debate on 
workfare. But during 1993 and 1994, against the 
background of a high public sector borrowing 
requirement and pressure to reduce expenditure, there 
was a new wave of (new right) attacks on the social 
security system - in partiýular, invalidity, benefits, 
universal schemes, and benefits to unmarried mothers. 32 
At the 1993 Conservative Party annual conference there 
were many attacks on single-parent families, and 
support shown for American schemes which penalised 
mothers on welfare who had additional children. Howell 
himself helped develop a scheme in his North Norfolk 
constituency, followed by other regional workfare-type 
pilot schemes such as 'Workwisel amd 11-2-11 for those 
falling through the Restart net. 
In the 1993 Budget, it was announced that the 'Job 
Seeker's Allowance' (JSA) would be introduced from 
31 Ransard, 20th November 1992. In the debate, David Willetts MP 
suggested difficulties with Howell's scheme, including planning, 
the state's role in the labour market, cost, and the issue of 
compulsion. Patrick McLoughlin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Employment, denied that the Government had plans to 
introduce a compulsory workfare scheme, preferring training or 
education for young people. It was suggested that compulsory 
workfare would unbalance the wage market. 
32 For example, 'No Turning Back' Group (1993), which proposed 
incremental reforms including cutting unemployment benefit from 
one year to six months, leading to private sector programmes for 
the long-term unemployed and a 'whole person' benefit. 
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April 1996 onwards instead of unemployment benefit and 
income-support payments, and available for six months 
on a contributory basis ýrather than one year. After 
six months, the payment would become means-tested. The 
assessment of benefit allowance would be tightened 
further by the 'job seeker's agreement'. Citizens 
receiving benefits would enter into a ', contract' in 
which they agree to a personal work plan to try to 
f ind work as a condition of the payment. The JSA was 
outlined in the Queen's Speech (16th November 1994). 
At the 1994 Conservative Party Conference, Social 
Security Secretary Peter Lilley announced a '-back to 
work bonus' scheme, designed to encourage' 150,000 
unemployed into part-time jobs by offering them up to 
E1,000. People who work part-time while claiming the 
new JSA or income support would build up an 
entitlement bonus. During 1994 there had been other 
reports that harsher benefit regimes were to be 
introduced, and even that a full workfare scheme would 
be included in the JSA legislation. 33 However, though 
significant, the latter turned out to be plans to 
33 'New benefits crackdown on jobless', The Guardian, *7th June, 
1994, based on a verified leaked memo from the Department of 
Employment, an agreement between the Secretary of State for 
Employment and the Chief Executive of the Employment Service, it 
was suggested that tougher new guidelines would be introduced 
quietly to test the availability for work of claimants for hard- 
to-fill -vacancies. New instructions in August 1994 issued to 
benefit offices from the Department of Employment duly doubled 
each Jobcentre's target for the number of people to have their 
benefit stopped for failing actively to seek work, in total 
135,000 people (also House of Commons official Report, Standing 
Committee B, 24th January, 1995, col. 4. ) Further, 'Jobless face 
'work or no dole' Bill', The Observer, 31st July, 1994. 
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pilot workfare schemes directed at those out of work 
for more than two years, rather than a uniform 
national scheme. The schemes would be run by the 
Employment Advisory Service instead of local 
authorities. 
The Jobseekers, Bill was issued on 2nd December 1994, 
introduced jointly by Peter Lilley and Michael 
Portillo (Employment Secretary) but without the 
specific regulations for actively seeking work,. It 
did however include an emphasis on claimant's 
lbehaviourl (appearance, manner) if it was thought to 
militate against them finding work, in the form of a 
'formal direction' rather than. the previous scope for 
employment officers to 'recommend'. Further, they 
would have the power to insist that ', such work 'is 
undertaken as a means of improving the claimant's 
prospects of being employed'. An additional leaked 
brief confirmed the use of penalties (up to six months 
long) for quitting jobs or being dismissed without 
'-good cause failing to attend interviews and 
courses, and breaking a direction from employment 
Staff. 34 The Unemployment Unit reported at the time 
that benefit cuts had been imposed on 40,000 people 
between April and December 1994, and the Citizens' 
Advice Bureaux (1994) criticised training schemes for 
being exclusionary, inappropriate and of low-quality. 
34 'Jobless who don't toe line face big cuts,, The Guardian, 13th 
December, 1994. 
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Michael Portillo denied again that the JSA represented 
workfare: "To describe that [JSA Bill] as ', workfare' 
strikes me as loose talk. To me, 'workfare' means that 
the state will be the employer of the last resort, 
committing itself to provide work for any who are 
without it. That implies a bigger role for the state 
than I am willing to contemplate. . [but claimants] must 
demonstrate their willingness to work. That can 
include being required to take work that is offered to 
them on. penalty of losing their benefit; if that 
spells workfare to some, so be it. "35 At the same time, 
the opposition suggested that the measures could 
result in 250,000 people having their benefit reduced. 
The JSA Bill received its second reading on 11th 
January 1995 by 304 votes to 2G9.36 In Committee stage 
(Standing Committee B) during January and February 
1995, many criticisms were made of the development of 
employment and benefit legislation (House of Commons 
Official Reports 1995) . 
37 
35 Hansard, loth January, 1995, col-52-3. 
36 one of the most persistent critics of the Bill, and the 
Government's general attitude to the unemployed, was Alan 
Howarth, Conservative MP (and subsequent defector to the Labour 
Party) . one significant criticism of the Bill he made was its 
granting of powers to the Government outside the deliberation of 
Parliament (on the amount of the JSA, the specific regulations 
concerning actively seeking work' and correct behaviour of 
claimants) . He found its stress on obligations of claimants 
'profoundly illiberal,. 
37 It was suggested by Ian McCartney (MP for Makerfield) that in 
the first six months of 1994, more than one out of seven people 
referred to a Workwise pilot scheme (10,000 are participating) 
have had their income support cut by 40 percent for up to four 
weeks (either for non-attendance or completion), see HoC official 
Reports, standing Committee B, 28th February, col. 654. Alan 
Howarth had suggested earlier in the debate over the second 
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Peter Lilley mooted in a speech to the Social Market 
Foundation on 9th January 1995 local variations in 
benefits by devolving responsibility, noting the 
example of Switzerland. Legislation for the JSA would 
for the first time allow variation in national benefit 
rules and rates. With the measures planned (incapacity 
benefit, JSA) Lilley hoped to save E4 billion by the 
end of the decade. 38 During the same period, the 
Employment Select Committee (ESC) examine d the issue 
of workfare schemes. Greville Janner QC, a Labour MP, 
was chair of the Committee but it also included Sir 
Ralph Howell, long-time proponent of workfare. The ESC 
had, known that ministers disapproved of workfare-scale 
intervention. On 25th October 1994 the ESC questioned 
Michael Portillo, then Secretary of State for 
Employment (from July 1994 to July 1995), who argued 
that he did not want the state to be the I employer of 
last resort' (also ESC 23rd May 1995). 
on 22nd November 1994, Anne Widdicombe, denied that 
. workfare was on the Government's agenda, though 
it 
should be noted that the form she defined it in was as 
a 'large-scale national compulsory scheme,. On 17th 
January 1995, in front of the ESC Peter Lilley 
admitted that there have been no cost studies of 
workfare schemes. The ESC also questioned (on 22nd 
November 1994) Professor Dennis Snower, who had 
reading that 40,000 people had suffered sanctions of up to 40 per 
cent (Official Report, loth January, 1995, vol. 252, col. 78). 
38 'Lilley returning to Poor Law' with benefits shift', The 
Guardian, loth January, 1995. 
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proposed schemes whereby employers would be paid part 
of the benefit in the form of an 'employment voucher', 
and Professor Richard Layard, who had proposed tax 
rebates for companies for hiring the long-term 
unemployed (which he claimed would end long-term 
unemployment). Howell suggested that while the 
Government's Workstart trial scheme (E60 per week to 
employers for hiring the long-term unemployed) was not 
workfare, it could be a route towards it. 
In addition, in April 1995 the ESC travelled to the 
United States to examine workfare programmes. 39 In 
particular they tried to examine the relationship 
between low unemployment and workfare, but found that 
any American programmes tended to have as their 
primary aim the reduction of the welfare budget rather 
than the reduction of unemployment. They had great 
difficulty in actually finding any genuine workfare 
programmes and were told that of the 15 million people 
in the United States on some welfare benefits, only 
15,000 (less than one per cent) could be said to be on 
workfare programmes. The closer to proper workfare the 
schemes they found, the more administratively 
expensive they tended to be. 
Howell himself gave evidence to the ESC on 16th May 
1995, explaining his own proposals and describingý 
himself as a 'hard-line capitalist'. The reception 
from the other ESC members was mixed. Harry Greenway 
39 This was covered in a television documentary, Scrutiny - The 
Way to Work, BBC 2,18/7/95. 
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(Conservative) doubted the coherence of the schemes 
while Warren Hawkesley (Conservative) agreed with the 
idea of compulsion. The ESC's report was published in 
May 1996. In July 1995 Howell had introduced a 'Right 
to Work' Bill based on his ideas (supported only by 
Frank Field) ; the ESC report supported this plan to 
give everyone of working age the right to earn their 
own living via the extension of 'Workstart' schemes - 
voluntary involvement in work programmes earning up to 
E120 a week. In July 1996, Howell introduced a second 
'Right to Work' Bill, which found greater cross-party 
support. 
The implementation of the LTSA was delayed six months 
from April 1996 to October 1996, blamed on the 
development of computer systems and staff training 
programmes. But the halving of the duration of 
entitlement to unemployment benefit went ahead from 
April 1996 - it was predicted that 70,000 would get no 
benefit at all, 95,000 would have to switch to the 
means-tested JSA and 85,000 would get less money as 
they are realigned to lower income support 
. 
rates. 
Peter Lilley, Social Security Secretary, noted that 
the JSA would give the Government the opportunity to 
pilot schemes, and raised the possibility of devolving 
responsibility for aspects of social security to 
localities (1995). 
In July 1995 the Department of Employment was 
abolished and its duties divided between the 
Department of Education and the Department of Trade 
and Industry. Gillian Shephard became Secretary of 
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State for Education and Employment. The new department 
took over Employment's responsibility for training 
schemes, including those run by TECs, as well as 
continuing the current role of the DfE. 
In October 1995, at the Conservative Party Conference 
there were briefings that John Major would announce a 
gradual move to a form of workfare in his end of 
conference address. 40 Instead he referred merely to the 
need for 'discipline, for the unemployed, and the 
"contract for work' idea in the JSA. However the JSA 
continued to attract criticism as unfair and counter- 
productive - aside from its regulatory advances, it 
cuts entitlement to unemployment benefit while putting 
up National Insurance premiums, and also by pushing 
people into a reliance on means-tested benefits 
creates further dependency. 
Again, in October 1996, the extension of '-workfare' 
was trailed in advance of the Conservative Party 
Conference. Major announced the extension of 'Project 
Work, in a speech to Conservative election agents, 
then being tested in two pilot schemes (Hull and 
Medway and Maidstone), to a second phase targeting 
twenty unemployment Iblackspots' and up to 100,000 
jobless. Under the scheme the long-term unemployed 
must undergo thirteen weeks of special job training, 
40 'Major set to back gradual move toward workfare', The Guardian, 
12th October, 1995. Shephard was quoted as saying (ibid)- "We are 
certainly looking at a wide range of approaches which examine the 
relationship between requiring activity for benefit, encouraging 
people to work while they are on benefit, but most of all 
encouraging people out of unemployment back into employment. " 
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provided by private voluntary charitable 
qrganisations, or lose benefit, followed by thirteen 
weeks of job experience, for which claimants receive 
an extra E10 a week on top of their normal benefit. 
This was announced formally on 8th November 1996 -a 
E100 million "nationwide, plan extended Project Work 
to twenty-nine areas for all applicants aged eighteen 
to fifty who have been unemployed for two years (two- 
thirds of the long-term registered unemployed in 
Britain). This has of course met criticisms that it 
does not create any good jobs or opportunities to use 
skills productively, but merely seems concerned to 
scare off 'bogus' benefit recipients. This is 
reinforced by the announcement of a Social Security 
Fraud Bill in the Queen's Speech (October 1996), 
allowing cross-checking of benefit claims, tax returns 
and VAT receipts, an inspectorate to monitor local 
authorities' attempts to reduce fraud, and greater 
penalties for false claimants. Concern was raised by 
civil liberties groups at the first measure in 
particular, given that the Data Protection Act had to 
be modified to allow the pooling of information 
necessary. The JSA replaced unemployment benefit and 
income support on 7th. October 1996, the biggest change 
to the unemployment system since 1948. 
7.8 Sunmary 
The unemployed are probably the least generously 
treated of social security recipients, indeed (Ditch, 
p. 36, ibid): "Nowhere is the principle of ', leýs 
eligibility, more vividly displayed than in the 
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treatment of the unemployed with long-term needs but 
short-term rates of support. " There may be strong 
public support for other aspects of state welfare 
(education, the National Health Service, old-age 
pensions), but far less for policies designed for 
those considered capable of active work - the "able- 
bodied beneficiary'. This has been reflected in the 
reality of provision, rather than Marshal lian -derived 
ideals of the welfare state. Forms of exclusion have 
been kept alive, even extended . 41 Some have emphasised 
the general disciplinary nature of social security 
systems as a mechanism of 'surveillance, which has 
been extended by the reforms discussed (Dean 1991). 
The f act that workfare has become thought an issue of 
importance illustrates in part the influence of the 
new right on the welfare debate, because it is 
regarded as the 'only solution' to the problem of the 
lack of obligations amongst the poor. That workfare 
may be justified by citizenship does not deny that the 
general citizenship of many under the Thatcher 
Governments was eroded. Poverty and inequality has 
increased (Walker and Walker 1987, Social Security 
Committee 1991, Becker 1991), and the 'poverty trap' 
is as persistant as ever (CMSC 1996) . It is the case 
41 Gordon ('Forms of Exclusion: Citizenship, Race and Poverty', 
chapter seven, Becker 1991) has noted how black people seeking 
welfare benefits encounter barriers additional to those faced by 
claimants in general. Entitlement has become tied increasingly to 
immigration status, creating a class of black people who are 
lawfully' resident in the country who have fewer rights than 
others. The effect is the questioning of status (and so of 
citizenship) of black people, even those born or long settled in 
Britain. Also Oppenheim (1990). 
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that poverty (Golding, P. xi, 1986) ".. is most 
comprehensively understood as a condition of partial 
citizenship. " Poverty and insecurity may have been 
increased by unemployment, a deregulated labour 
market, and harsher social security benefits, making 
the focus on the supposed ', behavioural deficiencies' 
of the unemployed appear examples of political 
cynicism (Millar, 113earing the Cost', chapter three, 
Becker 1991). In particular, the rights and 
obligations of young people have been effected 
(negatively) by the reforms. Citizenship has been 
denied them (Jones and Wallace 1992). 42 Further, given 
the more difficult eligibility requirements, it has 
been, noted (Dean, p. 199,1991): "It is no longer an 
answer to claim that social security claimants must 
assert themselves as citizens, when they must thereby 
define and defend themselves as the victims of 
poverty. " 
It is in this political environment - what has been 
called the 'revolution of reducing expectations' 
(Lister 1991) - that workfare has become an issue. In 
this context, the emphasis on 'duties', 'obligations' 
and reciprocity, (particularly as part of the 
'actively seeking work' regime) in justifying reforms 
in unemployment legislation represents the use of 
aspects of citizenship in order to erode the 
42 N. S. Harris (1989) blames the Beveridge Report for constructing 
an ambiguous status for young people, as employed or dependent on 
parents, workers or students, which provided later the 
opportunity for their independent benefits to be removed. 
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, universal membership', or general status of 
citizenship, of the poor. The reduction in the numbers 
of officially unemployed as a result of such schemes 
is of course one desired end, but should not be 
thought the only end. 
The ideological project of narrowing eligibility for 
unemployment benefit is an erosion of an unconditional 
right of citizenship, but not necessarily citizenship 
in general. obligations have been enhanced. The 
overall balance of citizenship has shifted, the 
overall effect may be regressive. 
Developments in Britain towards workfare programmes 
may reflect the 'free economy/strong state' model. As 
King (p. 197,1995) argues: "It is ironic that the 
construction of neoliberal work-welfare programs [sic] 
necessitates extensive state intervention both to 
police more rigorously benefit claims and to address 
the inadequacies of market-based training schemes. " To 
King, the liberal institutional biases -in British 
work-welfare programmes, in particular the distinction 
between 'deserving, and 'undeserving, recipients, and 
contributory and noncontributory programmes, are 
selective and stigmatising distinctions. The 
developments of the 1980s, especially in the third 
Thatcher term, compound them. Like citizenship itself, 
the status and role of workfare is dependent on 
political, economic and social context, and 
particularly what strategic aim it is supposed to 
achieve. If workfare schemes justified in the language 
of citizenship represent in effect the undermining of 
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the citizenship of the poor, this signifies the 




Conservative 'Active Citizenship, 
"This imposing and dif f icult ideal [I active 
citizenship' I becomes an ideology whenever we are 
told that we are already citizens, men at or near 
our very best, and that our country is a nation of 
citizens. We should all be more active, patriotic 
orators tell us, but they manage to say this 
without ever suggesting that we are so inactive as 
to render our citizenship inauthentic or the ideal 
suspect. They proceed to deduce our obligations (to 
participate, to obey, to fight, and so on) from 
that ideal. This is a mystification of the worst 
sort, but it might be that it serves a useful 
purpose: it keeps the ideal uppermost in our 
consciousness. Ideology is the social element 
within which ideals survive, and this may well be 
true even when the ideology is perfectly 
hypocritical. For if hypocrisy is the tribute that 
vice pays to virtue, then it serves at least to 
sustain the social recognition of virtue. "' 
8.0 Introduction 
During third-term Thatcherism, the idea of 'active 
citizenship, was referred to by a number of leading 
Conservative figures. Though dismissed as a brief 
rhetorical fashion, and however superficial in its 
original formulation, it was significant in two 
respects. First, though many criticisms were made of 
the Conservative conception of active citizenship, 
1 Walzer (p. 212-3,1970). 
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it was one of the factors which reawakened interest 
in 'broader issues around citizenship. Second, it 
highlighted certain aspects of the Thatcherite and 
new right project, and the weaknesses of some of the 
left's counter-arguments. 
8.1 The Rhetoric of Conservative Active Citizenship 
A series of articles and speeches during 1988-1990 
highlighted active citizenship. The most prominent 
figure involved was Douglas Hurd, then Home 
Secretary. On 5th February 1988 Hurd marked the 
bicentenary of the birth of Robert Peel by a speech 
to the Peel Society Dinner on the theme of 
citizenship at his Staffordshire birthplace. Since 
the speech attempted a reconstruction of Tory 
doctrine and consciously echoed Peel's essay on the 
same task in the same place, the address was 
inevitably dubbed the 'second Tamworth Manifesto'. 
Hurd recalled the social cohesion supposedly enjoyed 
in that age and suggested: "We have to find, as the 
Victorians f ound, techniques and instruments which 
reach the parts of our society which will always be 
beyond the scope of statutory schemes. I believe 
that the inspiring and enlisting of the active 
citizen in all walks of life is the key. "2 He feared 
that: "The fruits of economic success could turn 
sour unless we can bring back greater social 
cohesion to our country. Social cohesion is quite 
different from social equality: indeed the two are 
ultimately incompatible. But social cohesion 
2 Heater (p. 298-9,1990). For Hurd's 'Tamworth Manifesto' see 
Carvel (1988). 
374 
alongside the creation of wealth through private 
enterprise: these are the two conditions of our 
future progress. 113 
Social cohesion could be fostered by 'active 
citizenship,: ".. the active businessman can help to 
stimulate the arts or to create employment in 
discouraged areas. The active citizen can make sense 
of a Neighbourhood Watch scheme or a crime 
prevention panel. The active parent will under our 
reforms have much greater opportunities in shaping 
the education of his or her child. " To Hurd active 
citizenship involved: ".. the free acceptance by 
individuals of voluntary obligations to the 
community of which they are members. freedom will 
flourish where citizens accept responsibility. "4 
Later, in April, in an article in the New Statesman 
magazine Hurd (1988) suggested that: "The 
Conservative Party is moving forward from its 
justified concern with the motor of wealth creation 
towards a *redefinition of how the individual 
citizen, business and, voluntary group can use 
resources and leisure to help the community. As we 
expand the scope for such voluntary acts of 
citizenship, the left is still stuck with the 
bureaucratic definition of citizenship as something 
to which we are compelled by the state. " 
Denying a Hobbesian mentality to the Government's 
policies, he claimed: "Underpinning our social 
policy are three traditions - the diffusion of 
3 Riddell (p. 160,1991). 
4 Riddell (p. 171-2, op cit). 
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power, civic obligation and voluntary service - 
which are central to Conservative philosophy, and 
rooted in British (particularly English) History. 
The diffusion of power is a bulwark against 
despotism and corruption, and the key to active and 
responsible citizenship. Men and women are social 
beings. But the left's picture of a society 
dominated by the relationship between citizen and 
state is a pallid image of reality. Men have 
affection and allegiance for many collective 
organisations from a soccer club to a choral 
society, or even a political party. But the 
strongest loyalties are to family, neighbourhood and 
nation. " 
Hurd revived ' the idea of the importance of 
intermediate associations (Burke's 'little 
with local platoons'), which he identified not 
government (bureaucratic and remote) but school 
governing bodies, tenant's co-operatives, housing 
associations, neighbourhood watch schemes and 
charities. These provided opportunity for 'voluntary 
acts of citizenship', contrasted with the left's 
'bureaucratic definition of citizenship as something 
to which we are compelled by the state'. He 
suggested the thrust of policy was to shift power 
outwards, away from the ', corporatist battalions, to 
the 'small platoons'. Anticipating criticism of 
centralisation with regard to local government, Hurd 
claimed: we have no grand design, no Code 
Napoleon to govern local endeavour. The nature of 
local organisations will vary according to the 
functions which they perform: governing bodies, 
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tenants' co-operatives, housing associations, 
neighbourhood watch schemesý. Our approach is 
pragmatic, seeking to nurture effective forms of 
community organisation more local and more 
responsive to particular circumstance than local 
councils. " 
Responsibilities should be democratised as well as 
rights: "In previous centuries, when full political 
rights were enjoyed by few, the tradition of social 
obligation acted as a restraining and civilising 
influence upon the powerful minority. It was 
essentially aristocratic. Now that we have universal 
suffrage, general prosperity, and much greater 
equality of opportunity, we need to encourage the 
notion that civic responsibilities, too, are the 
property of all. They have been 
democratised. Compulsion by the state implies not 
fulfilment, but the absence or failure of personal 
responsibility. " 
Lastly, Hurd claimed active citizenship was 
intimately linked to the Thatcherite economic reform 
programme: 
"A social policy f ounded upon ideals of responsible 
and active citizenship is compatible with free 
market economic policies. Private property is the 
natural bulwark of liberty, because it ensures that 
economic -power is not entirely concentrated in the 
hands of the state. It also buttresses personal 
responsibility, by harnessing man's acquisitive 
instinct to the demands of stewardship. emphasis on 
private property and the encouragement of private 
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wealth' is necessary if the community as a whole is 
to prosper.. Those qualities of enterprise and 
initiative, which are essential for the generation 
of material wealth, are also needed to build a 
family, a neighbourhood, or a nation which is able 
to draw on the respect, loyalty and affection of its 
members. 115 
Junior Home Office Minister John Patten (1988a) 
added his voice in September 1988: "The active 
citizen is someone making more than a solely 
economic contribution to his or her community; 
nothing more or less.. It is.. about tapping a 
reservoir of talent. and energy and enabling it to 
flourish outside both the public and the private 
sectors -a third f orce which has an enormous and 
vital contribution to make. " Later, in December, he 
defended the Government's quest for active 
citizenship (1988b) : "After 40 years, during which 
it was often fashionable to exclude or decry 
individual action in the mistaken belief that 
-5 In September 1989 Hurd (1989) provided further definition. 
"Active citizenship is the free acceptance by individuals of 
voluntary obligations to the community of which they are 
members. It cannot be conjured up by legislation or by 
political speeches - although both can help. It arises from 
traditions of civic obligation and voluntary service which are 
central to the thinking of this Government and rooted in our 
history. The need to foster responsible citizenship is 
obvious. Freedom can only flourish within a community where 
shared values, common loyalties and mutual obligations provide 
a framework of order and self-discipline. otherwise, liberty 
can quickly degenerate into narrow self-interest and 
licence-The idea of active citizenship is a necessary 
complement to that of the enterprise culture. Public service 
may once have been the duty of an 61ite, but today it is the 
responsibility of all who have time oý money to spare. Modern 
capitalism has democratised he ownership of property, and we 
are now witnessing the democratisation of responsible 
citizenship. " 
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government always knows best, we have come to 
recognise that there is much more room f or active 
citizens to play a part, and sometimes a more 
effective part than can be played by the state. " 
He referred to the increasingly familiar examples of 
Neighbourhood Watch schemes, churches and youth 
clubs, community help groups and the Samaritans. But 
he dismissed the idea that active citizenship 
amounted to creating a 1politicised class' "That 
argument fundamentally misunderstands the active 
citizen. The active citizen can be defined as 
someone who cares, but who gives expression to their 
caring in a quantifiable way. There is nothing to 
stop a carer also being a campaigner-But the 
corollary is that' my definition does not include 
those whose only aim is to cause a stir. Simply to 
shout one's views from the nearest rooftop does not 
qualify one for the active list, nor does it suffice 
to make caring noises without acting on them. The 
truth is that the active citizens know who, and 
what, they are. We can all recognise one when we see 
one, and we all have an intuitive feeling for what 
active citizenship involves. ', 
Kenneth Baker (p. 95,1993) in an address to the Bow 
Group in 1987 argued that: "I do not think there is 
any reason to apologise f or the increased scope we 
have given for what might be called acquisitive 
individualism.. However, I do recognise that there is 
another side to the coin of economic individualism. 
That other side 
'is 
social responsibility. Those who 
succeed have obligations above and beyond that of 
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celebrating their own success. we all live together 
in families, groups and communities. The responsible 
individual does not believe that his involvement 
with others' is limited only to paying taxes and 
that's an end to the matter. The responsible 
individual is a concerned citizen, an active 
citizen, who by bringing his individual skills into 
play within a community role enhances the life of 
that community. " Baker offered a vision of the 
%community of individuals, . Government should pass 
power from the hub of the wheel towards the rim by, 
for example, encouraging parents and local 




Chris Patten in Marxism Today (February 1991) 
suggested: "There is a feeling that while we need to 
continue to apply some of the economic lessons that 
we've been attempting to learn in the 1980s, there's 
also a feeling that we need to be more explicit 
about the social responsibilities that should go 
with successful individualism. We have to emphasise 
both the importance of the collective and the 
community and the need to find ways of using market 
mechanisms to run community services more 
6 Ironically, in the week Thatcher spoke to the Conservative 
Party conference, it was announced that Baker in his role as 
Education Secretary had cancelled Citizenship as a GCSE 
subject (which had in the previous year attracted 5,000 
candidates) . This was part of a move to reduce the number of 
subjects that attracted 'few' candidates, but the timing 
seemed unfortunate. The apologia was that education for 
citizenship was supposed to run through the entire curriculum. 
However, in February 1990 Education Secretary John MacGregor 
prompted reports that 'Schools urged to teach ideal of active 
citizenship' (The Xndependent, 17th February, p. 2). 
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effectively without appearing in the process to 
devalue those services. " 
Conservative active citizenship produced reactions 
from the other major parties claiming citizenship as 
their own. It also provoked debate within academia 
and the media, and seemed to come at a pertinent 
juncture - the Charter 88 pressure group was 
launched in November 1988, the all-party Speaker's 
Commission on Citizenship was established in the 
same month, education and 'education for 
citizenship, in the wake of the Education Reform Act 
were prominent political issues, as were levels of 
crime, unemployment, social inequality and 
disorder. 7 Citizenship seemed, for a time at least, 
to have a particular purchase on a wide range of 
political and social debates, and appeared to offer 
some neglected solutions. 
I 
Though seen by some commentators at the time as a 
coded distancing from Thatcherite economism back to 
a more traditional Conservative 'One Nationism, by 
former supposed Heathites (Baker, Patten, Hurd) , 
active citizenship should rather be seen as one 
aspect of the broader Thatcherite agenda [chapter 
7 The Speaker's Commission on Citizenship Report, published in 
1990, had little discernible public impact. The main 
recommendations of the 33-member commission were that 
citizenship should play an important role in all years of 
education ' (including proposals that every school governing 
body should develop a strategy for citizenship across the 
curriculum, and that citizenship skills should be included in 
records of achievement), the law relating to legal rights, 
duties and entitlements be reviewed, a new honours system for 
citizenship, and a Royal Commission on citizenship to consider 
new legislation. In one sense it mirrored Conservative active 
citizenship in (what it thought was a novel move) seeing the 
voluntary capacity of citizenship as an extra fourth dimension 
to be added to civil, political and social rights. 
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nine] . There was no implication that this emphasis 
on active citizenship should be at the expense of 
active market participation and should be 
accompanied by a reversal of Iliberalising, reforms 
(privatisation, deregulation, contracting-out). 
Rather, its proponents claimed it was highly 
complimentary to those reforms,. Further, 
Thatcherism's apologists argued that active 
citizenship merely reiterated themes of social 
responsibility and duty that had been articulated 
earlier, often by Thatcher herself. 
8.2 Thatcherism's Moral Agenda 
Active citizenship was one theme present in a period 
of Thatcherism when senior Conservative figures 
sought to reassert the project on the 'moral high 
ground'. It was becoming clear that Thatcherism had 
caused a decisive shift in the economic 'climate of 
opinion, (also indicated by the concurrent Labour 
Party Policy Review), yet its social values were not 
thought to be wholly accepted. Labour under Neil 
Kinnock had been appearing to gain ground by 
attacking 'the 
amorality (indeed, immorality) of 
Thatcherism, and its role in creating a more selfish 
and divided society. In 1987, Thatcher had made some 
unsurprising remarks in an interview (the ubiquitous 
', there is no such thing' as society'), which were 
used to further characteýise her policies as 
socially-destructive. 8 The debate over active 
8 In context, the views she expressed were hardly original or 
substantive: "I think we've been through a period where too 
many people have been given to understand that if they have a 
problem, it's the government's job to cope with it. 11 have a 
problem, I'll get a grant. ' 'I'm homeless, the government must 
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citizenship, ' social responsibilities and self- 
reliance became the dominant issue towards the end 
of May 1988. 
Thatcher gave an address to the General Assembly of 
the Church of Scotland in Edinburgh (May 21st) , 
trailed heavily as an important statement of her 
beliefs. She located her personal duty in 
Christianity, and denied that . 
the motivation for 
wealth creation was wrong or immoral: ".,. any set of 
social and economic arrangements which is not 
founded on the acceptance of individual 
responsibility will do nothing but harm. 11-9 There was 
some role for the state in providing health and 
education, but not to the extent that it eroded or 
removed personal responsibility. She declared: "When 
you have finished as a taxpayer, you have not 
finished as a citizen. 1110 She called for a greater 
role for private charity in health care, in line 
with 'Victorian practice. " 
Although Hurd had been referring to his notion of 
active citizenship some months earlier, he returned 
house me. ' They're casting their problem on society. And, you 
know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual 
men and -women, and there are families. And no government can 
do anything except through people, and people must look to 
themselves first. It's our duty to look after ourselves and 
then, also, to look after our neighbour. People have got the 
entitlements too much in mind, without the obligations. There 
no such thing as entitlement, unless someone has first met an 
obligation" (Baker, p. 94,1993b, original interview in Women's 
own magazine). 
9 See p. 1 'Thatcher Bares Her Soul', and for an edited text of 
her speech p. 13-. '-I Believe: How Religion Shapes Thatcher's 
Life,, The Sunday Times, 22nd May 1988. 
10 The Guardian, 14th October 1988. 
11 The theme of the importance of participation in the 
voluntary sector was reiterated further in the Government 
White Paper on charities (HMSO 1989). 
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to it in the political storm created by Thatcher's 
Edinburgh address. He argued that he saw the active 
citizen, "enriched' by the prosperity of the 
Thatcher era and involved in his local community, as 
the key to achieving the social and political 
objectives of the third term. He stressed: "I do 
think that we need to emphasise more than we did at 
the beginning that individualism is not just a 
narrow or selfish thing. The reason why we put 
stress on individual achievement is not just so that 
we can pile up individual mountains of wealth but so 
that the country is a more decent Place. We have got 
to say to people who are doing quite well: "Look, 
there is a community to which you belong. Be an 
active citizen within it, . 1112 
one week after her address to the Church of 
Scotland, Thatcher spoke to the Conservative Women's 
Conference in London (May 25th). She made a 
traditional defence of 'the family', self-reliance, 
self-respect and 'good neighbourliness', as well as 
attacking socialist divisiveness and its role in 
undermining these values. 13 Her speech to the 
Conservative Party Conference of that year continued 
the citizenship theme, spun before and after as a 
strong rebuke to Labour's criticism of the 
12 'Hurd joins in Tory drive on moral debate,, p. 1, The Times, 
May 23rd, 1988. At the time opinion was divided as to the 
purpose of Hurd's intervention: "Although Labour immediately 
seized on Mr Hurd, s remarks as a coded attack on the Prime 
Minister, Tory MPs be 
* 
lieved he was giving voice to her growing 
belief that more people must begin to exercise the personal 
responsibility that goes with her brand of economic freedom. " 
13 'Thatcher champions the family', p. 1, and speech, p. 12, The 
Times, 26th May, 1988. 
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Thatcherite agenda as regarding 'just me and now, . 14 
Personal effort, she emphasised, enhanced rather 
than undermined the community, and greater 
responsibility gave more dignity to the individual 
and more strength to the community. 15 
8.3 The (Centre) Left's Response 
There were two main criticisms made of Conservative 
active citizenship. The first related to its anti- 
state welfare nature, the second to its anti- 
political nature. 
First, active citizenship, however desirable 
voluntary work and civil associations, was seen as 
unrealistic for many citizens. Involvement in such 
activities takes resources, time, and some degree of 
knowledge and previous experience. It was 
unrealistic to expect the, already disadvantaged, for 
whom these would be in short supply, to be able to 
be active citizens as much as more advantaged 
individuals. But if they were not expected to, and 
the active citizenship message was meant only for 
14 'Thatcher to stress role of citizens' , The Sunday Times, 
9th October 1988. After the speech, it was suggested (Jacques 
3.988) : "The idea of the active citizen received, as of last 
Friday, the modern-day Conservative equivalent of the -papal 
blessing, otherwise known as the public endorsement of 
Margaret Thatcher. It is no longer the personal fiefdom of 
Douglas Hurd, the home secretary. It is official. And it 
heralds the latest attempt by the government to break out of 
its defensive position in the debate on morality and social 
behaviour. " Similarly (Marquand 1988b) : "No doubt, political 
expediency provides part of the explanation. The [19881 budget 
had a peculiarly shameless quality about it, shocking to many 
Tory voters, as well as to non-Tories. Having been caught 
robbing the poor-box, ministers with good political antennae 
recognise that a spell of moral earnestness is now in order. 
Besides, Hurd and Baker both want to succeed to the 
leadership. Both know that they cannot do so as Thatcherites. 11 
3-5 Text of speech, p. 4, The Times, 15th October, 1988. 
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those with such resources (with more disadvantaged 
groups being the intended beneficiaries of active 
citizenship), then it was a highly divisive idea. It 
exacerbated the implicit demarcation between full 
citizens and recipient citizens, by identifying the 
importance of direct social assistance to some -and 
seeking to make them more reliant on the 
unguaranteed voluntary activities of other 
citizens. 16 Hence it was felt (Lister, p. 19,1990) 
".. that the government regards the poor as the 
objects, not*the subjects of active citizenship. " 
The Conservative active conception of citizenship 
was (Hall and'Held, p. 16,1989b) : ".. detached from 
its modern roots in institutional reform, in the 
welfare state and community struggles and 
rearticulated with the more Victorian concept of 
charity, philanthropy and self-help. " It was a 
vision of the old vertical society - citizenship 
confined to a prosperous and 'beneficent", minority - 
not the universal citizenship one. 17 It was seen to 
reveal Thatcherism's self-imposed impotence in 
dealing with its own social effects: 'government 
makes' the policies, the active citizens take over 
16 Skillen (p. 57, chapter four, Milligan and Miller 19-92): 
".. Hurd's 'active citizens' are a minority with, as he puts it 
, time and money to spare,. Having elevated, albeit briefly, 
the notion of active citizenship, to being a key stone in the 
Tory edifice, a fundamental ideal of political life, it 
emerges that active citizenship is a minor decoration, limited 
in its spheres of action and restricted in practice to those 
with 'time and money. to spare'. Unless with have now a two or 
three-tier concept of citizenship, it is difficult to see all 
this as a new 'definition of citizenship', or to see how we 
could have a 'social policy founded upon ideals of active and 
responsible citizenship'. " 
17 Jacques (1988). Similarly, Mouffe (1988) argued that it 
represented a privatised view of citizenship, a revival of the 
feelings of noblesse-oblige and moral duty among the rich. 
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bandaging the casualties' (Ascherson 1988) . It did 
not relate to the modern conception of citizenship 
at all (Oliver, p. 34,1991): "No attention was paid 
to the citizen's rights, or to the obligations of 
the state to the citizen in providing protection for 
civil, political and.. social rights. Nor was there 
recognition of the importance of the 'private, side 
of the life of the individual and the need for this 
to be free from undue burdens which remove from 
people the opportunity for self-fulfilment. 11 
Conservative active citizenship was so inflammatory 
because it was thought to imply a state of non- 
citizenship for many. 3.8 
Raban (1989) expresses the most virulent critical 
deconstruction of Thatcher's Church of Scotland 
speech. It reversed the sense that governments have 
to help educate the people on the increasing 
complexity of contemporary society, economics and 
politics, to go beyond the 'language of the 
breakfast table'. It was in addition, in linking 
Thatcherite individualism with 'Christianity', an 
implicit warning to the Church to 'back-off, from a 
18 Marquand (1988b) : "it is easy to spot weaknesses in their 
alternative. Their new Tory communitarianism has a strong 
whiff of the Lady Bountiful about it, Their responsible 
citizens sound suspiciously like paternalistic local 
businessmen, and their communities like extensions of the 
Rotary Club-Though they use the language of citizenship, they 
seem deaf to the notions of popular participation and equal 
rights without which that language is empty rhetoric. They are 
not merely deaf, but hostile, to its distributional 
implications. The old socialist cry, 'damn your charity, we 
want justice', means nothing to them. They do not see that a 
community cannot be fashioned out of a series of altruistic 
spasms: that a sense of community depends ýupon a sense that 
the- burdens and proceeds of community action are fairly 
shared. " 
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political role, that her Government was in control. 
Hence (p. 71-2): 
'"For 100 years, governments of every colour were 
committed to enlarging the language of citizenship. 
Now Mrs Thatcher's government is committed to 
closing it. It is a narrow and exclusive dialect, 
this language in which we are governed: it bolsters 
the sense of community enjoyed by those who use it 
and repels outsiders who aren't members of the 
f amily and in on the code. As a language, it has 
real integrity, precisely because it derives f rom 
the natural vocabulary, the social outlook, the 
settled habits of mind of one person, the Prime 
Minister herself. All the words fit, all the pieties 
and prejudices interlock. In its ceremonial, 
religiose form, as here, it has the unpleasant ring 
of a new and pertly unctuous thieves' slang. " 
Second, Conservative active citizenship was thought 
fundamentally anti-political. Though it appeared to 
draw on themes from the civic republican tradition 
of citizenship (Marquand, p. 340,1991) : 11. An terms, 
of that tradition,. -. the Hurdian ', active citizen, is 
an incomplete, even deformed, creature. " It did not 
embrace the important tasks fundamental to the 
tradition, especially the supreme civic duty of 
taking part in government. Rather, it was less 
citizenship and more a part of the 'English 
tradition of voluntary service'. It was a response 
to the increasingly fragmented society, and an 
attempt to fill the breach between the new right's 
economics (centred on utility-maximising hedonism) 
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and morality (a critique of permissive hedonism), by 
creating a moral justification for the market order. 
The active citizen was designed to supply the public 
goods (civility, honesty, mutual trust, community) 
which the market itself could not, to take the 
strain in the new right's project to privatise 
public purposes as well as ppblic institutions. 
Hence praise f or ' doing good f or others I, but only 
in a private capacity. It was regarded as revealing 
the behavioural assumptions of Thatcherism: action 
for all is altruistic, but self-interest is economic 
(Quicke 1992).. 
Active citizenship revealed Thatcherism's distrust 
of mechanisms of political accountability (Oliver 
1991). Alongside the corrosive effects of the 
market, it was meant to make people feel like 
citizens (Norman, in Milligan and Miller 1992) . But 
the favoured 'little platoons' were ones which 
confer virtually no power at all - they were 
markedly non-political. Hence it represented the 
attempt to divorce citizenship from politics.: 19 It 
was a spoiling operation, citizenship as 
conscription to the state, so diverting attention 
from ', real' citizenship demands, especially 
constitutional reform: "Active citizenship is not 
simply an evasion of the undemocratic realities of 
19 Instead, Norman suggested the appropriate vehicles for 
active citizenship should be those mediating institutions 
which provide individuals with a point of entry into political 
life (political parties, trade unions, protest groups and 
campaigning organisations), and also to try to create 
institutions of participatory democracy (p. 47, ibid)-. ".. the 
problem of active citizenship is the problem of how to achieve 
participatory democracy. " 
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today, it is a provocation: an attempt to seize the 
initiative on- citizenship so that citizenship can 
burn" (Barnett 1989). 20 These anti-welfare and anti- 
political aspects of the active citizen were seen to 
be mutually-supporting (Andrews, p. 215,1991), 
reinforcing the 'enterprise culture' but as a moral 
and. socially cohesive community. 
I 
Hence although active citizenship could have been 
dismissed as merely a superficial speech-filler, it 
served as a flash-point for many on the (centre) 
left because it was seen to encapsulate 
Thatcherism's perceived erosion of social rights and 
devaluation of public political participation. 
Thatcherite citizenship was a hypocrisy. ., But, 
in 
addition it was suggested that it was symbolic of a 
crisis for Thatcherism - its theoretical and 
practical inability to deal coherently with its own 
socially-divisive legacy (Mulgan, in Andrews 1991). 
Responsibility was instead a public and social, 
rather than only individual, concept. 
These criticisms were in many respects justified. 
Conservative active citizenship was an anaemic 
caricature compared to the deeper and richer themes 
to be f ound amongst the long history of ideas of 
citizenship. In the political context of the 
perceived erosion of communities, social cohesion, 
rights and local democracy, it seemed darkly ironic. 
However, 'these reactions were somewhat misguided and 
20 Paddy Ashdown (1989), leader of the then Social and Liberal 
Democrats, criticised Hurd for neglecting major constitutional 
reform: "Active but not too active might be the slogan from Mr 
Hurd. But a democratic citizenship cuts both ways.,, 
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representative of the left's detachment from the 
political culture. 
8.4 Active Citizenship and the Left's Detachment 
The Conservative conception of active citizenship 
may have seemed weak. The left's alternative vision 
of active citizenship was in some respects weaker. 
It tended to involve a concentration on vastly 
increased broader and deeper political participation 
(and related constitutional reforms), enabled in 
part by a full array of civil, political and most 
importantly social rights [chapter one]. Liberal and 
conservative . ', reservations' with regard to a primacy 
for political participation helped convince 
proponents of participatory politics on the left 
that only they can envisage the 'true' conception of 
citizenship, even that universal citizenship depends 
on the project to achieve participatory democracy. 
However attractive this notion of participative 
democracy might be, it has been suggested that it is 
highly problematic [3.5c]. In particular, the 
simplifying tendencies of communitarianism, most 
prominently, the desire to re-unify a fragmenting 
society under the rubric of . 'politics, , as if that 
were inevitably unifying, are unhelpful given the 
demands of pluralism. 
The left fell into the trap set by Conservative 
active citizenship. However superficial, there are 
two initial senses in which it outflanked the left. 
First, it was useful in seeking to consolidate part 
of Thatcherism's electoral constituency, linking 
citizenship with private property and also a certain 
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', apolitical, smugness. Hence (Ignatieff, chapter 
two, 'Citizenship and Moral Narcissism', Andrews 
1991, P. 27): "The active citizen is an idea deployed 
defensively: to lumber Labour as the party of state 
tutelage and to rebut the persistent and damaging 
charge that Conservatism is the party of greed and 
selfishness. The active citizen is also an image 
meant to take the party on the of f ensive, to give 
Conservatism an ideological hold on just about 
everyone's wishful best image of themselves: as the 
good neighbour, the concerned and active member of 
the community. " 
Second, it represented an intervention into the 
issue of individual behaviour and 'responsible, 
citizenship. These were constructed deliberately 
narrowly. There was no question of generating debate 
as to whether dissent, f or example non-payment of 
the poll tax, represented responsible citizenship 
for the greater good of the community. But 
nevertheless, in presentational terms this was 
advantageous to the Thatcherite project. The right 
captured (a certain construction of) active 
citizenship and its link to individual behaviour, 
and was then able to deploy it further f or its own 
purposes. For example, it could be related closely 
to the need for specific welfare recipients to 
fulfil certain obligations (as in the case of 
workfare), local citizens to behave responsibly, 
(and pay their poll tax however unjust they thought 
it), and parents to become involved in restructuring 
the education system by becoming school governors 
(encouraged by the Education Reform Act). But just 
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because Conservative active citizenship placed a 
very particular construction on 'responsible 
citizenship', did not mean that some form of 
responsible citizenship was unimportant. Of course, 
the left did not think this. But in its reaction to 
active citizenship, it was made to appear to by 
concentrating on 'more important' issues such as 
political participation, constitutional reform, and 
social welfare rights. As suggested (Kymlicka and 
Norman, p. 361,1994): "Many people on the left have 
tried to bypass the issue of responsible citizenship 
by I dissolving [it] into that of democracy itself I, 
which in turn has led to the '-advocacy of collective 
decision-making as a resolution to all'the problems 
of citizenship.. Unfortunately, this faith in the 
educative function of participation seems overly 
optimistic.. " It was no surprise then that the 
Conservative counter-blow was that the left was 
amoral, that it did not care about individual 
responsibility and its effect on social relations. 
Active citizenship exploited the left's exposure on 
the issue of duties, and its reliance on "general 
obligations' (fulfilled through taxation). Active 
citizenship allowed the emphasis to be placed on 
citizenship as a status earned (by whatever form of 
participation) as well as given. 
Further, in allowing itself to be characterised as 
unconcerned with individual responsibility and 
social morality, the left failed to appreciate the 
interest in these' matters which important 
contributors to its thought have had. To take one 
aspect of this question, in its reaction to 
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Conservative active citizenship, the lef t appeared 
to reinforce a dichotomy between individual 
responsibility and welfare rights to which important 
historical proponents of welfare rights did not 
hold. The key purpose underlying Beveridge's 
%liberal-collectivist' reforms, for example, was the 
maximisation of individual responsibility and the 
maintenance of the conditions of social independence 
(Cutler et al. 1986, Hills et al. 1994) (3.5b]. 
The implication that non-political active 
citizenship was somehow secondary (or even 
superficial) compared to political participation was 
an error. The left complained that Conservative 
active citizenship represented' a 'privatised, 
conception, that inclusion enabled by welfare was to 
become increasingly dependent on the private actions 
of benign individuals. However, while justifiable, 
it also revealed the left's unease with the nature 
of the private sphere. The 'public' and 'political, 
was seen to cast into shadow the 'private' and 'non- 
political,. Hence it was thought citizenship is 
nothing if it is not public' (Marquand 1989). This 
was an understandable effort of resistance against 
the 'privatisation of citizenship', but ineffective 
in helping the left engage positively with 
supposedly 'private, forms of citizenship. 
These emphases derive naturally from the inherent 
need for the left to seek to reorder social 
relations in the public sphere, and the influence of 
the communitarian tradition in idealising the 
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"political state' . 
21 But there is nothing inherently 
anti -progressive or corrosive of citizenship about 
private non-political activity, as would be more 
generally acknowledged (Macedo, 'Capitalism, Citizen 
and Community, Turner and Hamilton 1995a, p. 122-3): 
"For purposes of passing judgement about the 
'communal, character of people's involvements, one 
must consider the purposes, motives, and membership 
criteria of voluntary associations before simply 
writing them off as 'private'.. If voluntary 
association is important for promoting a self- 
reliant, energetic citizenry, then we should be 
Willing to accept some inefficiency in the delivery 
of some public benefits for the sake of providing 
opportunities for the exercise of the capacity for 
spontaneous action. " This reinforces the need for 
contextual rather than abstracted analysis. 
Further, what might be dismissed as private and non- 
political participation is often the sphere in which 
women have found it easiest to act as 'citizens' and 
participate '-informally', as opposed to the often 
exclusionary public political sphere (Orlof f 1993). 
This is relevant especially with regard to the 
inheritance of history in which women were barred 
from access to formal political structures. 
23- Nisbet, 'Citizenship: Two Traditions, , Turner and Hamilton 
(1995a) , p. 12 -. "Insensibly the idea spread that what could be 
justified only in terms of private property, voluntary 
association, occupation, or profession - of, in short, the 
private-social sector - was inherently inferior as a value to 
what manifestly sprang from the political state with its 
undoubted consecration to a public conceived for legal and 
administrative purposes as but a vast association of 
individuals - all equal, homogeneous, and motivated alike by 
conjoined self-interest and rationality. " 
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Emphasising the public sphere seemingly 'at the 
expense, of the private may further disadvantage 
groups already under-represented in the public. 
But the full significance 'of these errors can be 
appreciated only with reference to a particular 
characterisation of the dominant political culture 
[3.101. Conservative active citizenship picked up on 
the emphasis on market-based 'self-reliance' in the 
political culture, assumptions which concur with 
'liberal virtue theory, [3.5c] about responsible 
social behaviour, (self) discipline and ', manners', 
and the value of n6n-political civic public- 
mindedness. As such, it appropriated the religion 
of public civility,. Thus while the left's 
criticisms might be valid Conservative active 
citizenship may be divisory it illustrates how 
citizenship is not necessarily progressive but may 
promote further exclusion. 
Hence the root of the left's uneasy thrashing about 
in reaction to Conservative active citizenship - it 
seemed to represent a form of social participation 
(in non-political civil associations) which 
concurred with commonly accepted meanings of 
citizenship, but also was designed to undermine the 
central idea of citizenship, that of 'universal 
membership'. This created the dilemma of having to 
reconcile how a legitimate form of (non-political) 
citizenship could act against the wholly benign and 
emancipatory ideal of citizenship. The dilemma, only 
existed because of the left's too-simple thinking on 
citizenship. 
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8.5 The Strength of Conservative Active Citizenship 
". the sense of being self-reliant, of playing a 
role within the family, of owning one's own 
property, of paying one Is own way are all part of 
the spiritual ballast which maintains responsible 
citizenship. "22 
Though it may be that ordinary citizens want greater 
power and responsibility over their own lives, but 
this does not necessarily make them more supportive 
of the participatory project. The route to that 
power is more likely to be seen as deriving f rom. 
greater resources gained through the market, if 
possible, rather than through politically-active 
citizenship. 
Consequently, the discursive efficacy of 
Conservative active citizenship can be appreciated. 
In a predominantly liberal-capitalist society, (non- 
political) unpaid or non-instrumental activity holds 
a. unique position. Because it is not regarded as the 
primary form of work (paid labour), it is granted a 
certain moral specialness'. Given this analysis, 
Hurd and others were correct to argue, though of 
course from a very different standpoint, that active 
citizenship as Conservatives defined it was the 
necessary complement to the 'enterprise culture', 
and that traditions of voluntary service were rooted 
deeply in common sense understandings of what it is 
to be a 'good citizen'. 
22 Margaret Thatcher, quoted Xndependent on Sunday, 6th May, 
1990. 
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Further, the strategic efficacy of Conservative 
active citizenship can be appreciated. It sought to 
undermine the priority of state welfare provision. 
This would be exacerbated if the fragmentation of 
local government institutions meant local governance 
became significantly controlled by the kind of upper 
and middle-class 'active citizens' envisaged by the 
Government (Kearns 1995). Hence Conservative active 
citizenship represented another example of the 
regressive use of citizenship for strategic ends (in 
particular by harnessing the present inequalities of 
participation). 
Voluntary work in the community, involvement in 
local projects, even unorganised help for friends 
and neighbours, all are seen to feed into one of the 
common sense definitions of 'good citizenship'. Of 
course, citizenship is not reducible to this. Alone, 
the 'citizenship of contribution, is inadequate as a 
foundation for 'universal membership' (Finlayson, 
p. 411,, 1994): ".. the various sectors of voluntarism, 
while they offer freedom, flexibility, and choice, 
cannot guarantee uniformity and comprehensiveness. 
They may well embody the citizenship of 
contribution, and contribution can be offered to 
statutory bodies; they may well advise on statutory 
welfare rights; but they cannot implement the 
citizenship of entitlement. " 
In its "rediscovery' of citizenship, the left saw an 
opportunity to defend state welfare provision and 
further the vision of radical democratisation in all 
areas of social life. Thatcherism saw an opportunity 
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to undermine collective provision and reinforce the 
'market society'. However, Conservative active 
citizenship could also be characterised as a rather 
mundane (and certainly not disagreeable) idea: 
people should help others in their communities. T. H. 
Marshall himself called it a 'lively sense of 
responsibility, in the community. 23 The left's 
reaction to this revealed its disengagement from the 
dominant political culture. In seeking, rightly, to 
go beyond this (on its own) weak conception, the 
left exposed the faultlines in its own thinking. 
Citizenship in theory should not ignore citizenship 
in practice. This means in particular the majority 
who do not act as citizens in the manner properly 
thought of by participatory theorists, but who 
nevertheless are full and active members of their 
communities in the course of their daily lives 
(MacKian 1995). Concentration on political citizens 
reinforces inequalities already present. Ironically, 
the left in criticising Conservative active 
citizenship, also reiterated its focus on the 
minority of political citizens. 
8.6 Sunmiary 
Conservative active citizenship was an example of 
'liberal-conservatism' (2.81, the development of 
conservative ideas in the wake of the new right and 
in particular the project to reassert the efficacy 
of 'free markets'. As Conservatives claimed, active 
citizenship was the compliment to the 'free market'. 
It was useful to outflank and expose left thinking, 
23 Turner and Hamilton (p. 36,1995b). 
399 
as supposedly , neglectful of 
individual 
responsibility and morality. In addition, it was 
designed to reinforce the 'market society' - 
conservative active citizens were not to question 
politically the parameters of the social order. 
Given the left's detachment from the dominant 
political culture, Thatcherism was allowed greater 
scope for manoeuvre and freedom to appropriate 
discourses associated with it. 
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PART THREE 
POLITICAL PROJECTS IN CITIZENSHIP - 
THATCHERISM AND THE 'NEW POLITICS' OF THE LEFT 
Chapter Nine 
Thatcherism - The Subversion of Citizenship in the 
'Market Society' 
9.0 IntroductiPn 
A common assumption held by Thatcherism's critics is 
that Thatcherism neglected citizenship. Rather, this 
chapter suggests that Thatcherism can be shown to 
have sought to appropriate citizenship for its 
broader strategic purposes. 
There is already an established debate concerning 
Thatcherism, indeed (Jessop et al., p. 5,1988) : 
"Thatcherism seems to have acquired almost as many 
meanings as there are people who mention it. " This 
is unsurprising, given that ascribing or denying an 
underlying purpose to Thatcherism has become a key 
discussion. First, necessarily because of 
Thatcherism's dominance over the electoral and 
ideological agenda in the last two decades. Second, 
because any interpretation will both depend on other 
methodological arguments and indicate a more general 
analysis of the. development of post-war British 
politics, economics and society. 
Because of this, the argument here proceeds 
incrementally. First, previous theorisations of 
Thatcherism are drawn upon to suggest the need for a 
'multi-theoretic' approach, in ten respects [9-1- 
9.101. It is suggested that no single theorisation 
of Thatcherism is complete, but many have elements 
which point to some important aspect of Thatcherism. 
The scope for analysis under Thatcherism is so broad 
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that it deserves a degree of methodological 
pluralism in order to be accommodated. Approaches to 
Thatcherism are separated initially into sceptical, 
and 'non-sceptical, types, which divide on whether 
Thatcherism may be regarded as constituting a 
purposeful coherent political project [9.11. While 
the sceptical reservations are helpful in resisting 
exaggeration, only the non-sceptical approaches 
provide richer opportunities for analysis. However, 
such an approach should still incorporate policy 
case studies [9.2], which contrary to the typical 
expectation may allow a greater appreciation of how 
ideologically-driven Thatcherism was [9.31. The 
apparent inconsistency of Thatcherism in some 
respects may be regarded as symptomatic of its 
ideological project rather than its lack of 
radicalism [9.41. Different routes were experimented 
with towards the same radical end [9.51. This 
purpose is understood best by more developed 
theorisations [9.6],. especially those which while 
drawing on Marxist analysis develop a more complex 
and flexible understanding of Thatcherism. Again, 
this is not to deny more practical matters such as 
Thatcherism's immediate electoral basis, an 
awareness of which should be incorporated [9.71. But 
at the same time, it is necessary to recognise the 
extent to which Thatcherism constructed that support 
by maximising its use of discourses [9.81 . These 
different forms of analysis may be reconciled to 
produce a general but multi-faceted interpretation, 
here centred around the notion of the 'market 
society,, a rigid constructed social order. 
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These considerations are necessary in order to 
understand Thatcherism's relationship to 
citizenship. The notion of Thatcherism as merely a 
', Two Nations' strategy ignores its supposedly 
integrationist aspirations [9.91. Thatcherism used 
citizenship discourses, drawn from the new right, 
for its own project of the 'market society', which 
can be illustrated by the case studies [9.101. 
Second, Thatcherism's relationship to earlier f orms 
of British Conservative politics is explored [9.11). 
Following the above analysis, it is suggested that 
the division between Thatcherism and previous- 
Conservative regimes tends to be overdrawn. 
Thatcherism was forced to operate in a different 
context from other regimes, but nonetheless could be 
regarded as equally concerned to secure a stable 
governing project for conservatism. 
9.1 Between Scepticism and Non-Scepticism 
In the broadest sense, there are two approaches to 
Thatcherism. '-Sceptical, characteri sat ions seek to 
provide_ what they see as a useful corrective to 
'-exaggerated' accounts of Thatcherism's impact, by 
pointing to its incoherence, contingency, and non- 
ideological sources of policy change. They argue 
against Thatcherite lexceptionalism', questioning 
the validity of the term 'Thatcherism' itself. Some 
approach Thatcherism as 'personality,, referring 
particularly to Thatcher's own domination of 
government and policy. Thatcherism's project becomes 
in effect her agenda. To Jenkins (1987), Thatcherism 
is more usefully regarded as a 'style', whereas 
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Riddell (p. 7,1983) suggests it, is an I instinct I, a 
series of moral values (hard work, family 
responsibility, duty and patriotism) and an approach 
to leadership with some ideological elements, rather 
than an ideology itself. 
1, Non- sceptical I approaches (discussed later) do not 
analyse Thatcherism uncritically, nor necessarily 
grant it too much coherence, but do seek to 
appreciate in different ways the significance of its 
purpose and impact which sceptical approaches may 
neglect. These go beyond descriptions of Thatcherism 
which identify certain recurring themes (the market, 
reversing decline, 'Victorian values', strong 
leadership), and draw on political, political 
economic and sociological methodologies in order to 
theorise why Thatcherism was significant. They 
recognise that in some form Thatcherism was a 
purposeful political project organised to confront 
identified 'problems' in the Britain of the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
Such a recognition is important, and sceptical 
approaches, in to some degree dismissing the notion 
that there was any broader strategic purpose to 
Thatcherism, may neglect the evidence from policy 
change under Thatcherism which poin ts to recurring 
motivations for reform. Consequently, the 
reservations of sceptical approaches should be 
incorporated within the more theoretically- informed 
accounts offered by non-sceptical approaches. What 
then is the evidence from selected examples of 
policy change ? 
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9.2. Integrating Case Studies 
The first thing to note is that there is not 
necessarily a dichotomy between a case study 
approach to Thatcherism and an appreciation of its 
ideological purposes, as Marsh and Rhodes' (1992) 
characterisation of Thatcherism as a regime of 
inconsistent policy implementation implies. Of 
course, luni-dimensional' explanations are 
inadequate, and any interpretation should 
incorporate all three dimensions 
. 
(political, 
economic, ideological), the precise relation between 
which will vary between policies (Marsh 1995a). 
However, such an approach does not preclude an 
appreciation of how ideological Thatcherism was, not 
only in terms of output of discourses but also as 
subject to ideological and discursive inputs 
(primarily but not exclusively from the new right). 
Rather, the case studies force a critical 
understanding of the significance of the influence 
of the new right, without implying any simple 
translation between thinkers, think-tanks and 
policy. Marsh has suggested that (p. 611,1995a) 
".. the Conservatives used New Right ideology as a 
tool with which to forward their political ends - 
and these ends were electorally, rather than 
ideologically, driven.,, While noting the 
contingencies and competing pressures acting on the 
policy-making process, the case studies reveal' how 
the new right defined both broadly and specifically 
many of the 'problems', then offered reform 
strategies. They also show how ideological 
influences on policy-making can produce 
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inconsistency, rather than the consistency assumed 
by sceptical approaches to Thatcherism (the 
dichotomy between ideology and political calculation 
tends to be overdrawn) . As the case study chapters 
noted, many examinations of the policy process 
undervalue the influence of the new right because 
they do not appreciate fully the impact of its 
framing of the policy area (others perhaps neglect 
the contingencies of the policy-making process). 
The Education Reform Act [chapter five] is a 
valuable case study in that it reveals both the 
significant extent of the new right's influence 
while also noting its frustration at the pace and 
nature of ref orm under Thatcherism. From the Black 
Papers onwards, the new right was crucial in shaping 
the debate on British education, and identifying the 
'Problems' - the structure , of the system 
(particularly centring on the comprehensive ideal) , 
the corrupting influence of organised interests, and 
its link to wider social and economic problems - the 
decline in 'authority' and 'standards', and lack of 
entrepreneurial aspirations. The new right thus re- 
energised and re-ideologised state education as a 
key area for Thatcherism, and then provided ref orm 
strategies. Yet it was reliant on capturing key 
political actors, and given the complexity and scope 
of the reform package was disappointed with some 
developments' particularly the over- elaboration and 
pluralism of the national curriculum, and the 
initial limits to selection. In the context of the 
reforms, citizenship themes were appropriated - 
greater participation in school governing, the 
407 
appearance of increased school autonomy, greater 
diversity of opportunity within the system, and the 
reinforcement of rights to a guaranteed national 
curriculum. 
The Community Charge [chapter six] has tended to be 
seen as a highly ideological reform, ', ideological, 
used as a euphemism for reckless and electorally 
naive. The new right's concern with public 
expenditure made local government a key area of 
reform, and its specific (public choice - influenced) 
identification of the problem afflicting local 
government - lack of effective mechanisms of 
'accountability' - set the key principle which 
framed the policy-making process. But this process 
was spurred on both by the failure of previous 
reforms, and a specific series of events which 
produced mounting political pressure for a 
resolution. It is impossible to imagine the policy 
being developed in the form it was without both the 
highly ideologically-loaded discourses the new right 
brought to bear, and particular political 
developments and key decisions (particularly the 
desire to break from the previous failed pattern of 
reform). Its implicit definition of local 
citizenship, criticised by opponents, was an 
appropriation of certain citizenship themes - 
participation, obligation and 'universality,. 
Successive reforms developing a workfare system 
[chapter seven] also suggest the influence of the 
new right in framing the debate around welfare 
recipients, particularly the problem of 'dependency' 
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and the supposed need to reduce the size of the 
welfare state. More specifically, the new right 
pressed for specific reforms which enforced the 
obligations of recipients, in line with a conception 
of impressing on them the modes of behaviour of 
'proper' Pproductive, ) 'autonomous' and 
'responsible, citizens. Again, it utilised highly 
ideological conceptions to further the reform 
agenda. But progress was gradual, dependent on 
resistance encountered, the success of previous 
schemes, and the efficacy of political actors. It 
has sought-to reshape progressively the citizenship 
of obligations and social rights by appropriation. 
Contrary' to Marsh and Rhodes, then, Thatcherism did 
not merely develop trends but created them as well. 
It is important to appreciate the innovatory nature 
of Thatcherite strategy and conceptualise how it 
represented a decisive break with the earlier post- 
war era. The, case studies are not representative of 
all aspects of Thatcherism, but do contribute to an 
understanding of its ideological aspects and may be 
incorporated into a more theoretically-informed 
account which suggests a common purpose linking 
them. 
9.3 Thatcherism and Ideology 
Underlying the argument presented here is a sense of 
how dominant the new right has been in defining the 
agenda of politics over the last twenty years. This 
suggests an approach which appreciates 'climates of 
opinion, (Kavanagh 1987,1990). This type of 
interpretation rests largely on the assumption of 
409 
the end of 'consensus politics', that the generally 
accepted view of what constituted viable economic 
and political solutions changed. The climate of 
opinion - an outlook or set of assumptions about 
policy largely taken for granted - is' thought to 
have altered. Thatcherism was thus a return to 
individualism after a period of collectivism, 
located in the breakdown of the previous form of 
political assumptions. These conceptions are 
inviting but problematic because of their temptation 
to descriptiveness. Kavanagh (and similar 
commentators) do not help in identifying the causes 
of the changed tide within a broader theorisation. 
Instead, Thatcherism is seen to have emerged from 
the conjunction of a number of circumstances. 
Kavanagh (p. 21,1990) identifies continued relative 
economic decline, the defeat of the Conservative 
Party in the two general elections of 1974, the 
collapse of incomes policies in 1974 and 1979, 
spiralling inflation, unpopular strikes culminating 
in the 'Winter of Discontent', and the electoral 
problems of both main parties. 
Rather, the case study to theory movement allows the 
recognition that, often, climates of opinion move 
from the micro-level up, or at least from specific 
problems to general ideologies. The state education 
system is seen as failing, local government as 
unresponsive, welfare recipients treated softly. 
These become linked into a developing macro-level 
discourse. The integration of case studies with 
discourse theory [9.81 reveals how the climate of 
opinion was shifted consciously and deliberately, 
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and a new climate constructed. But it does not deny 
that political actors can then come to assume that, 
after the dominance of a new climate has been 
established, only certain ideas and policies are 
, viable'. Hopefully the value of the notion of 
climates of opinion can be retained while not 
resting solely on macro-level foundations. 
Some characterisations of Thatcherism privilege the 
ideological aspect. Letwin (1992) sees Thatcherism 
as moral project encouraging 'vigorous virtues', 
those supposedly at the core of English national 
character', whose neglect in favour of 'softer' 
values (sympathy, humility, gentleness) led to 
increasing decadence and dependence. ' Thatcherism 
tried to encourage a certain way of life, rather 
than implement a theory indifferent to the 
particular circumstances of time and place, and 
represents the legitimate expression of the English 
Conservative tradition of 'limited politics, by 
which the state withdraws from making decisions 
which could be made by individuals for themselves. 
Thatcherism had to be, radical to remove the 
obstacles to the moral 'and cultural revolution 
needed. Consequently, Letwin is able to suggest both 
that Thatcherism was coherent but not an ideology. 
I Kenneth Minogue has suggested similarly that Thatcherism was 
the education of Conservatives to rid themselves of 'bourgeois 
guilt' for social inequalities that had made them susceptible 
to social democratic arguments, 'The Emergence of the New 
Right', Skidelsky (1988), also Minogue and Biddiss (1987). Of 
course, such approaches are problematic because they connect 
with much wider controversies over English history, the 
historical roots of the British crisis, and the pre-modern 
form of the British state (Gamble 1993). 
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This is itself a highly ideological interpretation, 
but weakened by its non-economic approach. 
Similarly distinctive is Bulpitt's (1986) Icentre 
autonomy' thesis. Thatcherism as seen as a project 
in party political statecraft, and a continuation of 
traditional Conservative statecraft (competent 
government and winning elections), rather than being 
primarily ideological. Its apparent radicalism was 
designed only to re-establish conservative 
statecraft in new circumstances, particularly 
insulating 'high politics' from popular influences 
by conceding ground in 'low politics, (initially via 
monetarism). Though this approach has a refreshingly 
political-realist attack, it is unable to 
accommodate either the ideological aspect of 
Thatcherism or the different strategies employed by 
the Thatcher Governments as revealed in the case 
study policy areas. The latter are contradictory to 
the centre-autonomy thesis in that they reveal 
Thatcherism's desire to engage strategically in low 
politics areas in order to consolidate its project. 
Indeed, third-term Thatcherism appeared to rally 
itself against the lack of progress in such areas. 
More generally, such accounts do not provide a 
convincing analysis of the economic crisis but deal 
mainly with its political symptoms, as with all 
primarily political or state-centred approaches. 
9.4 Incorporating Contradiction 
Sceptical characteri sat ions of Thatcherism tend to 
rely on differing levels of contradiction to deny it 
was a purposeful political project. However, the 
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example of the poll tax has suggested the extent to 
which there were differing reform strategies within 
a highly. contingent policy-making process, but 
cognoscent with the same ideological aim, using 
different modes of interpellation to other reforms. 
Hence (Jessop et al., p. 9,1988): ".. in assessing 
the coherence of strategy, we should not require 
logical consistency out of time and place but simply 
consider how far different elements fit together 
over time and in different areas in pursuing the 
primary strategic goals. " The emphasis on coherence 
can exclude further analysis as to the nature and 
purpose of political projects, exacerbated in 
Thatcherism's case since it drew on both neoliberal 
and neoconservative discourses and agendas. 2 
Unlike many much-heralded political projects, 
particularly those who have pledged to modernise 
Britain and reverse its seemingly perpetual decline, 
Thatcherism regained its purpose and coherence after 
periods of flux and incoherence. Again, more 
informed theorisations are needed to articulate the 
relations between apparently contradictory elements 
2 But (Hay, p. 44,1992): ".. the criteria that a potentially 
dominant ideology must satisfy are not those of unity or even 
consistency, but rather that the ideology is easily 
articulated and comprehended, and that it justifies the 
strategic pollcy objectives necessary to secure the structural 
determinants of a new hegemonic settlement. The ad hoc nature 
of New Right ideology, combining neo-liberalism and neo- 
conservatism in a flexible relationship satisfies both 
criteria since either ideological base can be used to justify 
a particular policy objective. Thus, ironically, it is the 
very contradictions and inconsistencies of New Right ideology 
which ultimately'stem from the synthesis of neo-liberalism and 
neo-conservatism that give Thatcherism the visage of a unified 
political project driven on by an albeit twin-desire for 
, liberty, and moral authoritarianism,.,, 
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within Thatcherism (for example the "free economy, 
and the 'strong state' projects). 
9.5 Thatcherism as a Developing Project 
Further, it is obvious that political projects may 
develop, however ideologically-informed they are. 
The best appreciation of this is found in Jessop et. 
al. 's (1988) work on Thatcherism, or 'many 
Thatcherisms'. It is examined 'historically, rather 
than seeking to define a consistent set of policies 
which ran through all three governments. The 
changing 'strategic line, was never developed fully 
in a manner consistent with desired goals, but 
represented a complex and continuing process 
adjusting as strategic interaction proceeded. They 
distinguish three main stages (p. 18,1988) : a, the 
development of Thatcherism as a social movement 
defined by its opposition to the post-war settlement 
and the policies being pursued to sustain it; b, the 
period of consolidation culminating in the first 
effective control by Thatcherite forces of the 
Conservative Party, the Cabinet and the political 
agenda; and C, the period of 'consolidated 
Thatcherism' in which this control has been 
(re)deployed to pursue a long-term transformation of 
British society. Rather than conjunctural 
manoeuvres, this involved striking deeper structural 
roots to try to ensure the survival of the 
Thatcherite project beyond short-term policy 
failures and fluctuations in support. It tried to 
"Latcherizel the civil service and administration, 
reduce the independence of the media and educational 
4.14 
institutions, create new channels of representation, 
and to consolidate a new social base through a 
fundamental recomposition of class forces rather 
than merely exploiting temporary disaf f ections and 
discontents. The last two elements are illustrated 
particularly by the case studies, and their close 
relation discussed further in relation to the 
'politics of support, [9.71. The limited but 
significant emergence of citizenship, and selective 
deployment of participation, duties and 
responsibility, was an important strand in this 
third term project. 
Interpretations of Thatcherism should appreciate its 
ability for 'political learning' and 'lesson- 
drawing' (Rose 1991), the taking of a series of 
incremental steps to achieve a totality of 
innovation, possible only because it was goal- 
oriented, partisan and purposeful (Moon 1993) It 
cannot therefore be understood fully in terms of 
policy inheritance, adaption or consesus politics. 
Ferdinand Mount (1988) suggests Thatcherism is a 
, survivor regime,, a type which though lacking 
detailed initial plans are able to renew continually 
political purpose. and learn from experience. 
Sceptical characterisations which recognise this are 
unable to appreciate the ideological inputs and 
hegemonic purpose which fuel such renewal, and 
reduce it to Thatcher's 'personal will, (for example 
Riddell, p. 11,1991). These are apparent in the case 
studies of the education, poll tax and workfare 
reforms, all seemingly deadlocked policy areas. 
Thatcher's personal will did not activate extensive 
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reform programmes, but responded to a gathering (and 
new right-led) agenda for reform within its overall 
strategic aims. Despite the need to be wary of 
exaggerated new right claims to influence, there is 
some credibility to the notion that Thatcherism 
employed a "micropoliticall strategy, seeking but 
the next possible incremental step concurrent with 
the real world of interest group politics, and that 
(Pirie, p. 269,1988): "In several cases the success 
of the policy has led to the victory of the idea 
rather than the other way around.,, 
9.6 Political, Economic and Social Context 
"Marxist intellectuals in Britain appear to have 
'Thatcherism' on the brain. "3 
Purpose is only granted in full to Thatcherism's 
project by richer theorisations. There are two broad 
types. First, orthodox Marxist approaches, which 
tend -to 
depict Thatcherism as a barely-concealed 
class strategy. They suggest that the left's 
political response, if deflected by interpretations 
of Thatcherism born of the 'new revisionism', would 
neglect this fundamental fact. There is thought to 
be no strong evidence of Thatcherism's appeal for a 
large part of the working class, but rather their 
alienation from the Labour Party. Given the nature 
of ruling class elites, Thatcherism's 'class war 
conservatism' is thus regarded as hardly 
unsurprising and certainly not novel. 
Gould and Anderson, 'Thatcherism and British Society', 
Minogue and Biddiss (p. 40,1987). 
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Hence, Thatcherism was seen as representative of a 
new stage in the political and economic crisis of 
British capitalism. Thatcherism was a class response 
to the strength and militancy of the working class 
by the dominant sections of the capitalist class 
(Glyn and Harrison 1980), or the mobilisation of the 
lower-middle class strata (King and Nugent 1979). 4 
Even its economic 'irrationality, (damage to the 
British economy) can be explained as a politically 
rational strategy for 'capital,, rather capital 
based on foreign investment and linked to the Party 
(Ross 1983, also Ingham 1984), or a rejection of the 
interests of British capital (Overbeek 1989). 
Indeed, the crisis offered an* opportunity for 
economic and social reconstruction. For Nairn 
(1981), Thatcherism was a blatant attempt to use the 
recession to hasten and complete the dominance of 
(international) finance capital and the 
multinational sector, the resulting de- 
industrialisation representing Southern English 
hegemony freed from the archaic-burden, of industry 
and trade unions. However, in some accounts, the 
complexities of the political project are reduced to 
the 'politics of greed', a new national philosophy 
4 As Gamble (p. 190-1,1988) has noted, although the former 
interpretation of Thatcherism has been the more influential, 
it is problematic. It claims that the interests of banking 
capital ' dominated the coalition of interests supporting 
Thatcherism, and so the coalition would fragment, and that 
monetarism was unsuited to the complex task of managing an 
advanced capitalist economy. But, capital in fact protested 
very little under Thatcherism, and monetarism did express, the 
logic of the growing financial and commercial integration of 
the modern economy. 
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based not on altruism but the eager and unfettered 
pursuit of self-interest (Loney 1986). 
This is Marxism as the 'theory of the obvious' 
(Hall, p. 165,1988) . They do provide a meaning to 
the Thatcherite project from its economic and social 
context, but fail in establishing it as a political 
project because they do not grant primacy to the 
political (both the party political demands on 
Thatcherism and its political autonomy). They do not 
provide scope for further analysis (for example via 
case studies) given their deterministic 
characterisation of Thatcherism. In the 'general 
accumulation strategy' Marxist approach (Overbeek 
1989), the political critique is missing - if the 
social bases of Thatcherism lay in the petty 
bourgeoisie and small capital, it surely would have 
required the Governments to make compromises and 
concessions to them in order to retain office. Of. 
course, a more general 'logic of capital, approach, 
accepting specific national forms deriving from the 
peculiarities of individual social formations, 
avoids this (for example, Clarke 1987, Green, P. 
1987). But again it cannot provide any account of 
how politiýýal and ideological struggle modifies the 
timing of restructuring and also limits its 
effectiveness, and attributes a singular and unique 
logic to capital, particularly making comparative 
and historical analysis difficult (Jessop et al, 
p. 37,1988). In general such approaches tend to 
homogenise Thatcherism. 
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Second, more complex theorisations are provided by 
Gamble, Hall, Jessop and Hay. 5 Gamble (1988) 
suggests Thatcherism was a political project aimed 
at restoring the conditions (electoral, ideological 
and economic) for the Conservative Party to resume 
its leading role in British politics, especially via 
the restoration of the domestic and international 
authority of the British state and the reversal of 
Britain's economic decline. It was located in 
'crisis', but the hegemony of British capital and 
the ruling class was never in doubt. The world 
system was the single most important reason for the 
'new politics, - the exhaustion of the old regime of 
accumulation (Fordism, and the decline in the 
position of the United States), and the increasingly 
interdependent world economy. The world recession of 
the 1970s revealed the inadequacy of national 
accumulation strategies, stabilisation and 
industrial policies. Thatcherism was an attempt to 
reassert Conservative Party hegemony, though perhaps 
not a new hegemony itself. 
The ', Free Economy/Strong State' term has become 
widely used, but often far too loosely. It does not 
refer merely to the two most apparent schools within 
the new right (neoliberal free economy, 
neoconservative strong state), but rather the 
authoritarian aspects of both. It brings out the 
policing and disciplinary measures needed for the 
5 Hall has admitted that his discourse- theoretical approach 
was not intended as a general theorisation of Thatcherism, and 
Hay's work develops criticisms of Hall, so both are dealt with 
in the context of the value of discursive approaches [9.8). 
419 
free economy and social reconstruction envisaged by 
Thatcherism to encourage an 'enterprise culture' and 
'-popular capitalism', and explains its centralist 
tendency and the need for a strong state. 
Thatcherism had to block the extension of equal 
civil, political and social rights to all citizens, 
in the course of restructuring, so that the costs of 
restructuring could be loaded more easily onto 
vulnerable groups. 
Thatcherism characterised as a political project 
with hegemonic goals is valuable because it 
recognises that economic needs and structures are 
represented politically, yet avoids the implication 
that it was a wholly coherent project. The relation 
between the political project and the structural 
constraints acting upon it is crucial, though 
constraints are not just economic but also political 
and ideological (Marsh 1994, Gamble 1994). 
Jessop et al. (1988,1990, also Jessop 1989) suggest 
that Thatcherism was an attempt to restructure the 
Keynesian welfare state and the British economy 
towards a post-Fordist economy based on finance 
capital, highly flexible, non-unionised, and divided 
into a highly skilled paid core and low skilled low 
paid peripheral workforce. It used (rather than 
merely being the political ', shell, for) increasing 
social and geographical polarisations in order to 
construct a politically exclusionary ', Two Nations' 
strategy. This required breaking the power of the 
unions and shaking out Britain's traditional 
manufacturing industries. However, this strategy was 
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flawed because of the conflicts within British 
society and the fundamental weaknesses of the 
British economy. it was then primarily a 
productivist phenomenon, founded on the notion that 
the (Jessop et al., 1984., p. 51): 
productive be rewarded through the market for 
their contribution to production (or at least to the 
provision of profitable goods and 
services) (whereas] the parasitic must suf f er for 
their f ailure to contribute adequately (if at all) 
to the market (with little regard to the question of 
whether they are 'deserving, or otherwise). " 
In addition, Jessop et al. emphasise the external 
element in interpreting Thatcherism - the 
prioritisation of the City as an international 
finance centre and Britain's place in an expensive 
Atlantic Alliance system. Thatcherism favoured 
interests with an international orientation, since 
the Gaullist option of economic restructuring was 
not available because there was no significant bloc 
of domestic British capital which might provide the 
base for such a strategy. 6 But this meant that 
Thatcherism enjoyed an extraordinary level of 
decisional autonomy in policy formation and 
implementation. 
6 Cloke (1992) notes similarly that characterising Thatcherism 
as a new 'national, regeneration strategy is problematic, 
since it made no real concessions to British capital (p. 134, 
ibid): ".. one of the most dramatic components of T, hatcherism's 
economic agenda was its open recognition - even proclamation - 
that the interests of the British state are no longer 
synonymous with the interests of explicitly domestic capital, 
but with capital operating in Britain and the operations of 
British capital overseas. " 
421 
Though Jessop - et al. do not appreciate the 
development of Thatcherism within Conservative 
governing traditions as much as Gamble, they do 
integrate Thatcherism's political strategy (and 
necessary consciousness of the 'politics of 
support') and link it to its desire for hegemony 
based around a new accumulation strategy. 7 They 
appreciate that, for example, in the short to medium 
term, the strategies for the welfare state were not 
intended to produce serious changes in the economic 
prospects of ' the 'second nation' (the more 
marginalised) , but to consolidate political support 
for the general parameters of the neoliberal 
accumulation strategy and popular-capitalist 
hegemonic project. The creation of a new social base 
around popular capitalism rather than the welfare 
state, and a neoliberal state form, were designed to 
end the electoral decline of the Party. Similarly, 
Thatcherism's 'politics of power' (the 
internationalisation of' the economy) sought to 
achieve a significant class-based redistribution of 
income and wealth towards the 'privileged nation' . 
This reminds us of the necessity of appreciating the 
more short-term electoral foundations of support 
which before all else had to underpin the 
Thatcherite project. 
7 For example (p. 144,1988): "The primacy of the political 
class struggle in Thatcherite policy is often astonishing. 
Whereas the Labour government tended to subordinate political 
strategy to economic crisis management, the Thatcher 
governments have often treated economic policy as a subfield 
for the politics of hegemony.. The general rationale seems to 
be that if the government can modify the balance of forces in 
the short term, it will gain sufficient' time to restructure 
society, and to allow a market-generated recovery. " 
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9.7 Thatcherism's ', 13olitics of support, 
Thatcherism should still be seen as a domestic 
political project in need at optimum times of 
winning traditional bases of support, in particular 
by marshalling electoral constituencies. 
Consideration of the practical politics of support 
should not necessarily be regarded as incompatible 
with higher level theorisation. Indeed, the strategy 
for the 'reconstruction of civil society, begun by 
Thatcherism should be seen as both connected to a 
theorisation of the broader ideological, political 
and economic (hegemonic) aims of Thatcherism., and 
its desire to construct and maintain its electoral 
constituency. In a dominant political project such 
as Thatcherism, the two are closely related. 
Inevitably, Thatcherism pursued some policies which 
were directed at the middle classes to consolidate 
support, attract the '-affluent working class', and 
lock them into reforms. But Thatcherism also seemed 
to be particularly effective in the demobilisation 
of its opponents by their political divisions, 
especially by the construction of policies which 
would give the other parties, particularly Labour, 
difficulties. 
This is apparent in the case of the Education Reform 
Act and subsequent reforms. Increased parent- 
governor participation, 'privileged, grant- 
maintained status, the supposed 'fiscal autonomy, of 
local management of schools, were designed to 
marshal and consolidate a key Thatcherite 
constituency, and to dissect comprehensivism, other 
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organised interests, the 'egalitarian threat' and 
its link to a collectivist education project. The 
project of expanding 'choice, within the sector 
allied with the guaranteed enforcement of the 
national curriculum was formulated consciously, much 
to the dissatisfaction of some elements of the 
educational new right, to prove attractive to the 
same groups captured initially by wider home 
ownership, individual shareholding, private pensions 
provision, and other popular capitalism initiatives. 
Further, radical moves beyond the Conservative 
education reform agenda of the ERA and related 
reforms have been continually hedged by 
consideration of the politics of support. 
The Community Charge has been regarded as a case 
study of political failure, the end-result of a 
policy-making process ignorant of the practical 
issues of effective implementation and the politics 
of support. However, a close consideration of its 
development reveals it was not blind to these issues 
at all, but rather was formulated to resolve the 
problems in implementation and support which 
previous strategies for local government had 
grappled with unsuccessfully. The Charge was 
designed as a mechanism which would dictate 
efficiency without central government intervention, 
highlight isolate and disable local socialism, and 
so reinforce Conservative localised hegemony. It did 
not fail in aspiration, but in the complexities and 
contingencies of its tortured implementation. For 
this reason, rather than in its initial conception, 
it eroded the Conservatives electoral cQnstituency, 
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but its failure was far from inevitable. As the 
analysis brought out, there were key decisions 
around formulation, and implementation which 
undermined the mechanism's effective operation. 
The development of workfare programmes and other 
social security reforms were legitimated publicly in 
terms of clamping-down on the 'feckless' and helping 
the productive. 'Active citizenship, was an 
important and related concept reinforcing this. This 
was an electorally valuable discourse in the general 
contex .t of the economic, social and cultural crisis 
Thatcherism identified itself as being able to 
resolve. Resistance to the reforms was as a 
consequence deflected by linking it to support for 
the 'workshyl. Hence the purpose of such reforms was 
never merely (or primarily) to deal with the problem 
of the unproductive', but to lock-in coalitions of 
support against them in the context of the 'work 
society'. 
9.8 Thatcherism as Discourse 
Consideration of the politics of support alone does 
not capture the theoretical mechanics of the 
politics of Thatcherism. 'Interests' are not given 
rational facts, but must be discursively 
constructed. Any multitheoretic analysis of 
Thatcherism must then include an important role for 
discourse analysis. it further allows the 
appreciation of how a particular discourse - 
citizenship - was appropriated by Thatcherism. 
9.8a Hall - Thatcherism as 'Authoritarian Populism, 
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One of the most well-known theorisations of 
Thatcherism drew on discourse theory. Stuart Hall 
and Martin Jacques (1983, and Hall 1988), 
popularised the notion of 'Thatcherism', and defined 
it as a hegemonic project. 8 Thatcherism was seen to 
appreciate that the disorientation of British 
politics and the state's crisis of legitimacy in the 
mid-1970s provided a set of opportunities and spaces 
for a new politics. As an ideological project 
Thatcherism operated on several different levels, 
especially attempting to establish a new 'common 
sense' which contradicted many long-established 
assumptions (particularly about the responsibilities 
of government). Rather than simply being 
'reactionary', Thatcherism was characterised as a 
modernising project, adjusting to new realities and 
reforming (or removing) 'failed, institutions. 
As Hall summarises (p. 2,1988) : 11. Thatcherism's 
economic strategy is set against the relative 
decline and comparative 'backwardness' of the 
British economy and the state-Politically, 
Thatcherism is related to the recomposition and 
'fragmentation' of the historic relations of 
representation between classes and parties; the 
shifting boundaries between state and civil society, 
'public' and 'private'; the emergence of new arenas 
8 By 'hegemony', Hall means (p. 7,1988): ".. the struggle to 
contest and disorganise an existing political formation; the 
taking of the leading position, (on however minority a basis) 
over a number of different spheres of society at once - 
economy, civil society, intellectual and moral life, culture; 
the conduct of a wide and differentiated type of struggle; the 
winning of a strategic measure of popular consent; and, thus, 
the securing of a social authority sufficiently deep to 
conform society into a new historic project. " 
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of contestation, new sites of social antagonism, new 
social movements, and new social subjects and 
political identities in contemporary society. 
Ideologically, Thatcherism is seen as forging new 
discursive articulations between the liberal 
discourses of the "free market'.. and organic 
conservative themes.. Its rdworking of these 
different repertoires of 'Englishness' constantly 
-repositio'ns both individual subjects and 'the 
people, as a whole-Culturally, the project of 
Thatcherism is defined as a form of 'regressive 
modernisation' - the attempt to 'educate' and 
discipline society into a particularly regressive 
version of modernity.. 'r 
The value of Hall's interpretation has been to 
suggest, without relying on reductionist class 
analysis, that the effectiveness of Thatcherism 
rested on its ability to articulate different social 
and economic interests within its political project. 
It examined how economic crises and political 
processes are constructed discursively and how they 
are lived out (though there are 'conditions of 
existence' constraints on discourses) .9 Thatcherism 
constituted a field of deliberately inter-related 
discourses, in the context of the 'crisis' which was 
not given but was a field of struggle itself. 
In terms of content, Thatcherism represents the 
articulation of two seemingly contradictory sets of 
9 Hall cites the influence of Laclau's work, for example in 
recognising that there is no inevitable link between class 
origin and political ideas (P-6,1988). This broadly follows 
Politics and ideology in Marxist Theory, rather than Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy. 
I 
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ideas (p. 29,1983): "Thatcherite populism is a 
particularly rich mix. It combines the resonant 
themes of organic Toryism - nation, f amily, duty, 
authority, standards, traditionalism - with the 
aggressive themes of a revived neoliberalism - self- 
interest, competitive individualism, anti-statism. 11 
Its populism was key in enabling it to take the 
offensive in establishing moral and ideological 
leadership, which could create a new historic bloc of 
finance capital, the skilled working and middle 
class. But Hall described this populism as 
authoritarian because it was not designed to 
increase popular participation and democratic 
control but reduce it. It paraded as addressing the 
genuine concerns of the people while restoring 
strong leadership. Indeed, it founded its rule 'from 
above' in the popular fears expressed 'from below' 
Its radicalism connected with radical-popular 
sentiments, but turned them around, absorbing and 
neutralising them, hence a 'populist unity'. The 
left was presented as part of the power bloc, 
enmeshed in . the state apparatus and riddled with 
bureaucracy. As Hall (p. 51,1988) stated: 
". the actual experience which working people have 
had of the corporatist state has not been a powerful 
incentive to further support f or increases in its 
scope. whether in the growing doie queues or in the 
waiting-rooms of an over-burdened National Health 
Service, the corporatist state is increasingly 
experienced by them not as a benefice but as a 
powerful bureaucratic imposition on the people'. 
The state has been present to them, less as a 
428 
welf are or redistributive agency, and more as the 
0 
, state of monopoly capital And since Labour has 
f oregrourided the requirements of monopoly capital 
above all others, what is it that. can be said to be 
, false, about this consciousness ?" 
All this does not mean, claims Hall, that 
Thatcherism achieved hegemony, but was a hegemonic 
project which tried continuously to secure itself 
and recognised that political, moral and 
intellectual leadership must be coupled with 
economic dominance in order to restructure the 
social formation. 
Hall's characterisation is attractive because it 
appreciates how the new right was able gain such a 
purchase on the problems of the 1960s and 1970s, and 
advance on the political culture, particularly 
sections of the working class (it is this of course 
which disgruntles more orthodox Marxist critics). It 
captures the hegemonic aspirations of Thatcherism, 
though the pursuit of hegemony should not be 
restricted to the ideological sphere, but extended 
to embrace political calculation aimed at winning 
and maintaining support and managing the state and 
economic performance (as in Gamble's analysis). 
9.8b Criticisms of Hall's Analysis 
The question of lideologism, became the focus of 
criticism from many commentators, most prominently 
Jessop et al. (1984,1985). They claimed that 
authoritarian populism was rather marginal compared 
to the 'dual crisis of the state', of 
parliamentarism and corporatism, and the continuing 
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structural crisis of the British economy. Its over- 
extension mystified the real sources of support for 
Thatcherism. There was always a considerable working 
class Conservative vote, which Thatcherism in common 
with past Conservative regimes f ailed to organise 
politically. Hall overstated Thatcherism's strength 
and understated its pragmatism. 
Hall (1985, p. 150-60,1988) contended'that he always 
perceived of Thatcherism as highly contradictory and 
sought to show how Thatcherism managed to unify the 
contradictory strands in its discourse and to 
condense subject-positions. It was never meant to 
present Thatcherism exclusively as an ideological 
phenomenon. Hall's purpose in focusing on politics 
and ideology was (p. 3,1988): ,.. to make a more 
general point about the need to develop a 
theoretical and political language on the left which 
rigorously avoids the temptations to economism, 
reductionism or teleological forms of argument. " It 
was a rallying cry against the relatively thin state 
of political and ideological analysis on the left 
and the failure of the Labour Party to establish 
itself as a leading cultural. force in civil society. 
Hay (1992) extended the critique of Hall by 
suggesting his direct application of Gramscils 
conception of hegemony led him necessarily to 
conceive of it only at the level of the bourgeois- 
proletarian class struggle, the logical conclusion 
of which is that Thatcherism represents not only a 
crisis of social democracy but of capitalism itself. 
Yet at no time did the crisis ' constitute a 
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potentially pathological threat to the capitalist 
mode of production, and the primary challenge to the 
Keynesian welfare state came 'f rom the new right. 
Rather, hegemony operates at various levels of 
abstraction from macro (class hegemony), meso 
(electoral hegemony) , to micro (localised hegemony, 
the active consent of a micro-population to an 
ideological 'common sense' pertaining to a 
particular form of social interaction reproduced 
within a specific locale). The post-war settlement 
compromised its meso-level principle of equality at 
the micro-level because of its accommodation to the 
status quo. Thatcherism was involved in a crisis of 
electoral hegemony constructed and articulated 
within the confines imposed by bourgeois hegemony. 
Any attempt to restructure the state by a democratic 
political party (inevitably agents within civil 
society accepting the dominant bourgeois ideology) 
in order to provide the material basis f or a new 
hegemonic project logically cannot constitute a 
challenge to the dominant bourgeois ideology. 
Second, it was suggested that Hall failed to 
appreciate the structural determination of hegemony 
through an overemphasis on the discursive roles 
played by the media and politics in the ideological 
struggle for hegemony, the materialisation of 
ideology. This is the ways in which the institutions 
of civil society mould peoples, lives and the way in 
which the material rewards accruing to sections of 
civil society structure individuals, susceptibility 
and response to political ideologies. Hay's 
theoretical perspective is formulated within a 
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'critical realist epistemology in which actuality is 
constituted through the combination of real 
processes (such as social and political outcomes) 
which are indeterminate within any one structural 
system. Political choice is curtailed by the 
structural determinants of political society, 
constituting the constraints imposed by the existing 
economic relations and the administrative and legal 
structures of the state. These set the framework in 
which electoral hegemony is won, defining the limits 
of the penetration of the state of the institutions 
of civil society, and thus the capacity of the state 
to mould individuals, material experience. Material 
rewards are used to certain micro-populations within 
civil society to render individuals more susceptible 
to the moral and ideological justifications offered 
in the legitimation of 'such benefits, hence (p. 42, 
ibid): "To become potentially hegemonic, a 
Thatcherite ideology must articulate and 'resonate' 
with the material experience of civil society. " The 
state must not only successfully penetrate civil 
society's institutions, but also construct the 
material conditions in which they operate, producing 
a high degree of fit between the material lived 
experience of individuals within civil society and 
the dominant ideology. Hay (1996) has suggested 
consequently a new periodization of Thatcherism, 
and, rightly, that it has meant a 'rolling- 
rightwards, of the state rather than a rolling- 
back'. Thatcherism is seen as a regressive and 
primarily neoliberal project camouflaged by a 
rhetoric of moral conservatism. 
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There is one other criticism of Hall's approach, 
concerning its implicit conception of '-democracy,. 
Thatcherism was regarded as authoritarian populist 
because its mobilisation (a 'popular' movement 
against the power bloc for national unity around the 
free-market programme) cannot be ', democratic' . But 
as with the new right, the stick with which 
Thatcherism is beaten is the too vague and illusory 
one of some form of participatory democracy. 
9.8c Discourse Analysis Within a Multi-Theoretic 
Approach 
Since Hall's analysis is self-consciously partial, 
and Hay's additions useful, it seems that the 
insights offered into Thatcherism by discourse 
theory are valuable but limited. Most importantly 
such an approach lacks an explicit political economy 
of advanced industrial societies, and its role in 
relation to other approaches must be designated. 
This has been attempted by Bertramsen, Thomsen and 
. Torfing 
(1991), who integrate discourse theory, 
regulation theory, and strategic-relational 
approaches to state analysis, and so blur. the lines 
of demarcation between state, economy and society. 
Since discourse analysis operates at a more general 
and abstract level than the other two approaches, it 
serves as a central point of reference and 
emphasises the primacy of the 'political' without 
being allocated the universal master theory. Each 
theory represents different vantage points on the 
same 'whole'. 
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Following Jessop, state, economy and society should 
be analysed as institutional orders whose 
substantive unity is never pre-given, but created by 
the political struggles which take place within and 
outside them. Intra-social relations are shaped by a 
hegemonic project advancing a national-popular 
programme capable of articulating a specific form of 
the state with a particular accumulation strategy 
and a stable social base. But the social formation 
is "open-ended' because it is subverted constantly 
by a constitutive outside which prevents its 
closure. 
Discourse theory has focused mainly on the 
precariousness and fluidity of ideological 
formations and social 'identities within civil 
society but paid little attention to the enduring 
fixity of rules, norms and resources sedimented to 
varying degrees in particular forms of state 
apparatuses and political economy (nor the 
discursive construction of the economy, and '*the 
state' themselves). Regulation theory can appreciate 
the dynamic processes through which the 'determined 
autonomy' of the state itself becomes an object of 
regulation and the capitalist economy politically 
constituted, organised and reproduced in a 
relatively stable manner. The capitalist system 
survives because tensions are regulated by specific 
institutional forms, societal norms and networks of 
strategic conduct (but which cannot be explained by 
their functionality for capitalist accumulation) . 
Yet on its own, regulation theory tends to 
marginalise political agency. Strategic-relational 
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state analysis can compensate by stressing the 
importance of political forces as well as the 
centrality of the state to the dynamic of modern 
societies (for example, the way in which a 
particular regulatory ensemble is the outcome of 
political interventions conducted by political 
agents). Jessop (1990) has conceived of the state as 
a non-unified and decentred ensemble, characterised 
by a particular strategic selectivity which is 
itself an outcome of the political struggles between 
various social agents. 
The combination of approaches allows an 
understanding of societal processes of economic 
regulation as hegemonic practices, but such 
practiges cannot in any simple way be reduced to 
economic logics or only one logic of capital 
accumulation. Economic policy becomes a subfield for 
the politics of societal hegemony. The achievement 
and sustenance of state power presupposes a broad 
political strategy which transcends narrow economic- 
corporate interests, and the purpose of different 
economic state interventions cannot be taken for 
granted. When the arena for analysis is defined as a 
particular historical bloc, the integration of these 
perspectives becomes necessary to gain a complete 
picture of advanced industrial societies and their 
intra-social relations. Hence (Bertramsen et al., 
P. 205,1991) "The complementary problems of the 
three perspectives can ' be compensated for by 
stressing their complementary advantages. Thus, 
discourse analysis provides a much needed account of 
hegemony, strategic-relational state analysis offers 
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a valuable account of the selectivity inscribed in 
societal institutions and regulation theory breaks 
new ground with its account of the political 
structuration of economic life in particular, and 
societal reproduction in general. " 
Discourse theory has facilitated the analysis of new 
right and Thatcherite discourses on citizenship, and 
the recognition that the apparently progressive 
citizenship discourse could be appropriated by the 
right for regressive ends. The case studies have 
shown in part how this was achieved. The above type 




However, it must be emphasised that discourse theory 
is not overwhelmed by the addition of other 
supposedly more concrete f orms of analysis within a 
multitheoretic explanation, but retained as central 
to understanding the Thatcherite project. As has 
been suggested, the new right can be regarded as a 
theoretical project for a rigid social order [3.111. 
Thatcherism can be seen as the political project 
seeking to impose such an order and supported by the 
new right's discursive order, though not 
characterised simply as the direct translation of 
new right ideas into policy given the other demands 
on Thatcherism which have been noted. The end of 
this project is what is meant here by the term the 
'market society'. 
This may be fleshed out with reference to Karl 
Polanyi's The Great Transformation (1944), a 
somewhat neglected work which is apposite 
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particularly in the context of the revival of 
economic liberalism. Polanyi developed a critique of 
economic liberalism both as a political creed and as 
an account of the' nature of industrial society. He 
took seriously the role of culture and ethics, given 
his roots in anthropology, which were neglected in 
the neoclassical orthodoxy and Marxist counter- 
arguments. He criticised the disembedding under 
capitalism of economic activity from people's social 
relations. His dispute with economic liberalism 
focused on the issue of whether primacy should be 
accorded to the economic over the social and 
political. He argued a market economy can only exist 
in a market society' . The I self-regulating' market 
system is a myth. He traced the historical 
development of that society, arguing that the 
consequences of the market economy for human welfare 
were so extreme that they generated, political 
movements which demanded change and led eventually 
to the successful imposition of regulation and 
control. 10 To Polanyi, modern industrial society, 
despite the relative newness of the free market, 
remains in continuity with the great social orders 
of the past. It continues to protect itself against 
the forces which undermine its social solidarity and 
10 As Laclau (P. 57,1990) has suggested similarly: "The 
objective nature of the laws of the market, their operation 
outside the will and awareness of the producers, constituted 
an intelligible principle of social functioning-, but one 
which, like all pre-capitalist mechanisms of social 
reproduction, escaped the conscious intervention of the agents 
and did not therefore give space to alternative possibilities. 
It is with the transition to.. Iorganized capitalism, that the 
element of conscious regulation - and thus an eminently 
political regulation - begins to take on a new centrality. " 
Also Baum (1996). 
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threaten to distort its relationship to the natural 
environment. He suggested that in the long-term the 
%self-regulating' market economy and democracy are 
irreconcilable. Either the market will give way to a 
more co-operative social economy, or if the market 
remains in force it will depend increasingly on 
authoritarian protective rule. Polanyi rejected 
neither markets nor industrialisation. What he 
expected was that the emergence of a counter- 
movement would lead to a retrieval of a sense of 
social solidarity and create conditions in which 
markets and industries serve, rather than destroy, 
human community. This is the need to re-embed the 
economy -a participatory, decentralised industrial 
economy. 
The value of Polanyi's approach lies in the 
recognition that market societies are not natural, 
but are made, and made primarily by states. The 
'free market' is an institutional structure which 
does not emerge spontaneously from an inherent 
proclivity but is planned and state-sponsored. 'Homo 
Economicus, is a product of the market society and 
not the other way around. A market society is not 
merely one in which resistance to the market 
principle is disabled through legislation or in 
which the free market project is politically 
hegemonic, but one in which most institutions and 
the everyday orientation of social actors are 
brought into line with the principles of the market: 
%individualism', 'competition', ', self-interest". 
These are not givens, but social constructs - hence 
the conceivable link between Polanyi's thesis and 
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discourse theory. The market subject not only lends 
ideological support to these principles, but comes 
to embody the new order in everyday action. It is 
possible to embody this ethic without lending it 
explicit intellectual support. Most importantly, in 
constructing a political order in which occurs, the 
autonomy of the supposedly irrevocable 'free market' 
is protected. In other words, the operations and 
consequences of the market are accepted in exactly 
the manner in which the new right, and the 
neoliberal new right in particular, would wish - 
uncritically. 
This suggests that regulation theory's concentration 
on the explicit restrictive mechanisms by which the 
state ensures capitalist reproduction should be 
joined by discourse theory's awareness of the way in 
which market subjects are constructed and market 
principles and understandings conveyed. A multi- 
theoretic approach then has the potential to 
identify not just the economic but also the 
political and social (behavioural) parameters of 
market activity. Hence the importance of both 
substantive legislative and institutional reforms 
made under Thatcherism, and accompanying discursive 
strategies, both examined in the case studies. 
Polanyi developed his thesis in the age of the 
supposedly irreversible advance of collectivism at 
the expense of economic liberalism, but it appears 
increasingly pertinent in the counter-age of the 
resurgence of 'liberal market utopianism'. The 
counter-movement in the contemporary era has come 
from the right, not the left. 
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Thatcherism acted in many dimensions and. on many 
fronts, in terms of discursive strategies. But there 
were linking themes which were used, across 
different areas of policy. Two examples are noted 
here, both of which are relevant to 'citizenship, as 
constructed under Thatcherism. 
9.8e 'Enterprise Culture' 
The '*enterprise culture' was a significant 
collection of discourses deployed by Thatcherism 
(Keat and Abercrombie 1991) . The f irst main aspect 
of the 'enterprise culture, is its intervention in 
terms of values. The acquisition and exercise of 
'enterprising' qualities must be encouraged, and by 
implication, tendencies which are deemed to hinder, 
let alone challenge, such qualities must be 
neutralised or reversed. Hence the importance, 
though ultimately the fallacy, of the new right's 
(historical) arguments that such 'qualities' are 
'natural', even distinctively British or English 
(Clarke, Macfarland, Letwin). This is the basis on 
which notions of 'self-reliance, and 'independence' 
are constructed, as well as supposed opposites 
contrasted, such as the 'dependency culture'. In 
particular, 'responsibility, is defined in a 
specific manner, in this sense in direct fiscal 
terms (the conservative active citizenship, sense 
of 'responsibility, is seen as complimentary to 
this). These discourses are not concerned simply 
with how citizens act, but how they see the 
behaviour of themselves and other citizens a form 
of ', cultural engineering'. This is not especially 
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innovatory in terms of an analysis, af ter all, the 
proponents of the "enterprise culture' themselves 
such as David Young spoke frequently of the 
importance of focusing on the transformation of the 
culture and psychology of citizens (Morris, 'Freeing 
the Spirit of Enterprise,, chapter one, Selden, 'The 
Rhetoric of Enterprise', chapter three, ibid). As 
with many aspects of Thatcherism, this project was 
most advanced in the third term. 
The second main aspect of the 'enterprise culture' 
was that public institutions must be remodelled 
along the lines of commercial enterprises, or at 
least a model presumed to approximate them. 
9.8f **The New Autonomy' of Institutions 
An analysis, drawing on Polanyi Is insights, into 
Thatcherite public sector ref orms has been made by 
Scott (1996), who shows how the movement to devolve 
powers from the centre should not blind analysts to 
the role such institutions have played in greater 
social regulation. Especially important to the 
constitution of the economic subject is the 
structure of rewards through which the social order 
seeks to assure its maintenance. and reproduction, 
which guarantees a degree of predictability at the 
level of social action (this reflects the point made 
earlier by Hay). Scott sees the devolved budget and 
cost/service centre reforms (such as those in health 
and education) as the organisational embodiment of 
the political beliefs of the Thatcher era. The new 
worker serves his employer not through loyalty but 
through initiative motivated by the inducements 
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provided by a loosened organisational structure. 
Hierarchical control is maintained by changing 
actors, orientations and ethic through altering the 
environment through which they act. The ', new 
autonomy' is real but its beneficiaries find 
themselves in shifting opportunity structures within 
which they do not have direct control. Combined with 
other factors' inhibiting collective action, their 
newly won autonomy is unlikely to translate into 
effective control. This is the underlying source of 
stability of both social and hierarchical relations 
within such internal markets. As in traditional 
organisations, agents have little influence over 
strategy, but they nevertheless shoulder a greater 
direct responsibility for success or failure. Under 
these conditions agents are no longer servants of 
but paradoxically entrepreneurs for an institution. 
Hence while responsibility becomes devolved, power 
shifts to the centre. Elites are freed from the 
necessity of continual participation in the flow of 
commands on a routine daily basis, enabling them to 
focus on the development of strategies whose 
implementation they do not have to supervise 
directly. in this limited sense only, a 
characterisation of Thatcherism as Icentre autonomy' 
(Bulpitt) is correct, but it fails to grasp the 
purpose of the project. 
9.8g Case Studies as Projects for the 'Market 
Society' 
The case studies are valuable in illustrating this 
analysis. The Education Reform Act, and grant- 
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maintained schools in particular, illustrate the 
nature of the new autonomy, effectively re- 
orientating actors by altering the structure of 
their environment (more generally achieved by local 
management of schools) . The national curriculum is 
the explicit mechanism for central control, but the 
developing structure itself is more revealing as to 
how direct central intervention appears to be 
restrained while hierarchical control is 
strengthened significantly. Previously established 
discursive strategies can be seen as crucial for the 
legitimation of the reform project - identifying the 
widespread 'problems, with state education and their 
sources (in the structure, ideology, and interests 
of that system) , and impressing how an agenda based 
on (a very restrictively defined conception of) 
, choice, and 'standards' would resolve these 
problems. 
The Community Charge was a mechanism designed to end 
a failed pattern of explicit central government 
intervention,. while achieving simultaneously the 
centre Is strategic aims by establishing a mechanism 
of rewards 'shaping the environment of local 
democracy. But the construction of interests was not 
inevitable or solely material. Thatcherite 
discourses were crucial in establishing the 
*, problem' with local government, and the necessity 
of the reform programme. They demanded progress 
towards the 'popular' 'efficient, limited 
contracting local authority, made '-accountable, by 
the selective fiscal-oriented participation of local 
citizens. 
443 
The new autonomy witnessed in the education and 
local government reforms used citizenship as a 
reforming principle to reinforce the principles of 
the 'free economy' and the 'strong state'. Workfare 
and active citizenship used citizenship as a 
reforming principle for exactly the same ends, 
defining the nature of the 'productive citizen, and 
his proper mode of behaviour. Hence all four case 
studies represent elements of the attempted 
Thatcherite construction of the economic subject and 
the reinforcement of the economic, social and 
political parameters of the market society. 
Scott may be too deterministic in that he neglects 
that the design and reform of such structures is 
also subject to political struggle and contingency, 
but the value of such an analysis is that it cuts 
through the crude dichotomy between market and 
bureaucracy-state and enables theorisation of how 
such reforms are about ', control'. " Here, the Free, 
Economy/Strong State summary of Thatcherism can be 
extended to analyse policy change, the state is 
crucial in constructing the parameters for the free 
economy. This shows how inadequate theorisations of 
11 As Scott states (p. 104 ibid) : "The importation of new 
management models from the private into the public sector 
provides one clue to the central paradox of contemporary 
British life. At a time when the ideological underpinning of 
'the new utopian project appears to be crumbling, its power 
over our lives grows. " Because of the translation of the 
pattern of belief into habitual behaviour and institutional 
arrangements, the 'accelerated Thatcherism of the 
institutions' can continue without Thatcherism as a p(? pular 
and populist political ideology. The new right's ideology 
becomes a seemingly neutral organisational technique. This is 
the reason why such reforms have been so difficult for the 
opposition to challenge. 
444 
Thatcherism as merely a deregulatory capital project 
are (ironically, they too subscribe to the idea that 
the 'free mark et utopia, is somewhat autonomous and 
self-regulating). It reconciles the genuinely 
emancipatory effects of markets with an analysis of 
how the market order is constructed by constituting 
new subjects in positive and routine everyday ways, 
even amongst those agents who do not lend it support 
at a political or ideological level. As with 
Polanyi's analysis, this represents both a 
methodological and political advance, since it 
challenges (neo-) liberalism's self-image. 
The notion of the 'dominant political culture' has 
been outlined previously [3.10]. Thatcherism's 
advantage iii this culture was significant, but it 
was given that advantage in part by the inadequacy 
of the left's theory. Hence it was allowed to 
appropriate many discourses for its own strategic 
ends. 
With the methodologies outlined here, this political 
culture may be theorised more fully. The relative 
stability of the characteri sat ions of the meanings 
of 'freedom', 'liberty' and 'rights, in this culture 
represents their significantly sedimented nature. 
They are quite fixed discursively, given their 
relation to structural constraints, and the 
discursive effort that has been spent on making them 
so. But the insights from discourse analysis and 
Polanyi reveal in addition that they are constructs 
all the same, secured deliberately by states seeking 
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to bring social action and institutions into line 
with market principles. 
Previous characterisations of Thatcherite discourses 
have tended to homogenise them, trying to construct 
one broad discourse which can then be summed up in a 
single phrase. But a multi-theoretic approach 
mitigates against this. The use of case studies 
shows discourses alter between policy areas, though 
there may be common themes. The politics of support 
can show why the some targets of discourses were 
more strategically important than others. The 
introduction of forms of political economic analysis 
can show why particular policy areas were thought 
important for reform, and how such reforms linked to 
the broader accumulation project, hence how 
discourses may have been deployed for specific 
ideological purposes. For example, as the 
examination of the conservative active citizenship 
discourse noted, the left's reaction to its apparent 
hypocrisy neglected its strategic purpose within the 
Thatcherite project - the hegemonic capture of the 
themes of civil society. of course it was in 
contradiction to other aspects of Thatcherism, both 
its discourses and reforms. Active citizenship used 
a different discourse on obligation, for example, 
than that used in the education reforms, poll tax or 
workfare, because the target audience of the 
interpellation was different as was the intended 
effect. Instead, the key aspect to be caught is the 
purpose of the project. 
9.9 ', Two Nations' ? 
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However different discourses were deployed for 
strategically selective effects, the notion of 
Thatcherism as a purposeful political project does 
demand an overall coherence of purpose, which must 
imply what Thatcherite citizenship was. A popular 
conception of that purpose has been provided by 
Jessop et al. (1988)., who present Thatcherism as a 
'Two Nations' strategy. This aimed to break 'One 
Nationism, and recompose the Conservative vote. Two 
Nations attempted the unification of 'good citizens' 
and 1hardworkers' (productive) against a contained 
and subordinate nation, and particularly 'parasitic, 
citizens. 12 The main elements of this strategy were 
four: an explicit rejection of Keynesian welfare 
state integration; the presentation of divisions on 
a single vertical cleavage and in terms of blunt 
dichotomies; the recomposition of the Conservative 
working class in a privatised instrumentalist 
direction via the market; and state intervention to 
ensure greater production. 13 Its main thrust was to 
12 of course, it'should be noted that welfare provided through 
occupational and fiscal channels and through the subsidising 
of 'private' markets is often ignored, especially in 
discussions of citizenship (Harrison 1991). 
13 Gamble (1988) also suggests the shift away from One Nation 
Toryism with its conception of unification of a nation 
composed of many different interests and classes through a 
common citizenship and a common loyalty to an ideal of 
nationhood, as a central thrust of Thatcherism (particularly 
as an electoral strategy). Krieger (1986) termed Thatcherism a 
Ide-integrative strategy, which capitalised on a political 
environment in which a large percentage of voters were liable 
to reject the premises of social democracy. It could no longer 
consolidate a political base when an economic downturn 
exacerbated differences among its own constituency, but 
Thatcherism could resolve' the tensions with strategies for 
economic growth which exacerbated class, race and gender 
divisions, which consciously rejected the welfarist 
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benefit those who belonged to the productive core of 
the market economy through state benefits and the 
rewards of the market, in contrast to those seen as 
marginal to the market economy who would experience 
deteriorating economic conditions and reduced social 
welfare. This- was supposedly consciously different 
from a One Nation project which involves an 
inclusive and expansive conception of the social and 
political community and in intent tries to transcend 
differences and to share necessary sacrifices and 
benefits. 
Thatcherism was divisory, in many respects, but not 
necessarily in such crude terms. 14 Yet the 
conception of political projects as one/Two Nation 
is somewhat unsophisticated as the end result of a 
complex theorisation of Thatcherism, and retains 
echoes, of the deterministic approaches the authors 
consciously seek to supersede. Just as Jessop et al. 
have admitted to assuming initially connections 
between 'flexibility,, post-Fordist accumulation 
strategies and Thatcherism, 'so the danger with the 
Two Nations thesis is that it assumes relations 
between discourses, actual strategies and reforms, 
and social and economic effects. It suggests a 
rather crude divide between One Nation Conservatism 
and Two Nation Thatcherism. The former is accepted 
uncritically, as a marginally different form of 
integrative norms of the post-war era. See also Offe's (1987) 
narrowing of the 'parameters of sameness'. 
14 Smith (1994) with regard to sexuality: Thatcherism tended 
to avoid simple attacks on a fixed enemy', but employed 
differentiations (for example, between 'good homosexuals, and 
%dangerous queerness). 
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social democratic integrationist politics. Given 
Jessop et al. Is proclaimed sensitivity to, context 
and changing historical conditions, this is 
problematic. It does not really examine what has 
changed and what remains in Conservative discourse 
and strategy, between regimes which have operated at 
different times and under different conditions. 
Thatcherism did after all have its own One Nation 
discourse, which may be summarised as ', one nation 
under property rights and nationalism', just as One 
Nation Conservatism did. It appeared very much 
conscious of rhetorical strategies to affirm its one 
nationism, the '-national interest', threats to the 
nation, and so on. of course, this is a naive 
reading of political rhetoric, but discourses cannot 
be rejected or accepted at will because of the 
normative inclination that some are used to mask 
other strategies, while some refer to the 'truth' of 
any project. Presumably Two Nations is not meant to 
suggest that Thatcherism sought to undermine its 
governing project by'creating an unpoliceable second 
nation, and so it must at least imply limits to the 
deliberate marginalisation of the unprivileged. Yet 
as the examination of new right conceptions of 
citizenship shows, other forms of social integration 
were proposed (through the market, and civil 
society) , and an analysis of Thatcherism such as 
Hall's shows how it appeared to offer radical forms 
of inclusiveness as well which exploited the 
exhaustion of social democracy. 
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Jessop et al. point to the strategic use of the 
product ive/parasitic discursive dichotomy. But, the 
characterisation of the dominant political culture 
suggests that this dichotomy is a highly sedimented 
discourse. The culture has always been primarily 
productivist, in terms of the importance of an 
individual's relation to the market and its 
benefits. This is why Thatcherism's 'economic 
realism, was relatively easy. to construct and 
deploy, and difficult to resist and counter. 
In this context, the rejection of Keynesian welfare 
state integration must be 'examined. Jessop et al. 
suggest this is a key justification for Thatcherism 
being characterised as a Two Nations strategy. But 
the form of integration assumed under post-war 
regimes is contentious-Inequality persisted, though 
lessened, and truly effective mechanisms for 
political participation were not advanced during 
this era. 15 
It also seems to neglect previous Conservative 
appeals to sectional interests. Jessop et al. 
suggest that there is a fundamental difference 
between Thatcherism and preceding conservative 
regimes as the former 'consciously' uses these 
appeals as part of its general hpgemonic strategy. 
But given the significant change of economic, 
political and social, contexts, particularly the 
3-5 Jessop et al. (p. 177,1988) suggest that Thatcherism's 
vision of individual participation in the market under popular 
capitalism via atomised consumption allowed it to claim to 
speak for the people' while eroding simultaneously those 
, remaining representative structures with any real power', but 
it is never clear which structures they are referring to. 
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conditions of the 1970s, the unchanging 
'consciousness' qualification to the One/Two Nations 
dimension is inadequate. Jessop et al. do not 
indicate what must be taken as evidence of a 
conscious Two Nations strategy, which implies this 
is really an interpretation of the social effects of 
Thatcherism, rather than having been - theorised 
properly into their account of Thatcherite strategy. 
The lack of recognition here of established 
Conservative governing techniques is crucial. 
Conservative regimes, in the context of mass 
democracy, have always been conscious of the need to 
recompose the 'conservative working class, in a 
privatised instrumentalist direction via the market. 
Conservative regimes which have 'failed, have done 
so in this regard. Thatcherism's 'popular 
capitalism' and the policies associated with it 
(individual shareholding, council house sales, 
property-owning, private welfare and pension 
provision) were astute examples, but the concept can 
also be seen as a recurring 'element in Conservative 
statecraft. 
Further, the actual extent to which Thatcherism 
destroyed Keynesian welfare state integration is a 
compound of assumptions. For example, it is 
important to examine *to what extent Thatcherite 
reforms have eroded citizenship rights both formally 
and effectively, especially rights to welfare 
services, benefits and so on, and to what extent 
these served practically as forms of integration, 
or, in the context of the dominant political 
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culture, actually dis-integration. The social 
experience of welf are recipients may be regarded as 
the prime example of the latter. 
Thatcherite citizenship should not be reduced to the 
Two Nations thesis. It seems like an attempt to 
claim Thatcherism could not appropriate citizenship 
given the supposed direct contradiction between a 
divisory two nations and the universality' of 
citizenship. The absence of a critical theorisation 
of citizenship is the inadequate basis upon which 
the implication of the Two Nations thesis is made - 
that Thatcherism's discourses on 'freedom' and 
'opportunity' were only the illusory overlay for the 
real class project - seems a return to the 
inflexibility of orthodox Marxist accounts. To 
suggest this is not to deny the regressive effects 
of Thatcherism. There have been widening divisions 
in wealth and increases in absolute poverty, 
erosions of liberties under law, and of sexual, 
political, and moral freedoms, and a lack of 
progress (even regression) on political rights, 
accountability and open government. These are all 
aspects of the expansion of The Coercive State 
(Hillyard and Percy-Smith 1988, Index an Censorship 
1995). Decision-making has become even more 
exclusive, participation . 
further marginalised, 
rights eroded, information restricted, and the 
state's role expanded to intervene in more areas of 
people's lives. 
The case studies illustrate this. The structure the 
Education Reform Act has Initiated is divisory, and 
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its narrow selectionism will effect adversely those 
already disadvantaged within the system. As the 
scope of the meaning of ', education' is restricted, 
within the structural constraints of the system and 
the confines of the national curriculum and testing, 
social, economic and cultural biases may effect the 
progress of oft-neglected groups. The Community 
Charge impoverished the already disadvantaged, both 
directly and by forcing reductions in local 
services, and would have done so increasingly if it 
had survived. It seriously limited the scope of 
purpose of local democracy. As present schemes are 
organised, workfare will not lead to the 
reintegration of benefit recipients into mainstream 
work society on a non-stigmatised and properly- 
resourced basis, especially not in the context of 
increased poverty, insecurity, and absence of 
adequately paid full-time employment. 
Yet, these developments make it more important to 
understand how and why a supposedly progressive 
notion such as citizens hip can be appropriated by 
the right f or a regime which has, in sum, eroded 
citizenship for many. If it is to be taken 
seriously, and if progress towards universal' 
citizenship is to be achieved, then this is crucial. 
It is hardly marginal to the question of 
Thatcherism. Again, the Free Economy/Strong State 
characterisation of Thatcherism is fundamental in 
understanding how important it was to the political 
project to control the social effects of the 
neoliberal political-economic programme. 
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9.10 Thatcherism as a Project in Citizenship 
"What I am desperately trying to do is to create one 
nation, with everyone being a man of property, or 
having the opportunity to be a man of property. 113.6 
Thatcherism was a purposeful (though not wholly 
coherent or homogenous) political project to restore 
Conservative Party hegemony born of the 'crisis, of 
the 1970s. As Gamble has suggested, this crisis 
concerned the decline of the Party, the exhaustion 
of the previous regime of accumulation and British 
economic decline, and the decline in the authority 
of the British state. However internationalist 
Thatcherism appeared oriented (in terms of capital), 
its focus was specifically on the British state, 
economy and society, and was often itself prey to 
transnational forces and developments. 
It was of course a capitalist -oriented regime, but 
cannot merely be reduced to a single economic logic 
-a multi-theoretic approach resists this. It 
certainly was a productivist phenomenon, but in a 
broader and more significant sense than that 
suggested by Jessop et al. A multi-theoretic 
approach allows investigation from many angles of 
Thatcherism's attempt to construct a market society 
and the reconstitution of social action within it, 
rather than merely to deregulate a market economy. 
Economic policy becomes a subfield for the politics 
of societal hegemony, and the project Thatcherism 
set out on was broader than the political response 
16 Margaret Thatcher, interview with Hugo Young, February 1983 
(Holmes, p. 210,1985). 
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to narrow economic- corporate interests alone. Once 
this fundamental insight is recdgnised, the value of 
a plurality of approaches is appreciated. They are 
necessary to capture all the different aspects of 
such a significant project. 
Thatcherism helped construct a significant change in 
the climate of opinion, often from micro-level 
foundations, effectively seizing on discontents, and 
there was some real basis to these discontents. It 
consequently both helped construct, and exploited to 
optimum effect, the sense that collectivism was 
exhausted. Though periods of pragmatism and 
confusion can be identified, this should not detract 
from the theorisation of its project but reinforce 
the primacy of political constraints and 
contingencies which occurred while it attempted to 
achieve its aims. Some of the apparently 
contradictory policy developments under Thatcherism 
had their source in changing strategies to achieve 
relatively stable ends. 
In short, Thatcherism was a highly ideological 
project, both in terms of influences upon it and its 
role in constructing discourses to legitimate its 
actions and disarm its opponents. This was apparent 
in its general strategies, and specific reform 
programmes, however incoherent they may have 
appeared at certain stages. The focus here has been 
on the most developed phase of Thatcherism, though 
it has still been important to recognise the limits 
of its reforms in many areas. , 
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Thatcherite discourses concerned neoliberal and 
neoconservative themes, but it was keen to 
appropriate useful discourses f rom other strands of 
thought. The discursive analysis of Thatcherism 
shows why some earlier but limited characterisatiofis 
(-for example, Letwin's 'vigorous virtues'), can 
still have a role, since they describe elements of 
Thatcherite discourses. It deployed selectively 
discourses for particular effects (though of course 
not always successfully) , and was highly conscious 
of the politics of support, the construction and 
consolidation of alliances of interest thought 
necessary to its own electoral-winning constituency, 
which it tried to incorporate into its reforms. 
Within this project, citizenship was appropriated. 
The reformulated conceptualisation of citizenship 
reveals its complex and contradictory role in social 
inclusion and exclusion. It has shown citizenship as 
a concept (or rather bundle of concepts with an 
ethical core) rather than as a theory, and its 
potential for use in political strategies. 
Thatcherism developed a varied, contingent, but 
powerful notion of citizenship and #s usage, at 
many times outflanking the left's supposed 
'monopoly'. 
Drawing on Hay's disaggregation of levels of 
hegemonic struggle, the case studies have 
illustrated Thatcherite operations at the micro- 
level - localised hegemony, the search for the 
active consent of a micro-population to an 
ideological 'common sense' pertaining to a 
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particular form of social interaction reproduced 
within a specific locale. one of the reasons why 
these reforms have been so problematic for the 
opposition has been their strategic use of 
citizenship (participation, duties, obligation, 
rights) in order to achieve Thatcherite ideological 
goals. The difference between citizenship discourse 
and Thatcherite ideology has been maintained through 
the recognition that discourses can be used 
ideologically and directionally (3.8e]. 
In addition Thatcherism appeared particularly astute 
with regard to the varying degrees of sedimentation 
of discourses, that is, politically aware as to what 
social understandings and perceptions could be 
changed with ef f ort, and which probably could not. 
This seems especially true in relation to the 
dominant political culture described, which 
Thatcherism, aided by the absence of the left, 
capitalised on. 
Thatcherism exploited the non-progressive aspects of 
citizenship (its exclusiveness, localism, and 
individualism), downgraded political participation 
where it threatened the project, used it selectively 
where it assisted it. As with the new right, 
Thatcherism used the f aulty discursive construction 
of citizenship, most prominently the divide 
(tension) between civil, political and social 
rights, and its weak relationship in . legitimating 
social democratic institutions (such as 
comprehensive schools, local 'democratic' 
participation, unemployment benef it and the welfare 
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state). So* the notion that Thatcherism's only 
dynamic in relation to citizenship was a retreat 
f rom social rights to civil rights is misleading. 
Indeed, the case studies reveal that in many 
respects the explicit abolition of social rights 
under Thatcherism was limited, though the project's 
ends were largely achieved. 
Of course, the aims of Thatcherism were very 
different from the ethical ideal at the heart of 
citizenship, 'universal membership'. The coercive 
and authoritarian dimension (the underlying dynamic) 
of Thatcherism can be captured in two ways - the 
regulatory mechanisms including legislation which 
actually secured explicit authoritarian rules, and 
the broader project of seeking to establish the 
market society by bringing into line institutions 
and the everyday orientation of social actors with 
the principles of the market. 
only this strand of the multi-theoretic approach can 
grasp a crucial part of Thatcherism, s politics of 
support without the danger of universalising its 
appeal (the criticism made of Hall Is conception) . 
This is because it both appreciates the potential 
meso (electoral) level appeal of Thatcherism, and 
the more particular efforts to construct micro 
(localised) appeal. Both of course are not limited 
to discursive strategies, but incorporate also the 
deliberate construction of material rewards. It 
forces an understanding of how Thatcherism's project 
was designed to go well beyond its explicit 
supporters, to secure the new order in everyday 
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action. 17 The relative success of Thatcherism is 
shown in the conversion of its political opponents 
to parts of its agenda, particularly the dominance 
of market principles. 
In terms of the political, social, cultural and 
economic effects of Thatcherism, ', Two Nations' is 
correct in broad terms, but this cannot serve as a 
general summation of the purpose of Thatcherism as a 
political project. As with 'Free Economy/Strong 
State', or 'Conservative Capitalism' (Hoover and 
Plant 1989), it is descriptive of important elements 
of Thatcherism's agenda. But its purpose'was the re- 
construction of the market society, kind of 'great 
market retransformation'. Only this captures its 
hegemonic aspirations, and hence its significance. 
This is not a full analysis of Thatcherism based on 
a multi-theoretic approach, particularly its forms 
of regulation and state strategy, but a broad 
outline. It suggests that the research agenda on 
Thatcherism is far from exhausted. 
9.11 Thatcherism and Conservatism 
This argument may be extended to suggest how 
Thatcherism may relate to contemporary British 
conservative, politics. It was a recurring subtext to 
17 ThIs kind of analysis undermines the critique thatý 
Thatcherism was a 'crusade that failed' (Crewe 1989) in the 
contest over values. Reliance on orthodox polling data alone 
does not reveal the significant sedimentation of market 
principles particularly amongst those who do not identify 
specifically with Thatcherism as a party political agenda, or 
acknowledge that hegemony does not depend on the explicit and 
unequivocal expression of support for specific initiatives. 
The key is the apparent absence or exhaustion of alternatives, 
hence 'agreement' with Thatcherism. 
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Thatcherism as to whether it represented 'authentic' 
conservative traditions or a largely 'foreign' (and 
therefore supposedly destructive) political project. 
Defences of Thatcherism as a return to the 'true' 
Conservative tradition were mounted from the late- 
1970s onwards. 18 But of course these had a specific 
political purpose: to reassure the Party that a 
project regarded as alien to its traditions was not 
being foistered upon- it, and often to point 
implicitly or otherwise to the inadequacy of post- 
war conservatism. Such arguments tended consequently 
towards simplicity, and an over-reliance on 
Thatcherism's conservative rhetoric. But the 
alternative under-theorised Thatcherite 
exceptionalism has been unhelpful by'neglecting 
the continuities between the Thatcher Governments 
and previous Conservative regimes. Hopefully a 
multi-theoretic approach of the type outlined here 
can avoid both dangers, retaining a conception of 
the significance of Thatcherism while linking it to 
some strands of conservative thought and discourse, 
and some established governing principles. 
As suggested, the characterisation of Thatcherism as 
a Two Nations strategy, and hence a distinct break 
from previous One Nation Conservative regimes, is 
unhelpful. Part of the reason for the electoral 
success of the Conservative Party has been its 
discourses of citizenship - the importance of the 
nation, family, duty, patriotism, unity, and the 
'18 Blake (1985), Joseph (1975), Thomas (1976), Lawson (1980), 
Willetts (1992), Harris (1989). 
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naturalness of hierarchy - while in the post-war 
'settlement' appearing to link this with support for 
the institutions and policies associated with social 
democratic citizenship (particularly the social 
rights to welfare) . This has encouraged the notion 
that such regimes could be associated with one 
nationism because they appeared conscious of the 
importance of social integration, and how it was a 
supporting. foundation for their governing project. 
Yet therein lies the danger of a too benign 
characterisation of pre-Thatcherite Conservative one 
nationism. Such strategies were part of an overall 
governing project, rather than governing projects 
being subsumed into one nationism ideology, which 
seems to equate to some level of social cohesion. 
'one Nation, was of course also a useful strategy in 
highlighting the supposedly (class) %divisive, 
nature of the Labour Party. 
Some aspects of conservative thought and discourse 
remained. in Thatcherism. In particular, Thatcherism 
retained traditional conservative discourses on the 
nation, family and duty. Thatcherism, as with 
previous Conservative regimes, was in some sense of 
protean ideology, taking opponents ideas and 
adapting them (Evans and Taylor 199G). This has been 
conservatism's traditional response to the dilemma 
of introducing a popular element in order to 
legitimise social, political and economic inequality 
without challenging the status quo or admitting 
citizens directly into the governing process. 
Thatcherite discourse appeared as much concerned 
with maintaining one nation as previous conservative 
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regimes had, if not more so, yet in a more 
fundamental manner. It integrated one nationism into 
a nationalistic and liberal economic discourse. This 
can only be contextualised when Thatcherism is seen 
as a political project to reinforce the market 
society. In this sense, the One Nation/Two Nations 
dichotomy obscures the purpose of Thatcherism. It 
was more seriously engaged in a one nation project 
than other post-war Conservative regimes ever had 
been - all citizens integrated into or rather 
observing the behavioural modes of the market 
society, and conscious of its rules, norms, limits 
and procedures. No previous Conservative regime had 
the ambition, chance or need to follow such a 
project, and so genuine comparisons between 
Thatcherism and previous Conservative regimes are 
difficult. As Gamble (p. 237,1988) suggested: "'The 
kind of task which Thatcherism has been called on to 
perform is an unusual one in the history of 
Conservatism. British Conservatives have generally 
been used to operating within an establishe d 
hegemony. Attempting to dismantle and discredit 
institutions, structures and policies which once 
carried the full authority of the state is not 
normally characteristic of Conservatives-But 
understood as statecraft, aimed at determining the 
Conservative party interest and restoring the 
freedom of action and the authority of the party in 
government, Thatcherism is placed firmly in the most 
central Conservative tradition of all. " 
A general common strategic thread runs through all 
post-war (and previous) Conservative regimes - forms 
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of material and discursive social integration for 
the sake of the Conservative governing project. So 
while Thatcherism was an important rupture., it was 
primarily one which may be defined with reference to 
its ambitions for the market society, rather than 
with traditional Conservative governing codes.. This 
is why suggesting all Conservative regimes are only 
after 'power' neglects important qualifications 
(Davies 1995). As has been suggested, the key 
Conservative ideas of the twentieth century have 
been the protection of property and the extension of 
property ownership, the first more than the second 
(Ramsden 1996). 
This was why Thatcherism's interventions were in 
many ways deeper and more profound than One Nation 
conservatism's ever were. 
Following insights from discourse analysis, they had 
to be. As suggested (3.81, the political 
re4rticulation of 'the social' (or at least the 
established social) has become more necessary in the 
context of the increasing dislocation of structure 
under contemporary capitalism. More and more areas 
of social must become the product of political forms 
of reconstruction and regulation. This needs to be 
multi'-faceted, and both explains why Thatcherism 
sought hegemony in many different spheres and why 
orthodox Marxist explanations depending on a 
simplistic one-dimensional notion of 'crisis' are 
inadequýtte. The latter often neglect the political 
construction of power, whereas Thatcherism could not 
afford to. The constant production of 'social myths' 
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is more crucial in an era under the combined effects 
of commodification, bureaucratic rationalisation and 
the increasingly complex f orms of the division of 
labour, given the inability to rest on inherited 
', objective, institutional forms, according to Laclau 
and Mouffe. This explains finally why Thatcherism 
was 'ideological' as well, since as Laclau stated, 
the ideological would consist of those discursive 
forms through which a society tries to institute 
itself as such on the basis of closure - the 
fixation of meaning, and the attempt to institute 
'society' (or a particular discursive construction 
of it, anyway). 
Further, the integration of a case study approach 
into the multi-theoretic analysis shows some similar 
lines of policy development between Thatcherism and 
previous Conservative (and non-Conservative) 
regimes. These were noted in the case studies. For 
example, new right educationalists had to seek to 
influence policy-making largely within established 
Conservative education circles, and those who did so 
most successfully were more attuned to the 
preoccupations and consistent themes of those 
circles than others. Witness the success of the 
neoconservative-led pressure for more rigorous 
definition of the curriculum particularly in areas 
such as History and English, and the neoliberal-led 
failure of the campaigns for the introduction of a 
voucher system. 
If one claims that Thatcherism lies within the 
'traditional, conservative principles and concerns, 
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then obviously any explanation as to why 
conservatism and the Party seem to be in crisis 
cannot be based 'on Thatcherite exceptionalism. 
Rather, the likelihood is that any defence of 
Thatcherism as authentic conservatism will also 
point to any deviations away f rom Thatcherism since 
1990 aý root cause of those difficulties, as indeed 
the pro-Thatcherite right has. But there appears to 
be. a growing sense in which despite the apparent 
dominance of Thatcherism over British politics and 
the electoral resurgence of the Party from the end 
of the 1970s, the present Conservative difficulties 
are in part a result of its legacy. 
The obvious paradox of this is that conservative 
discourses on citizenship retain, despite the 
contemporary problems of Conservative strategy, 
powerful and influential. - witness their 
accommodation by the 'New' Labour Party, and the 
debilitating impact of Thatcherism on %progressive, 
conservatism. The market society has been 
reinforced, but Conservative Party hegemony appears 
to be in doubt. There are a number of current 
notions as to why this might be. To take one, John 
Gray (chapter nineteen, %Conservatism, individualism 
and the political thought of the New Right', 1993a) 
has with increasingly greater urgency argued that 
the new right has neglected the cultural 
inheritance' needed as the foundation of the 
capitalist order, in part because of their debts to 
the rationalist tradition of classical liberalism. 
The dangerous and unrealisable utopian project of 
the minimal or neutral state has ignored the 
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necessity of a common culture. The new right 
transmitted to conservatism an abstract rationalism 
and legalism that occludes serious theorising of the 
conditions under which market capitalist 
institutions have for centuries enjoyed an almost 
unchallenged hegemony in Britain and the United 
States, particularly its cultural foundations. For 
Gray this has trapped the Conservative Party in an 
ideological lend-game,. 
This type of argument, while. pointing to 
contributing factors in the Party's current 
problems, must in addition appreciate the role of 
the new right in saving the Party's electoral 
fortunes and enabling it to establish a dominance in 
the 1980s. The question of the 1990s has yet to be 
answered fully. But if it is the case that the 
current fissures within the Party relate ultimately 
to differences over how to deal with the 
Thatcherism's legacy, then there can in a sense be 
only one logical future direction for the Party 
based on the characterisation of Thatcherism 
presented here: to continue with the 
'Thatcherisation' of the state, civil society and 
pu4lic life. 
The notion that because Thatcherism promoted 
, individualism' it has undermined the Conservative's 
governing project -is too simple. The electorate's 
rejection of the Party, did not occur because the 
market society is in any way in doubt, or the 
project of Thatcherism in this regard has failed. 
The market principles have been re-established, and 
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any other social values are marginal. 'Market 
individualism', 'competition' and 'self-interest', 
along with Thatcherite 'economic realism', are 
virtually hegemonic. The irony is that at the time 
that the Conservative Party should be establishing 
comfortably its governing hegemony on such firm 
foundations, it is undergoing a serious crisis of 
confidence. 
9.12 Sunanary 
A multi-theoretic approach to Thatcherism reveals an 
unfinished and important agenda for research, and 
may help construct a characterisation of it as a 
political project centring on the construction of 
the social, economic and political parameters of the 
market society. Further, developing this analysis, 
Thatcherism may be regarded as a serious project in 
One Nation Conservatism in the sense that it drew on 
discourses of citizenship which appeared to offer 
forms of 'universal membership'. Its underlying 
emphasis was one of control and regulation, in order 
both to re-establish the dominance of the 
Conservative Party and the market order. The case 
studies illustrate this project, revealing the 
influence of new right discourses and how they were 
translated into policies which were to entrench 
further the values and forms of behaviour associated 
with the market. 
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Chapter Ten 
Reversing the Subversion of Citizenship - 
Citizenship in the 'New Politics, of the Left 
"We may become the makers of our f ate when we have 
ceased to pose as its prophets. " 
- Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies 
(1962). 
10.0 Introduction 
This chapter draws out the implications of the 
previous arguments, about the nature of citizenship, 
the new right and Thatcherism, and the case study 
reforms, for left politics. 
From what has been suggested so far, there would 
seem to be a tension in prescribing any reformulated 
model of citizenship f or the lef t. First, f rom the 
recognition of the new right's powerful discourses, 
and their important appropriation of the interests 
of the '*private' spheres of the market as well as 
civil society, any new left politics of citizenship 
would seem to demand simple clear discourses, which 
might be used to legitimate certain progressive 
policy change. Yet, from the methodological 
approaches used, particularly those of discursive 
analysis and post -essentialism, the emphasis would 
seem to be on the recognition of complexity in all 
its forms, indeed perhaps the -impossibility of 
making any firm defensible statements about society. 
However, f ar from being irreconcilable, it will be 
suggested that these two needs are inter- dependent, 
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and that with regards to post-essentialist 
approaches, the suggestion is not that it is 
possible to ever formulate a post-essentialist model 
of citizenship, but that the key is rather a 
continual awareness of what happens and what is lost 
when we essentialize. 
First, it is suggested that given the arguments 
already presented, the contemporary era may be 
regarded as one marked by the 'crisis of politics' , 
in the sense of genuine macro-social choice of what 
type of society citizens might want to live in 
[10.1]. As often remarked, this does not seem to be 
a particular era of '-big ideas', but rather the 
dominance of one - the (supposedly) "free market'. 
This represents some kind of victory for the ideas 
associated with the new right. 
However, some ideas outlining the potential shape of 
a re-energised progressive politics are noted, which 
will ask important questions of long-assumed 
concepts such as citizenship [10.21 . In particular, 
though drawing on radical theoretical developments, 
it is suggested that such a politics will be 
practical, incremental and pragmatic rather than 
ideological in the more established sense, 
especially in seeking to recognise the reality of 
, lived experience,. It will also attempt to 
appropriate concepts from the right, just as the new 
right sought to do from progressive politics, for 
the purpose of practical measures to improve 
ordinary living and working conditions, and to 
protect the integrity of the'individual [10.31. A 
469 
recognition of social complexity can support af orm 
of politics which concentrates on simple public 
discourses, because it appreciates that the dominant 
public discourses may be too strong to be challenged 
head-on. Instead they may need to be accepted in so. 
far as political struggle will be waged within their 
parameters. This is particularly the case regards 
liberal discourses, and even those associated with 
the market. 
This will make demands on citizenship theory, 
particularly in emphasising a more critical, 
material and contextual approach [10.51. The 
emerging model which best satisfies these demands is 
citizenship focused around individual autonomy, 
rather than political participation [10.6]. This 
might be regarded as a 'second-wave, of progressive 
thinking around citizenship since its re-emergence 
as a theme of some public and academic interest 
since the late 1980s, the 'first wave' represented 
by the kinds of approaches which did not quite break 
from many of the problems of the orthodox social 
democratic conceptions of citizenship [1.9a] despite 
appearing more 'individualistic'. Whether this model 
will recognise adequately the ethical ideal of 
'universal membership, [10.71, the recurring problem 
of universality [10.8], the importance of economic 
citizenship [10.91, the need to reconcile such a 
project with the market [10.101, and the value of 
, social capital, [10.12], is examined. In this 
sense, the underlying question is whether this model 
represents too sharp a break from previous 
progressive thinking, or from a genuinely 
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progressive politics altogether. Last, in keeping 
with the emphasis on practicality, this semi-formed 
model is applied to the areas of welfare and 
education, to speculate on what kinds of policies it 
might imply [10.13). 
10.1 The Left's 'Crisis of Politics' 
The case has been made for the influence and 
importance of, new right and Thatcherite projects in 
citizenship. New right conceptions of citizenship 
hit the lef t in areas where it was weakest - its 
conception of socialist 'freedom', and poor 
relationship with the dominant political culture. 
The new right sought to claim civil society and the 
private sphere for themselves. Neoconservatives were 
allowed to appropriate 'concern' with changes 
effecting the family, education and the discipline 
of children, the primacy of work, threats to Public 
order, personal and private morality, the 
dysfunctional effects of the welfare state. 
Neoliberals were allowed to appropriate discourses 
on unleashing individual diversity and 
entrepreneurial opportunity. Hence the new right was 
able to combine 'social morality' with individual 
(market) gain and self -interest. This circumvented 
the commonly- assumed divide between "citizens' and 
'consumers'. On the whole people do not want to 
choose between being 'good parents' by sending their 
children to good schools, for example, and 'good 
citizens, by sending them to the nearest, but 
deficieA, state school. The new right told them 
that being a good citizen was being a good consumer. 
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This has exacerbated difficulties for the left in 
constructing a coherent, modern and effective 
political project of its own. John Dunn (p. 122, 
1993) has suggested, not a little pessimistically., 
that the contemporary political environment is 
characterised by: ".. the effective disappearance of 
any systematic, or even widely credited, conception 
of how, f or many generations to come (or even f or 
ever) it [capitalism] could stand in any danger of 
being replaced by anything more edifying or less 
dismaying. What has been deleted from the human 
future, almost inadvertently but still with 
remarkable decisiveness, is any f orm of reasonable 
and relatively concrete social and political hope. " 
This is true in part. For many on the left, it does 
seem that there is a contemporary 'crisis of 
politics', of genuine human choice, autonomy and 
freedom. It would appear that (Miliband, R., p. 188, 
1994): "The liberation from capital is nowhere on 
the agenda of politics. " In the terminology of the 
present argument, it is the idea of the 'market 
society' which has achieved an overwhelming 
dominance, and with it what has been termed by 
another theorist 'Anglo-American citizenship theory' 
(Somers 1995a, 1995b), basically the paradigm of 
Western liberalism and especially-the way in which 
'freedom' is defined as autonomy from the state. 
This is quite different to the idea of the 
overwhelming dominance of 'the market', and does not 
suggest the non-existence of many forms of dissent, 
or the huge social and economic problems which 
afflict Western liberal-democratic 'capitalist 
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societies. Rather, it represents the effective 
hegemony of a particular vision of how people should 
behave, and the environment Porder') in which they 
do so. Of course, there are people who disagree 
profoundly with it, but they are marginal and made 
marginal. Some would suggest dispiritingly that 
because of the nature of modern societies 
(particularly the nature of the state, large 
corporations and the media), the possibility of 
meaningful citizenship has been lost. ' 
These arguments raise profound questions of left 
politics, in particular its conception of 
citizenship, the 'dominant political culture, and 
the market society, and how the left should 
accommodate itself to them. Should citizenship be 
public and political, or private and non-political ? 
Can it deal with 'privatism' ? What should be its 
guiding ideas - 'freedom, and liberty', or 'social 
justice, ? These areas of fundamental rethinking 
depend also on the critical evaluation of the limits 
of traditional democratic socialism, indeed, the 
problematic relationship between socialism and 
democracy itself (Mclellan and Sayers 1991). 
This chapter explores some respects, both 
theoretical and practical, in which the left may be 
attempting to resist and even reverse the atrophy of 
politics. The f irst point of optimism f or the lef t 
1 Laski (1928). Habermas (p. 11,1992): "Only if such an 
interplay between institutionalised processes of opinion and 
will formation and those informal networks of public 
communication occurs can citizenship today mean more than the 
aggregation of prepolitical individual interests and the 
passive enjoyment of rights bestowed upon the individual by 
the paternalistic authority of the state. " 
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emerges, somewhat ironically, from the new right. 
The new right demonstrated that radical initiatives 
can achieve degrees of 'success' (on their own 
terms) . of course, it had many (structural) f actors 
in its favour which the left does not have. Yet 
initially,, the new right thought the "consensus' too 
strong to be challenged at its fundamentals, and was 
cautious in many areas, before it made significant 
ground (often from the micro-level). A key factor in 
its success was its discursive programme - its 
construction of the 'crisis' of contemporary 
politics, and its constant and broad public process 
of discursive appeal (Hall, p. 188,1988): "[The new 
right) . actually do believe that you have to 
struggle to implant the notion of the market; and 
that, if you talk about it well enough, effectively 
and persuasively enough, you can touch people's 
understanding of how they live and work, and make a 
new kind of sense about what, s wrong with society 
and what to do about it. " Further, the new right has 
forced the lef t to think again about what it is to 
be 'radical', how political power may be used 
effectively, how the state may act as a barrier to 
freedom, and the importance of capturing the 
discourses of liberalism. It is in this context of 
the 'crisis of politics, that parts of the left have 
begun to think anew about citizenship. 
10.2 The "New Politics, 
"The politics of citizenship, in sum, throws us into 
the deep end of some very profound, general, 
theoretical concerns about politics as well as 
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posing a set of complex organisat-ional issues. To 
think it through -a project only just beginning - 
we need to attend to both dimensions. The elements 
of equality and universality associated with the 
idea of 'the citizen', and the diverse and 
particular requirements of different groups which 
have to be met if they are to enjoy 'free and equal, 
status, demand that the Left clarify, more 
profoundly than it has so far, both the principles 
of the politics of citizenship and their 
institutional requirements. What is at stake is 
nothing less than reformulating socialism to take 
better account of 'citizenship, and the conditions 
and limits this imposes on state action and 
political strategy. 112 
It is not an original suggestion that in the face of 
the new right's project over the last twenty years, 
the left in many respects has frozen, and retreated 
into the conservative comforts of its established 
ways of ýhinking. As Panitch (p. 41-2,1986) 
suggested, the new right attack: 
". . should not have become the occasion for a knee - 
jerk defence of the Keynesian welfare state with all 
its ambiguities and constricted reforms, but rather 
treated as the occasion for proposing - for 
insýsting on - the fundamental restructuring of the 
state and its relationship to society so that the 
communities it is supposed to serve and the people 
who labour for it together have great involvement in 
the public domain. rather than leave the issue at 
2 Hall and Held (p. 188,1989a). 
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, less state, versus 'more state,, socialists must 
recognise that popular antipathy to the state can 
also be addressed in terms of speaking of a 
different kind of state. " 
This kind of critical approach to previously assumed 
and accepted ideas is the crucial starting-point of 
the 'new politics'. According to Laclau (1990, also 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985), despite this 'crisis of 
politics', the contemporary era represents an 
opportunity for the lef t because of the structural 
dislocations caused by developments in capitalism, 
revealing increasingly the historicity of being, and 
hence the purely human and discursive nature of 
truth. This was in part the context which led to the 
purpose of Thatcherism and the -new right - the 
necessarily political discursive re-imposition of 
the 'market society'. But it also opens up new 
opportunities for a radical'politics, because of the 
new liberty gained in relation to the object and 
from an understanding of the socially constructed 
nature of any objectivity. Hence (p. 56,1990) : "The 
more dislocated is the ground on which capitalism 
operates, the less it can rely on a framework of 
stable social and political relations and the more 
central this political moment of hegemonic 
construction will be; but f or that very reason, the 
more extensive the range of alternative political 
possibilities opposed to capitalist hegemonization 
will also be. " 
They define the project for the left as the 
construction of radical and plural democracy (p. xiv, 
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1990) : ". the radicality of a politics will not 
result from the emergence of a subject that can 
embody the universal, but from the expansion and 
multiplication of fragmentary, partial and limited 
subjects who enter the collective decision-making 
process. " Hence (Laclau, p. 1G, 199G): "Incompletion 
and provisionality belong to the essence of 
democracy. " The unbridgeable gulf between the 
universal and the particular, and the impossibility 
of finding a location for the universal, makes 
democratic interaction achievable. In other words, a 
new type of thinking for the left, based not on 
homogenised and universal thought. and conceptions of 
social systems (Lent, 'For a Radical Democracy', 
chapter four, Wilks 1993). Radical democracy is 
conceived as a general principle, rather than as an 
ideology. * 
of course, this so-called 'new politics', or process 
of lef t transf ormation, began with the rise of the 
new left in the 1960s, but might be seen to have 
been left uncompleted. It was in part, with the 
challenge from radical feminist and environmental 
agendas, a recogniti 
I 
on that left politics had become 
statist, anti-individualist and monolithic, and 
included a desire to reassert humanist traditions 
including liberation and agency (OUSDG 1989). The 
rise of the new right, in its radicalism and 
discourses on anti-statism and individualism, came 
to force the left into a primarily defensive 
position. 
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But as has been suggested, the lef t is not free to 
embark on this re-thinking as it wishes, just as the 
new right could not merely proclaim the new order it 
envisioned. If it is to move forward, it will 
develop an awareness of the limits of the initially 
achievable, including the Isedimented' nature of 
much social discourse. This may include 
understanding how the market and institutions of 
civil society mould people's lives and the ways in 
which the material rewards accruing to sections of 
civil society structure individuals' susceptibility 
and responses to political-ideologies. The new left 
may be more concerned to resonate with 'lived 
experience,, while seeking also to construct the 
material conditions of lived experience. After all, 
people will not: accept the left's discursive 
definitions if some form of 'reality' does not 
accord with them. For example, they will not 
consider political participation and state-provided 
'social rights, enhance their citizenship if they 
find them exclusionary, unreactive and disabling 
when dealing with them. As Hindess (p. 48,1987) has 
stated: "The claim that British social policy 
underlies a broad equality of status could be 
advanced only at the cost of ignoring the 
organisational forms in which its goods and services 
are provided. " An awareness of the economic as well 
as the political and social parameters of the market 
society, within which the left must operate, may 
lead to some forms of profitable appropriation of 
seemingly unfriendly' discourses. 
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An example might be the notion of the 'underclass'. 
The left has tended to reject the term as an 
inherently regressive construction, because it 
identifies a particular group and suggests their 
behavioural and psychological attributes are part- 
cause of their poverty. It neglects, deliberately, 
social and structural conditions, thus undercutting 
assistance for, them and justifying more 
authoritarian methods to 'police' them. Yet to 
attempt to ignore the notion of the "underclass, 
might be a great mistake, since the idea of a 
dependency-prone, often criminal and problematic 
underclass has been used to drive the debate over 
welfare, and construct its parameters. It would be 
another case of ceding a concept with some 'reality' 
over to the right, and vacating the battleground. 
Rather, the left might seek to use the concept. 
First, it represents the failure of 'one nationism' 
and social cohesion, and thus represents an 
opportunity. It refers to a group cut-off from the 
'mainstream' values, attitudes, motivations and 
actions of the rest of society. Hence it could form 
the basis of a project to highlight the ways in 
which such people are ma rginalised, and legitimate 
the design of welfare programmes to avoid this. It 
would emphasise social re-integration, and the 
benef its of this in terms of a saf er, f reer, more 
efficient society. It might then be linked to other 
strategies for greater social integration and 
cohesion. 
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Second, individual behaviour and 'life values, may 
be regarded as of wider political importance. The 
left might find it useful to develop a 'politics of 
conduct' to counter the right, because the better 
society must be based in part on the 'responsible' 
individual behaviour of citizens. This would be part 
of its positive accommodation with the private 
sphere, regarding private relations as legitimate 
demonstrations of identities, values and concerns, 
even though they may not be recognisably 
'socialist'. 
The left's evacuation of the 'politics of identity,, 
a key element in citizenship, was helpful to the new 
right's project. As Hall (p. 192,1988) suggested: 
"Now the astonishing political fact that people can 
be colonised by the right has in part to do with the 
fact that there is no alternative vision of what or 
who people are. On the left and in the labour 
movement, we have lost our sense of history.. Freedom 
of speech, assembly and the franchise, the things 
amongst others that we took to the high seas to 
defend, have only been won in our society as a 
result of the prolonged struggle of working people. 
That is what democracy actually is. But how is it 
represented in popular history ? As the gift of the 
rulers. Somehow, democracy I came I. " The lef t has 
tended to rely on a rather conservative version of 
social development, to its own detriment (Elliott 
1993). This might even be reflected in Marshall's 
thesis. Hence according to Hall, the key practical, 
theoretical and moral issue for the left is the 
, struggle for popular identities'. The contemporary 
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political battleground might be regarded as being 
one of citizenship. 
A key aspect of such a simple, 
left 'common sense, might b( 
utopian aspiration for complex 
discourse of the type idealised 
instead an appropriation of 
individualism, the dominant but 
10.3 The Purpose of the Left 
clear and effective 




broad social ethic. 
"Economic liberty implies, not that all men shall 
initiate, plan, direct, manage or administer but the 
absence of such economic inequalities as can be used 
as a means of economic constraint. 113 
In general terms, it has been suggested that the 
left concentrate on (Selbourne, p. 233,1985): ".. the 
principal political battle of our age: that for the 
rearguard protection of the physical and mental 
integrity of the individual person, and of his or 
her fundamental rights as a human being. Indeed, the 
paradox of all left paradoxes is that such concerns 
could ever have come to be regarded as peripheral or 
merely 'liberal, matters. " These urgently-needed 
rights against oppression go beyond mere rights of 
possession. Western societies have reached a point 
where they depend for their continued existence on 
systems of production fundamentally at odds with 
their deepest moral precepts. As Gamble (p. 185, 
1996) has suggested: "Prominent among these moral 
precepts are notions of' the sanctity and moral 
equality of each individual. The first is associated 
Tawney (p. 186,1952). 
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with the ideas of individual conscience and 
individual autonomy, the second with the idea that 
if individuals are considered to be equally worthy 
of respect, they should have equal 'rights. The 
joining of these two notions makes egalitarianism 
inseparable from individualism, and helps explain 
why it has always been so difficult to confine 
liberty to negative liberty. Realisation of the 
principle of moral equality always involves positive 
liberty as well, not merely' the protection of a 
sphere for each individual, but the creation of 
conditions in which individuals can fully enjoy such 
a sphere and develop their full potential. " 
If the contemporary left has a purpose it is to 
improve the living and working conditions of 
ordinary people, via consciously designed social, 
economic and political reform. It has found it 
unhelpful to confuse associated concepts such as 
'collective ownership', 'equality,, , social 
justice,, participation or social cohesion with this 
end, or to assume that there is a generally shared 
life-style which can be identified as the single 
criterion of citizenship. 
10.3a The Problem of Socialist 'Freedom' 
"Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not 
equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human 
happiness or a quiet conscience. 114 
If this analysis is correct, one of the ironies of 
the left is that despite seeking to make 'liberal' 
ideas real, particularly liberal freedom, it has 
4 Berlin (p. 125,1969). 
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f ailed to articulate a viable conception of f reedom 
itself, or at least one which keyed into ordinary 
citizens, less abstract desire to live comfortably 
and safely within the kind of communities they want. 
Political freedoms, and rights to political 
participation, are important, but tend to be seen as 
means to this form of f reedom, instead of ends or 
'goods' in themselves. A left project in the 
appropriation of apparently hostile conceptions of 
'freedom, may then be thought necessary. 
The neoliberal new right tended to use a Hayekian 
definition of freedom_- the 'absence of dependence 
on the will of another'. Hayek's (p. 20,1960). 
essentials of liberty for any person were: ".. if he 
is subject to the same laws as all his fellow 
citizens, if he is immune from arbitrary confinement 
and f ree to choose his work, and if he is able to 
own and acquire property, no other men or group of 
men can coerce him to do their bidding. " Liberty for 
the individual, he suggested, can exist without 
'political liberty' - participation by citizens in 
the choice of their government, in the process of 
legislation, and in control of the administration. 
It is the exclusive reliance on this negative 
conception of liberty which is problematic, not the 
use of the Hayekiqn definition as a starting-point. 
Though this new right foundation is a narrow one, a 
left version may go beyond it by establishing strong 
links between political liberty, social rights and 
individual autonomy. What it should not continue to 
do is seek to convince people that 'freedom' has 
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been increased when restrictions are placed on the 
'rights' associated with the market (particularly 
rights to property ownership), because it has tended 
to fail in doing so. A loss of liberty may be 
compensated for by an increase, in equality, or 
another value, but only equality has been increased, 
not another version of '-freedom'. 5 In this sense, 
Berlin is virtually correct. It is not that there 
are not other meanings to concepts such as 
'freedom', but in the context of the dominant 
political culture and the pervasiveness of liberal 
discourse, alternative meanings are so marginal as 
to become largely ineffective for a radical 
political project. Further, if it is the case that 
'consumer freedom' has replaced work as the focal 
link between systematic reproduction, social 
integration and individual action, and individual 
freedom is constituted in the main as the freedom of 
the consumer (Bauman 1988b) , then the left may seek 
to engage more profitably with this conception of 
freedom. 
Thus the new left project tends to seek to 
demonstrate its recognition of the value of each 
person's life within the community. This seeks to 
outflank the new right, and highlight its failures. 
Society depends on individuals forming and pursuing 
their own understandings of the good. This is why 
the left's attempts to 'appropriate', or show it is 
5 This is the typical problem with socialist conceptions of 
freedom, the forced confusion between 'freedom' and 'equality' 
(for example, Hattersley 1987). of course it is crucial for 
the lef t that they are linked, but they may also be in 
conflict. 
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friendly to, such forms of behaviour, is as the 
right has shown such a key battle. Individual human 
development, indeed citizenship, rather than the 
remaking of human nature or the envisioning of the 
theoretical parameters of a brave new world' , has 
become the fundamental issue for the left. This 
borrows a little in stance from the conservative 
disposition in this regard; there is no ', ultimate 
liberation' for all people, and no perfect 
rationally-designed environment in which they can be 
liberated. Forms of social integration, crucial for 
any meaningful citizenship, are not seen necessarily 
to be dependent on total equality of status, but are 
too complex and fluid to be reliant on only one 
determinant. They are dependent on self-respect and 
a recognition of one's social ability and worth, as 
well as the social, cultural, as well as economic, 
resources to act. 'Empowerment' can be political, 
economic, cultural and social, and Inter-related. 
The confidence to act positively, and the resources 
to enable it, does not respect these boundaries, but 
grows in each. 
10.4 "Generative Politics, 
The left may be finding it more profitable to 
replace its tendency towards '-blueprint politics' 
with 'generative politics, (Giddens, 'Brave New 
World: The New Context of Politics', chapter one, 
Miliband, D., 1994) . The 
former rests on a politics 
of lend-states', an essentially static conception in 
which political competition is defined by competing 
blueprints for the future. Socialism is seen as an 
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end and not a process. But it is often in danger of 
ignoring social, political and economic realities, 
and the experience of everyday action. The latter 
tries to see politics as a process, the politics of 
a constant and continuing re-application of a set of 
values to changing circumstances. Hence (Miliband, 
D., p. 6,1994) "Generative politics is above all 
committed to the creation, development and 
sustenance of economic opportunities and social 
commitments in the context of the plural reality in 
which we live. "6 
As Giddens (p. 32, ibid) describes its outline, it 
seeks to achieve desired outcomes through providing 
conditions for social mobilisation and engagement, 
create circumstances in which active trust can be 
built and sustained, accord autonomy via specific 
programmest encourage ethical principles of action, 
and decentralise political power (though this may 
enhance the greater legitimacy of the centre, beyond 
a 'zero-sum' conception). 7 It is a def ence of the 
6 See also Mulgan (1994) . Similarly, EScudero ('Reinventing 
Politics' , chapter eleven, Miliband, D., 1994) proposes six 
principles f or social democratic thinking: it should avoid 
dogmatically- ideal ised closed systems of thought and ends 
(tolerance, pluralism and consensus must be guides), renounce 
any notions of historical progress (p. 240, ibid-. ".. public 
policies should not be seeking to make provision for mass 
collective public participation, but to devise new instruments 
for accessible, normalised individual control"), base its 
appeal on individuals, their rights, duties and potentialities 
(the dominant cultural reference point), Ide-bureaucratise' 
politics via flexibility and innovation, ensure the 
transparency of public institutions, and incorporate the 
democratic means as part of its message. 
7 Though it implies a more radical socialist politics and a 
greater emphasis on political participation, Wainwright's 
(1994) argument for a 'new left' has some similarities with 
the form of politics presented here. It draws on a radically- 
broadened Hayekian model of the dispersed nature of knowledge 
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political domain, but appears consciously material 
in that it recognises the importance of material 
conditions and organisational frameworks for the 
life-politiqal decisions taken by individuals and 
groups. It is consciously not a panacea. There are 
always new (and old) political problems. and 
contradictions. 
It might be said that this politics seems 
conservative, even 'regressive', but to its 
proponents this is not necessarily the case. 
Generative politics echoes Laclau and Mouffe's 
suggestions for the form of 'radical democracy' 
(p. 82,1990): "Society, then, is ultimately 
unrepresentable: any representation - and thus any 
space - is an attempt to constitute society, not to 
state what it is.. this final imcompletion of the 
social is the main source of our political hope in 
the contemporary world: only it can assure the 
conditions for a radical democracy. " Again, it 
rejects the 'authoritarianism, of end-states 
politics. 'Truth' is pragmatic and in this sense 
becomes properly democratic (p. 173,1990): ".. to the 
recognition that we ourselves are the exclusive 
creators of our world, and the ones who have a 
radical and untransferable responsibility towards 
it. " It is a politics of lemancipations' rather than 
'Emancipation', more democratic in its respect for 
specificity. The growing 'fragmentation of social 
actors and social struggles, is more difficult to 
manipulate and disregard. It also connects with a 
to support a socialist but anti-social engineering approach 
for a greater variety of forms of popular self-government. 
487 
citizenship based around individual autonomy and 
individual responsibility, to support the 
fragmentation of struggles. 
This is a defence of politics as an activity that is 
wider than the narrow liberal conception, but 
narrower than the 'all-embracing participatory 
vision. It tends towards being practical and 
realistic. It is clear that politics seen as a 
process rather than the battle between end-states 
encourages a greater consciousness of process, of 
the everyday realities of peoples, lives and the 
decisions they make. It is this awareness which is 
important for left political strategy as well as 
citizenship theory. 
10.5 Critical Demands on Citizenship Theory 
This implies the move towards what may be summarised 
as a critical, material and contextual approach to 
citizenship; critical because the -effects of 
citizenship or constituent elements are not assumed, 
and may be regressive; material because the actual 
effects of citizenship are often in material 
consequences; and contextual because no overall 
macro-operation of citizenship is assumed. Most 
importantly, it seeks to go beyond the conception of 
unitary macro-social principles contesting ground 
from each other (for example, 'class, versus 
%citizenship'). There is no immanent logic in social 
relations or concepts. Therefore, re- 
conceptual i sat ions of citizenship which do seek a 
general definition of its nature are thought 
misguided. citizenship may in different ways 
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facilitate a genuine integration and amelioration of 
conditions which construct or reinforce forms of 
exclusion, and it retains the ability to be used 
effectively by many reformist groups in the struggle 
for their own social inclusion and entitlement. 
However, it also may fail to promote genuine social 
integration, or further enable social, political and 
economic structures, practices and allocative 
decisions which promote exclusion. In the 
foundations for a new conception of citizenship, the 
progressive potential of citizenship is retained 
within a critically-informed account. Citizenship is 
then a less reliable concept than the left has 
tended'to assume previously, but still valuable. 
A contextual conception does not mean only the study 
of localised spaces, physical settings f or social 
interaction, or any illustrative empirical study, 
though these are important as part of this approach. 
Rather, it is meant to be (Thrift, ', Light Out of 
Darkness', p. 25-6, Cloke . 
1992): ".. the pivot of a 
theory of social agency, showing the way in which 
'people', understood as cultural artefacts', 
consist of a series of dialogical personas 
constituted in and by particular settings, and in 
turn constituting these settings. 118 Further, as 
Mouffe (p. 13,1993) suggests: "Radical democracy 
demands that we acknowledge difference the 
particular, 'the multiple, the heterogeneous in 
effect, everything that had been excluded by the 
concept of Man in the abstract. Universalism is n6t 
8*Also Gilbert (1992). 
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rejected but particularised; what is needed is a new 
kind of articulation between the universal and the 
particular. " 
This may be thought to imply profound problems for 
citizensýip (Clarke, p. 42,1996) : "The politics of 
the particular rather than -the politics of the 
universal has become a major characteristic of the 
politics of our time. As citizenship, from its 
inception, has been concerned with the general or 
universal, it seems irrelevant to the 
particularities generated by this life politics. " 
But this need not suggest the redundancy of the 
idea, rather its reformulation. As Thrift states 
(p. 28, ibid): ".. in Britain now, the chief 
imperative is to f ind out how, why, with what and 
where people belong: what their economic, social and 
cultural resources are and how they wield them. This 
is a necessary first step to establishing a new 
notion of collectivity, one which is not associated 
with uniformity and subordination but is 'active, 
demanding and creative'.. " 
These demand a 'differentiated, conception of 
citizenship. Such a conception has a difficult 
relationship with the idea of universality. It might 
be that the tension between universalism and 
particularism is inherent in citizenship (Beiner, 
p. 12,1995). Yet citizenship theory has tended to be 
too abstract. 'Universal membership, may be an ethic 
at the heart of citizenship, ' but it is not now 
thought of as an inevitable end. Such a reformulated 
conception tends to recognise how citizenship is 
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struggled over, and how gains necessarily are 
contingent. Citizenship helps establish 'areas of 
contestation' (Giddens) over inequality and 
exclusion. 
The criticisms made of Marshall's thesis tend to be 
kept in mind when reformulating the framework for a 
critical conception of citizenship. It cannot be 
over-optimistic about the progressive consequences 
for citizenship against forms of inequality, or 
assume that the universal i sat ion of social services 
may act as the basis of a common experience and 
hence promote 'class fusion'. Citizenship rights, it 
is recognised, do not lead necessarily to social 
cohesion. Indeed (Ignatieff, p. 69, Beiner 1995): "If 
the idea of citizenship is in crisis today, it is 
precisely because experience has not validated the 
post-war civic ideal that public goods would ext6nd 
civic solidarity. " The rights associated with 
citizenship are then seen as complex and separate 
entitlements and opportunities, rather than a 
homogenous guarantee of citizenship status which 
-will be used by all citizens in the same ways. The 
extent to which they actually 'free, individuals 
becomes a focus for analysis rather than assumption, 
particularly within the wider social, economic and 
political context. As Hindess (p. 5,1987) notes, 
underlying much previous left thinking and a whole 
tradition of social administration research, 
deriving from Fabianism, is the notion that: ".. it 
must seem that the only real obstacles to the 
eradication of poverty and a more egalitarian 
society are the government's lack of knowledge of 
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social conditions, on the one hand, and its lack of 
political will, on the other. " 
This form of approach to citizenship from sections 
of the contemporary left has a number of other 
implications, which should be noted briefly. First, 
it has led to a renewed interest in the difficult 
problem of obligations. Its typical vagueness in 
this area has been recognised as a weak point f or 
criticism from the right. In response some f igures 
have concentrated on the importance of fulfilling 
duties, and a more widespread ', principle of duty, 
(Selbourne 1994) . Yet for the new left project of 
citizenship, individualism, may be characterised 
more positively and need not be a corrupting social 
phenomenon. While the fulfilment of social 
obligations (of whatever kind) may represent a 
genuine strengthening of citizenship, duties cannot 
and should not always be correlated directly to 
rights, because pressure will tend to focus on the 
more explicit rights (for example, benefits and the 
'problem, of the unemployed) while duties should be 
related to all citizens. 
Second, given the primacy of the private sphere, the 
left is learning not to be seen to downgrade 
voluntarism, the 'citizenship of contribution,. It 
is an important part of '-social capital' (10.121, 
and should not necessarily be replaced by state 
welfare because of the universalist ideology of 
citizenship. The-sense of social duty cannot afford 
to be dissipated. The answer, as Marshall (p. 80, 




limited loyalties, to the local community and 
especially to the working group. " This may mean 
greater local disparities, but also the enhancement 
of citizenship. This is another example of the need 
to go beyond the left's assumptions of synergy 
between its cherished ideas. 
Third, the reliance on vague notions- of 
participation is regarded as increasingly 
problematic. 'Parts of the left seem to imagine 
participatory politics as a field of rationality, 
but (to borrow from conservative, and particularly 
Michael Oakeshott's insights), human behaviour is 
always highly conditional, steeped in traditions, 
cultural, and open-ended. Hence (Anderson, p. 43, 
Miliband, D., 1994): "The danger of conceiving 
democratic life as a dialogue is that we may forget 
that its primary reality remains strife.. Gender 
equality cannot be realised without lifting the 
economic handicap from maternity; work cannot be 
assured to all who seek it without infringing the 
prerogatives of corporate investment; electoral 
democracy cannot be deepened without treading on the 
interests of established parties; peace cannot be 
assured without altering the hierarchy of nuclear 
security. It is a mistake to imagine that there is a 
quick route to universal goals, to which all can 
rally without loss. " Like the new right, the left 
seeks to use mobilisation in limited forms, to 
support reforms, and further strategic ends. This is 
one sense in which the left's use of citizenship is 
unavoidably material, one of the 'multiple 
structures of control' (Mulgan 1994), including the 
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market - Though the new right sought ultimately to 
disable politics, in the sense of alternative 
social, economic and cultural choice, this part of 
the left is choosing to react by resisting the 
temptation to totalize politics. It is thought that 
some part of political liberty should include the 
potential of freedom from politics itself. 
10.6 Citizenship as Individual Autonomy 
David Held (1989,1994,1995) has begun to suggest a 
framework for citizenship based around ', individual 
autonomy'. The complexity of modern citizenship is 
underestimated if it is conceptualised only in 
relation to 'class' and 'capitalism', since it must 
appreciate the many ways in which the full 
participation of individuals in the community has 
been restricted, and so incorporate many different 
forms of social exclusion, stratification and 
marginalisation. Citizenship itself, in the way 
groups struggle for autonomy against various forms 
of hierarchy, is a medium of social conflict. 
Instead, a 'free and equal, citizenship should be 
founded on the creation of '-equal autonomy' and a 
'common structure of action', which addresses 
, illegitimate, asymmetries of power and opportunity. 
This may mean that systematically disadvantaged 
citizens be treated unequally in order that they 
might become equally free. The 'principle of 
autonomy' means that people should enjoy equal 
rights and obligations, be free and equal in the 
determination of their own lives, so long as they do 
not use this to negate the rights of others. 
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Though rooted in individual autonomy, . 
this 
conception has important structural implications. 
'Nautonomic' structures (in which asymmet: rical life- 
chances are systematically generated) restrict 
participation, and limit democracy to a privileged 
domain. The purpose of such an approach is the 
creation of equal participative opportunities 
(rather than 'equality'), so allowing citizens the 
free and equal determination of the conditions of 
their own association. Held suggests this has two 
main implications - that people should be self- 
determining, and that democratic government should 
be 'limited government' (government which upholds a 
legally-circumscribed structure of power). 
Though valuable this framework for citizenship must 
also appreciate the impact the wider consequences of 
capitalist relations have on inclusion and 
exclusion, and the nature of the construction of the 
, market society'. Methodologically, this opens up 
many forms of analysis - political economy, 
discourse, and the incorporation of feminist (and 
other) critiques of universality,, which would 
allow a greater understanding of how individual 
autonomy is restricted. 
This approach may be helped by the incorporation of 
some similar arguments made by Michael Walzer in his 
Spheres of Justice (1983), in which he seeks to 
formulate an environment for equality which is 
consistent with liberty. He does not derive 
individual rights from any theory of common 
humanity, but from shared conceptions of social 
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goods which are admittedly local and particular. But 
more significantly, the principles of justice are 
themselves pluralistic in form (p. 6, ibid) : 11. that 
different social goods ought to be distributed for 
different reasons, in accordance with different 
procedures, by different agents; and that all these 
differences derive from different understandings of 
the social goods themselves - the inevitable product 
of historical and cultural particularism. " 
10.7 'Universal Membership, 
Citizenship as individual autonomy may appear rather 
a spare conception compared to the seemingly rich 
accounts of political membership offered by 
communitarians, and to be in tension with the 
ethical ideal within citizenship, that of 'universal 
membership'. Yet it offers a clearer route by which 
to re-think citizenship. Given that social 
integration is more fluid and complex than 
citizenship theory has tended to take account of, 
there is no theoretical contradiction between 
universal membership and individual autonomy, if the 
former is conceptualised in a more realistic manner, 
as an uncapturable web of individual forms of 
participation which develop and reinforce a sense of 
genuine social inclusion. The individual's own 
'social, is enhanced, not a pre-set theoretical 
model of a preferred ideal of 'proper, public 
participation. Indeed, such individual participation 
may not appear very social at all, and may consist 
primarily of ', private' autonomous (or close social 
group) activities and pursuits. The problem in 
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exhorting a particular form of participation is that 
it ignores new types of civil associations (Putnam 
1995), for example those which may combine small- 
group participation with large-scale advocacy, such 
as community service and self-help groups. This is 
another reason why such an approach should not 
necessarily be seen as 'conservative'. The 
'Balkanisation of interests' is a real social 
phenomenon, and while such associations may often 
neglect class and race factors, the principle of 
autonomy is supposed to act progressively to temper 
these hindrances on participation. In many respects, 
this might be seen to call for an active civil 
society rather than a political community, as 
commonly conceived. Hence (Walzer, p. 106,1992) 
"Join the association of your choice is not a slogan 
to rally political militants, and yet that is what 
civil society requires. " 
10.8 Resolving the Problem of Universality 
As has been suggested: "The risk associated with 
current feminist writing is that in the (necessary) 
critique of gender neutrality, some feminists may 
give up on any notion of universal humanity, and 
therefore lose what gives equality its power. 119 
There is the fear that some forms of a 'politics of 
difference' such as I. M. Young's, tend to create 
fixed and oppositional categories which can result 
.9 Anne Phillips (p. 158, chapter six, 'So What's Wrong with the 
Individual ? Socialist and Feminist Debates on Equality', 
'Osbourne (1991). Similarly Vogel (1988), Riley (1992), 
Phillips (1993). Dietz (chapter fifty-one, 'Context is All: 
Feminism and Theories of Citizenship', Turner and Hamilton 
1995b). 
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in another version of the suppression of difference 
(Aziz 1992). 
A suggested way out of this dilemma is a process of 
synthesis beyond 'equality versus difference, 
(Lister 1993,1995), a: politics which neither 
denies nor capitulates to the particularity of group 
difference" (Phillips, p. 5,1993) . Of course, there 
may not only be important differences and needs 
between gender groups with regard to citizenship, 
but also within them (similarly with ethnic groups), 
according to wealth, social position, varying self- 
identity, and other important factors. Equality and 
difference are not thought to be necessarily 
incompatible. The very notion of political equality 
implies differences to be discounted so that, 
despite them, people are treated as equals for a 
specific purpose. The use of them as dichotomous is 
in' itself a construction which disguises relations 
of subordination. Indeed (Sassoon, p. 97, ', Equality 
and Difference: The Emergence of a New Concept of 
Citizenship', chapter seven, Mclellan and Sayers 
1991): "Disarticulating and making concrete the 
abstract concept of the individual helps us to 
recognise something else: viewed from one facet or 
another of our identity or our subjectivity, we each 
belong to a partial group, we are each an I other' , 
whatever our race, gender, nationality. " A 
recognition of complexity reasserts the importance 
of the specific and the concrete. 
Yet this does not imply that a reformulated 
conception of left citizenship must be at the 
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expense of a gendered analysis of the power of 
relations which still underpin constructed 
categories and hence serve to perpetuate women's 
'exile, as a group from full citizenship. 
Ironically, the emphasis on the role of active 
participation to bring women's concerns into the 
public arena can neglect the value of individual 
(particularly social/welfare) rights, the 'informal, 
participation women are involved in regularly, and 
the structural constraints upon them in particular 
contexts which hinder such idealistic 
participation -: 10 Hopefully, this appreciates the 
validity of the critiques of universalism while 
retaining the power of the idea of universal 
equality. 
10.9 Economic Citizenship 
More critical discussions of citizenship have tended 
to highlight the neglect, within reformist models, 
of substantive economic rights of citizenship, 
alongside civil, political and social rights. A 
model of citizenship as individual autonomy, far 
from necessarily being prey to the same lack of 
economic analysis which has tended to afflict social 
liberalism and reformism, may reinforce the 
importance of political economy. Genuine individual 
autonomy will demand a multiplicity of detailed 
reforms, always contingent and developing, to ensure 
resources and opportunities for participation. This 
10 so, f or example, gender relations can be introduced into 
the typical gender-blind 'power resources, -type studies of 
social rights/welfare states (Orloff 1993). 
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is regarded as the real test of the progressiveness 
of citizenship. 
This may be part of 'developing 'egalitarian 
individualism' approaches. These seek to discover 
how property rights and ownership may be made to 
work for an egalitarian project. The alternative, as 
suggested, is to attempt to resist, and fail doing 
so, the link between individual property and 
effective citizenship. This demands a theoretical 
change of conception, and then further examination 
of the mechanisms by which this might be furthered. 
10.10 Citizenship and 'the Market' 
"There is a central need now to rethink the idea of 
citizenship in a more individualistic age. This will 
require bringing ideas about citizenship into a 
clearer relationship with the market. ": Ll 
The scope of aspirations for political participation 
has been criticised previously. Some parts of the 
left are moving away from the notion, rooted in some 
aspects of citizenship theory, that individuals can 
only express themselves fully as members of a 
, unified political community' . They are seeking to 
link strategies for citizenship with 'economic 
rationality' , rather than weaker notions of I social 
compassion', and in doing so are investigating 
accommodations with 'the market'. 
As suggested, many have f ound social analysis based 
on macro terms alone (such as the 'state', the 
'market', 'civil society') to be unhelpful. Such 
11 Hoover and Plant (p. 282,1989). 
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distinctions can be made, but too often mask 
extremely complex sets of conditions. The problem is 
attributing to them one specific principle of 
operation and ef f ect. As has been suggested, this 
has afflicted citizenship theory, in the conception 
of the constant and inherent clash between the 
principles of the 'market' (individual, amoral, 
inegalitarian) against those of 'citizenship, 
(moral, cohesive, egalitarian). This represents the 
lessentialisation, of the market and citizenship, 
which is present in many f orms of analysis (Hindess 
1987). It is unhelpful to think of a single logic of 
welfare which opposes the 'market' . -In terms of 
welfare, it ignores different forms of provision, 
social stratification, individual behaviour, market 
benefits, side-effects, and many aspects of the 
actual provision of social rights. 
Markets operate under specific institutional 
conditions, which vary considerably in terms of who 
the market actors are and the resources available to 
them, the legislative regulation and other forms of 
administrative and political controls, customary and 
other informal constraints on acceptable behaviour, 
linkages with and spill-overs into other markets 
engaging different actors and controls. The form of 
analysis developed along these lines derives from 
Polanyi. Hence the consequences of market allocation 
are not thought able to be determined independently 
of what those conditions are. It is worth noting 
briefly some related projects to integrate markets 
into left politics. 
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10.11 "-Market Socialidm, 
Social democratic parties have of course sought ways 
of seeming to accommodate the market, but as 
suggested the foundations of these attempts were 
never as secure as supposed. More recently, attempts 
have been made to construct more explicitly the 
possible relationship between the market and 
Socialist goalS. 12 
'Market socialism, has gained much attention by 
reviving a neglected aspect of social democracy - 
the socialisation of ownership - while retaining the 
market mechanism as a means of providing most goods 
and services. often, it is based on the recognition 
that it has been politically disastrous to allow the 
new right to equate the free society with their 
version of capitalism, hence. its possible value 
within the argument presented here. The 'pure' model 
of market socialism entails that all productive 
enterprises are constituted as democratically- 
controlled workers' co-operatives, profits 
distributed as income within the co-operative. 
Novels The Economics of Feasible Socialism (1983) 
argued that a socialist market is necessary for 
pluralism as well as efficiency. He' proposed the 
social ownership of all the major means of 
production, and makes banks and other credit 
institutions subject to central planning, with 
reserve powers of central co-ordination. But it 
would be Icommodified', though not necessarily 
12 It has of course been argued by critics that 'market 
socialism, is an oxymoron, for example McNally (1993)., 
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determined by the market, since democratic votes 
would decide the boundary between the commercial 
market sectors and those where goods and services 
were provided free. 
Miller (1990, also Le Grand and Estrin 1989) 
examines the details of such a system, including a 
limited central state. only, market socialism 
combines effectively the market, state, and 
community, given existing value-commitments - 
freedom, justice and democracy. As Plant 
PSocialism, Markets and End States', chapter three, 
Le Grand and Estrin 1989) has suggested, given that 
market socialists accept in effect a large part of 
the liberal argument - that citizens on the whole 
should be lef t to determine their own idea of the 
'good' - that market socialism requires greater 
equality at the beginning', in order to secure 
effective choice. As Plant (p. 73, ibid) states: "If 
socialism is to be allied to increasing liberty and 
f reedom of choice, it should not seek to impose a 
particular pattern of community on society, but 
rather accept the diversity of community forms which 
will emerge as the result of. -people exercising their 
own choice. You cannot on the one hand seek to 
empower people and then restrict in an artificial 
way the choices open to them in pursuit of some ill- 
defined concept of community. " But it does require a 
theory of distributive justice that may be drawn 
upon in order to work out detailed mechanisms by 
which all citizens may act effectively in particular 
markets, and hence an important role for the central 
state. 
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Archer (1995) claims that 'economic democracy, - 
labour-managed enterprises - may be advanced 
progressively by labour movements engaging in trade- 
offs between wage restraint and incremental 
increases in control. But all such projects have to 
face the difficulties of the present environment, 
particularly the*power of (international) financial 
capital. 
Pierson (1995) in a valuable analysis, identifies 
three main problems with market socialist models - 
their failure to specify adequately the forms of 
social ownership, to envisage a political regime 
which is congruent with both their programme for 
social ownership and democratic legitimacy, and 
especially the political feasibility of such 
projects in the context of socialism's contemporary 
difficulties. He notes that such models tend to 
remain worker's socialism, whereas most of the time 
many citizens are consumers, or even denied access 
to the labour market. 
Perhaps more politically cautious, even 'micro- 
political, , but potentially radical approaches are 
necessary. For example, as Gamble and Kelly (1996) 
have noted, given that most working people are now 
owners, either directly or through their pens ion 
funds, the real challenge for a 'stakeholder, vision 
is to show how ownership and property rights can be 
made to work for an egalitarian project. 
Though a proper analysis of these approaches is 
outside the scope of this discussion, they may prove 
a promising basis for an explicit left accommodation 
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with markets. Individual autonomy founded on 
%market' participation and ownership, may be more 
productive than trying to link citizenship. with 
fuller political participation. of course, it would 
be hoped that greater individual autonomy might lead 
to an enhanced sense of political efficacy, but this 
cannot be assumed or relied upon. However, markets 
alone, however reconfigured, will not provide the 
kind of social order needed. Non-market relations 
between citizens are crucial, and the left cannot 
rely on illusory notions of 'community' and social 
solidarity. 
10.12 'Social Capital, 
"It is only where the individual has choice, and its 
inherent responsibility, that he has occasion to 
affirm existing values, to contribute to their 
further growth, and to earn moral credit. obedience 
has moral value only where it is a matter of choice 
and not of coercion. 1113 
'Social capital, has too-rarely been appreciated by 
either left or right. The character of civic life is 
connected closely to economic progress, growth and 
institutional performance. This has been argued 
persuasively by Robert Putnam's Making Democracy 
Work (1993), a study of varying civic traditions in 
contemporary Italy. Vibrant social networks and 
norms of civic engagement, an active public-spirited 
citizenry, egalitarian Phorizontal, ) political 
relations and a social fabric of trust and co- 
operation, explain institutional success better than 
13 Hayek (p. 230,1967). 
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other factors. Areas without such values and 
traditions are more prone to corruption, low 
participation, and authoritarian government. 
Stronger community seems to allow citizens in the 
more civic areas to be more liberal. The success of 
democratic government then depends on the degree to 
which the environment in which it operates 
approximates the ideal of a civic community,, 
essentially the communitarian vision. of 'civic 
humanism'. Both states and markets operate more 
effectively in civic settings. Hence there is 
thought a correlation between social cohesion, 
political harmony, and good government. 
The appreciation of social capital, is a more 
helpful approach than that which merely longs for a 
nostalgic illusion of bygone 'community', and seeks 
to impose some likeness of it (which of course has 
the opposite effect intended by destroying social 
capital) This is why this conception of social 
capital is very different from the often 
authoritarian emphasis of neoconservatives, with 
rega rd to the 'traditional family', social 
discipline,, and 'hierarchy' . 14 It hopes to retain 
the individual within community, since it is the 
individual which invests in the social capital, and 
renews it, as well as relying on it. Personal 
security and autonomy reinforces collective 
participation. Attempts to encourage the development 
of social capital must be non-authoritarian and non- 
coercive if they are to succeed - this applies also 
14 See also Sullivan, 'Re-inventing Community: Prospects for 
Politics', p. 20-32, Crouch and Marquand (1995). 
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to progressively-intended policies which erode 1ýcal 
social capital. social capital may be liberal in the 
best sense of the word, where community may not. 
The other value of this approach is that it dissects 
the failure of the new right, without relying on 
weak (in the context of the political culture) 
notions of 'social compassion, . On the theoretical 
level, the new right is inadequate. Neoliberalism 
cannot in its cruder forms appreciate 'social 
capital'. Neoconservatism is too-authoritarian for 
it, and is incapable in most forms to incorporate 
modern individuality. Further, this type of analysis 
reverses the new right assumption that stronger' 
interest groups mean a weaker economy, as government 
is restrained in its decision-making by their 
threats while being expanded because of their 
demands. Rather, '-strong society' can mean strong 
economy and state. This may dissect the right's most 
important asset in the dominant political culture, 
its reputation for effective economic marshalling of 
the productive aspects of the market society, by 
showing the importance of social capital to economic 
efficiency. Social capital is not merely a nice 
addition to a project for citizenship - markets are 
tolerable only if embedded within a strong civil 
society, which may challenge the influence of 
concentrations of private power. 
As has been suggested, the new right project has 
concerned forms of social control, under which 
social capital must by definition be eroded. Social 
capital is too unpredictable to be encouraged as 
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part of this project. Such an approach highlights 
the practical waste and inefficiency of the new 
right and Thatcherism, and may examine the effects 
of 'free markets' on this capital, which might be 
both positive and negative. As Giddens (1994) has 
suggested, the radical nature of the neoliberal 
project may mean that the left is now positioned to 
represent a conserving force against those which 
have ravaged communities. Yet (p. 9, ibid) : "In a 
post-traditional society, the conserving of 
tradition cannot sustain the sense it once had, as 
the relatively unreflective preservation of the 
past. " If it is thought that civil society is 
collapsing, social capital is crucial for its re- 
building (Foundation for Civil Society 1996). 
Social capital appears to offer a foundation for a 
left approach to find ways in which vibrant civic 
association may be encouraged, without restricting 
individual autonomy. In contrast to the new right 
project, as characterised here, the purpose of new 
left citizenship characterises itself as genuinely 
plural (Hirst, p. 14,1994) : "Citizens need a 
political community that will enable them to be 
different, and not one that exhorts them to be the 
same. " By necessity, this shape for a left politics 
of citizenship is theoretical. Some of its practical 
implications need to be brought out. 
10.13 Welfare and Education 
10.13a Welfare 
The defence of adequate state-assisted welfare 
provision is crucial. for this left project of 
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individual autonomy. But the key principle, in the 
context of the dominant political culture, is the 
explicit- acceptance by welfare systems of the 
primacy of market appropriation, and consequently 
the design of welfare programmes in line with this. 
This suggests in reverse that the practical 
operation of welfare services needs to inform 
citizenship theory, or how the citizenship of 
individual autonomy may be extended. 
For example, the assumption within much citizenship 
theory that 'equality, can be the result of welfare 
provision ignores many practical difficulties. 
First, if the provision of welfare services does not 
rely on price as a distributive mechanism, welfare 
providers rely on other means of regulating what 
might otherwise be an excess demand for the limited 
goods and services at their disposal. The use of 
non-price allocative -mechanisms might not imply 
equality of access to the services provided, even 
when those mechanisms have been introduced in the 
name of equality. Second, social welfare provision 
operates through particular policy instruments, and 
these may have consequences further than their 
purely allocative effects (for example, favouring 
certain patterns of domestic relations). 
Consequently, new thinking on welfare tends to 
emphasise greater flexibility of provision, focusing 
on how to enable clearer principles of greater 
individual autonomy and personal responsibility 
rather than a vague form of 'equality' reliant on a 
supposedly developed sense of welfare mutuality. In 
particular, if citizens hold the norm that they 
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should be 'independent, (self-supporting), the issue 
is to f ind ways in which the state might provide 
them with means of subsistence without violating 
their self-respect (Moon 1988b) , while in addition 
generating at least some sense of mutual obligation 
for the 'citizen-stranger' (Culpitt 1992). If 
individual autonomy is thought a, sharper principle 
for welfare design, this is important because 
support for left programmes may only be sustained if 
goals are defined and their accomplishment 
demonstrated clearly (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). 
One approach which might be examined is that which 
has been most recently rephrased by Hirst (1994) - 
'associative democracy'. This is a project for 
'thick welfare, but thin collectivism', via 
voluntary and democratically self-governing 
associations, within a common framework of 
regulatory rules. This appears to cohere with the 
model of citizenship outlined here (p. 14, ibid) : 
"The only way radical ideas will gain ground is by 
arguing for new types of institutions and in doing 
so for a constituency that goes way beyond the left. 
To respond to the changed conjecture we need 
political ideas that can cope with decentralisation, 
that are not utopian about the prospects for such 
change, and that do not confuse decentralisation 
with participatory democracy. Only thus can we hope 
to promote non-collectivist means of ensuring a 
well-governed and adequately serviced society, open 
to the aspirations of diverse social groups. " This 
reflects the movement by some sections of the left 
to value the role of the voluntary sector more. 
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Participation in welfare provision has come to be a 
prominent concern because of the failings of the 
bureaucratic model - too large, impersonal and 
inaccessible to the ordinary citizen. This has 
developed from the 1960s, but was not a new concern, 
being inherent in the ideals of the voluntary sector 
itself (Finlayson, p. 305-8,1994) .: L-5 The new left is 
concerned that the citizenship of entitlement' is 
designed to enhance the citizenship of 
contribution'. 
Probably the most incisive thinker on welfare on the 
contemporary left is Frank Field (1993). Most 
recently (1995,1996, also "Reforming the Welfare 
State', chapter nine, Radice 1996), he has proposed 
the establishment of a National Insurance 
Corporation, a Private, Pension Corporation, and the 
re-modelling of the present income support system 
into a pro-active agency. Field assumes that self- 
interest is the strongest human characteristic, 
though the reforms are intended to create a strong 
foundation for welfare provision. Families need to 
be able to add to their household income without 
fear of losing entitlement, by comprehensive 
coverage of insurance benefits (rather than the 
15 But it should be noted that the criticism of the welf are 
state made by voluntary organisations is different from the 
new right attack, concerned with extending the opportunities 
for choice within the welfare state and developing partnership 
between private and public provision, including advocacy and 
community-based provision. To supporters of voluntary 
provision, its aims are the same as that of the'ideals of the 
welfare state -a collective sense of responsibility for 
dignity, health, security, freedom, and fair life chances for 
all, and they have been equally critical of attempts to merely 
shift responsibility for provision on to the voluntary sector 
(see Finlayson, p. 386-7,1994). 
511 
concentration of a poverty line which social 
security should be set above). 16 
Predominantly contribution-based schemes do seem the 
most obvious way in which welfare can run along 
market lines, and hence gain the 'legitimacy, of any 
other commercial transaction. The more firmly social 
rights are based on market principles, the more 
durable they have proven to be. The benef its for 
insurance contributors, 'sanctioned' by the market, 
the ones which the great mass of the middle-class 
thinks it has paid for and will not relinquish, are 
those that have proven most resistant to erosion. 
Whether this is counter to the idea of citizenship 
(membership and need alone create entitlement) is a 
difficult question, but one which must be faced by 
the left instead of a cosy reliance on 
universalism. 17 The danger in contribut ion- based 
schemes is of course that they may draw the 
boundaries around citizenship in a more exclusionary 
16 The National Insurance Corporation responsible f or this 
range of benef its would be based on the friendly society 
principle, owned and run by employees and employers (the 
government's role would be limited to the size of Exchequer 
contributions to the scheme). Hence it takes the idea of 
universalism and enforces it on the private rather than public 
sector (everyone at work will have to be in a company or a 
private scheme, and contributions for both employers and 
employees would be compulsory) .A National Pensions Savings 
Scheme would be established as a cheap form of pensions 
saving, and only those on very low pay would need their 
insurance and pension contributions supplemented. Those 
outside the labour market would need contributions from the 
Exchequer paid to the National Insurance Fund and their 
private pension. The 'pro-active' income support system would 
require every claimant below retirement age and not long-term 
sick and disabled to draw up a career plan, and be able to 
turn their income support payments into educational 
maintenance allowances. 
17 Beveridge was certainly aware of this problem in his 
deliberations, see Baldwin, chapter four, 'Beveridge in the 
Long, ue Dur6e,, Hills et al. (1994). 
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manner. The majority of the population is assumed to 
share the characteristics of contributory 
citizenship, but in a way Beveridge could not have 
foreseen, much poverty has been caused increasingly 
by conditions that social insurance cannot cope 
with, for people who have never been and are 
unlikely to become regular contributory members of 
social insurance (the permanently unemployed, single 
mothers, the underclass') . It is these tensions 
which thinkers such as Field are attempting to deal 
with. 
10.13b Education 
Education has tended to be identified by the left as 
a key area of reform for a more socially just, equal 
and cohesive society. Yet parts of the left have 
recognised that it may be overloaded in terms of 
social objectives. The right has discovered that 
education is a difficult area in which to model 
reforms to achieve certain social and political 
ends, as the development of the National Curriculum 
and the relatively slow take-off of Grant-Maintained 
schools reveals. Sections of the left have noted 
i--hat regarding education as a vehicle for social 
cohesion is problematic, given that it is crucial in 
addition in terms of personal (even 'consumerist) 
aspirations for individual advancement which may not 
necessarily concur with social cohesion. As a 
result, some progressives have sought to capture the 
discourses on 'standards', 'quality', and 
'opportunity' as the new right did, while addressing 
the continued failure of the British education 
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system to educate and skill adequately the 'bottom 
half, of pupils. 
This suggests that the status of Grant-Maintained 
(GM) schools might be reformed, rather than 
abolished. Given the dominance of market-based 
discourses, there' is a strong link assumed between 
exclusiveness and 'quality', and 'consumers, of 
education have tended to exchange information to 
form the commonly-known local hierarchy of schools 
(often to the detriment of comprehensive schools) . 
The role of LEAs might be enhanced by establishing a 
duty for them to act as 'advocates' for and 
representatives of parents and pupils, that for 
example they are treated fairly in school admissions 
and holding schools accountable if they are not. 
While the National Curriculum (NC) generated much 
criticism from left educationalists during its 
formation, it retains a progressive potential. It 
could be regarded as an 'entitlement curriculum,, in 
part why it remains disliked by some elements of the 
neoliberal educational new right, who felt that the 
curriculum had been Inationalised'. Its development 
indicates how it might be broadened from its 
initially narrow foundations, particularly via 
cross-curricula themes. The Dearing Report changes 
altered the NC, but promised a moratorium on further 
detailed curriculum changes until the year 2000. 
Though in the short-term this will be adhered to, 
much could be changed in the testing and assessment 
criteria. In the context of the dominant political 
culture, these market-type indicators tend to prove 
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popular. Value-added criteria might be added to 
produce a fairer picture of a school's performance. 
other innovations have been suggested, including 
agreed contracts between parents, pupils and 
teachers (Barber 1996b for example, proposes a 
rigorous 'Individual Learning Promise'). 
Most schools have enjoyed the semi-independence that 
Local Management of Schools (LMS) has brought. A 
layer of bureaucracy has been removed, and greater 
decision-making autonomy created for heads. It might 
be useful for the left to investigate how the 
structures in place might be reformed in their 
details for more egalitarian ends, including greater 
scope for local educational initiatives. There could 
be increased accountability for the new educational 
quangos, opportunities for governors (a potentially 
powerful political lobby) to co-ordinate their 
decisions and attempts through such co-ordination to 
utilise them as a force for progressive change, 
methods developed in which school planning can move 
beyond short-term annual crises to long-term 
stability and development. 
. 
But the most important current educational issue the 
lef tf aces is that of selection. This is a complex 
and involved area, and contains a number of issues - 
not only the potentially inegalitarian consequences 
of selection, but the divisory academic-practical 
separation it has reinforced and the substantial 
increase in expulsions of 'problem' pupils which its 
growth has encouraged. However, some associated with 
the lef t have begun to suggest that the problem is 
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that-the debate on selection has been caught up with 
the confusion between mixed ability teaching and 
comprehensive education. Comprehensives need not, 
and largely do not, pursue a policy of mixed ability 
teaching. Comprehensives are compatible with the 
moulding of teaching to meet individual children's 
skills and problems. This the general problem of the 
confusion between the method of teaching and the 
type of institution, which is partly the fault of 
the pro-comprehensive lobby (Innes 1996). 
The main argument repeated against selection is that 
it label's some children failures, but it is asked 
how much sympathy are the parents of %more talented' 
children reasonably supposed to have with this ? 
This allows the new right to claim that left 
educational policy would be a levelling-down 
process. The idea remains that selection helps 
'brighter, children, and hence the structure of the 
debate tends to create a political constituency for 
selection. Instead, the strongest argument against 
selection is that it harms almost all children by 
preventing proper mixed ability teaching - 
interchangeable streaming by subject. It prevents 
the recognition of the variety of areas in which 
children can excel by lumping all areas of the 
curriculum together, and the differing rates at 
which children develop which needs easy interchange 
between ability groups. Usually, further selection 
harms those children at the lower half of a 
selective school, who do not benefit from the 
traditional definitions of academic success and may 
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suffer in terms of confidence and motivation from 
being in the position they find themselves. 
Pollard (1995) has called for the left to think 
again about selection, given the difficulties of 
comprehensive schools, and argued that selection by 
ability could represent the apotheosis of socialist 
meritocracy. It would be fairer and more honest than 
the implicit selection currently present, as well as 
the 'selection by wealth' of private schools (the 
real social engineering present in British 
education). The key is selection within a system 
where all the choices available are of high quality 
schooling of one form or another (as in Germany and 
many other European countries), rather than the form 
of selection apparently envisaged by the right which 
benefits only those suited to an academic education. 
Selection at fourteen (perhaps with another 
opportunity for transfer at sixteen), following Will 
Hutton, might be the solution to connect retaining 
middle-class support for state education, 
excellence, and opportunities for all. 
The other education idea strongly associated with 
the new right - the voucher - might usefully be 
reconsidered by the left. The new right claimed that 
the purpose of the voucher was not only choice, but 
genuine choice for parents from backgrounds usually' 
denied it. Such choice would not depend on political 
astuteness or familiarity with the system, but 
resemble effective market choices (in which all 
classes are necessarily familiar). Le Grand for 
example has proposed that vouchers be given 
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according to area of residence, with higher value 
vouchers going to families in poorer areas. 
10.13c 'New' Labour - New Politics ? 
Some of these themes might be somewhat familiar, 
given that there are some similarities between these 
suggestions and the rhetoric which has surrounded 
'New' Labour before its victory in the General 
Election in May 1997. Though there were suggestions 
that under Tony Blair, Labour was developing a 
communitarian approach, it might more usefully be 
regarded as a recognition that in terms of the 
prevailing political culture, older social 
democratic and progressive discourses had become 
unhelpful, and a more liberal-individualist yet 
hopefully still progressive model of citizenship 
would be more politically successful. 
The notion that Labour had been influenced heavily 
by communitarian ideas, or even the 'authoritarian, 
movement in Conservative (especially law and order) 
policy, might be replaced by a recognition that its 
rhetoric and initial policy proposals mirror the 
arguments of '- liberal virtue theory' as described 
previously. It certainly was not seen to represent a 
civic republican or politically-participatory model 
of citizenship. Its ideas on welfare indicated a 
move away from collectivist solutions, to a 'pro- 
active' welfare state more demanding of recipients. 
Similarly, in education-it was regarded as moving to 
appropriate the issue of standards rather than 
debates on structure, and retreating over a 
universal rejection of selection where it was 
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already operating. Indeed, in a broader sense, the 
'New' Labour project for election might be regarded 
as a bold move to appropriate discourses which had 
come to be associated with the new right, as this 
analysis has suggested is necessary for the left. 
Government, especially the demands of working 
through detailed reforms in education and welfare 
which do enhance progressive notions of genuine 
individual freedom, is likely to demand even bolder 
thinking. 
The significance of Labour's landslide victory is 
yet to be judged more properly, given that it is too 
early to ref er to a coming era of radical 
progressive reform which sweeps away the dominance 
of new right ideas. It is difficult to disentangle 
the electorate's rejection of a divided and 
inefficient Conservative Government, from any hunger 
they might have for a new progressive project. If 
theý argument here is followed, the result may be 
seen to represent the electorate's recognition of 
'New" Labour's acceptance of the dominance of new 
right ideas, and particularly those associated with 
the market, rather than the rejection of those 
ideas. The electorate may also desire a slightly 
more progressive manoeuvring within the parameters 
of the 'market society'. Whether the tensions 
between a progressive project and the market society 
are too great to defuse or resolve will be the story 
of the next decade in British politics. 
10.14 Sununary 
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In the difficulties left politics has encountered 
over the last twenty years in particular, it has 
been suggested that the idea of citizenship should 
become a valuable organising principle. There is 
much sense in this, since it is a concept which 
appears both to unite questions of rights, 
democratic participation and social cohesion, and 
which could determine more clearly the goals of 
progressive politics. But, as the arguments 
presented in 'previous chapters have attempted to 
reveal, there are significant difficulties with both 
of these hopes. In short, citizenship has limits as 
the organising principle for the left. Given that it 
is a concept, rather than a theory, the left should 
not assume it has any special relationship with 
citizenship. It too has to work through carefully 
the concept of citizenship, and seek out its 
implications. 
As a loosely defined, vague hope, the concept of 
citizenship is debilitative of left thought and 
action. if assumed, because 'realised, in 
institutions rather than individuals, it will not 
become the central idea of a popular lef t, but a 
weight on its imagination and radicalism. It should 
be retained as an ethical principle - universal 
membership, or to T. H. Marshall, the ', basic human 
equality of membership'. But a critical, material 
and contextual approach to citizenship is needed if 
this is to be more than moral narcissism. 
Citizenship should be made to relate to the project 
to improve the lives of ordinary working people and 
increase their opportunities for individual 
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autonomy, rather than trying to bring their 
experience into line with an ideal of citizenship. 
Citizenship as individual autonomy represents only 
an outline of what is thought a more critical and 
profitable approach to 'getting under the skin, of 
'private, liberal -individualism, the foundation for 
the construction of a new left 'common sense' . For 
many, this will seem to be a project born of 
defeatism, a lack of confidence in established 
socialist and progressive ideas and values, and an 
'-epistemic conservatism, (Miliband, R., p. 5,1994) 
accepting the right's arguments as to the limits of 
social reform and renewal. Yet to its proponents, 
who may be more willing, to recognise the extent of 
the right's influence on contemporary politics, this 
may be a more productive route to universal 
membership, and its radical implications are wider 
than the left has tended to grasp. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Conclusion - Citizenship and Politics 
11.0 Summary 
This study has concerned the conceptions of 
citizenship constructed by the new right, their 
impact on aspects of policy change under 
Thatcherism, and how as a consequence parts of the 
left are beginning to reformulate their 
understandings of citizenship. It has suggested that 
a more valuable appreciation of the significance of 
new right conceptions of citizenship may be 
developed by: first, noting the disengagement of the 
left from areas of what has been termed the 
'-dominant political culture' and the right's 
appropriation of them; and second, identifying 
aspects of the concept of citizenship which suggest 
that much of the left has been mistaken in regarding 
citizenship as a homogenous, unproblematic and 
inherently progressive phenomenon (or alternatively 
merely as a liberal -capitalist 'con-trick, ) . These 
arguments have been illustrated in three case 
studies- of policy change under Thatcherism. While 
not being necessarily representative of all aspects 
of Thatcherism, they have suggested that the 
Thatcher regime in part used the idea of citizenship 
to design and legitimate some reforms, whose 
consequences have been divisory and inegalitarian. 
Hence there is an important paradox underlying 
contemporary politics. The new right (and 
Thatcherism) can be seen to have developed powerful 
discourses on citizenship, which should not be 
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dismissed as somehow "illegitimate, in theoretical 
terms (especially in the context of the dominant 
political culture), but whose social effects can be 
seen to have undermined citizenship as universal 
membership, in terms of social cohesion and 
individual autonomy for many people. Less apparent 
than these imýortant practical consequences, but no 
less significant, the new right can be regarded as 
seeking to restrict the autonomy of politics, or 
more specifically the autonomy of alternative 
political projects which might challenge the "free 
market', its values, structures and institutions. 
This argument is now repeated in more depth. First, 
it was suggested that 'there are four key aspects 
which frame an exploration of the contemporary 
meaning of citizenship' - the 'reformist debate,, 
'modern' citizenship, the two main political- 
philosophical traditions of citizenship, and the 
concepts related to citizenship such as rights, 
duties and social cohesion [chapter one]. 
. Contemporary understandings of citizenship, 
that is, 
in the 'dominant political culture' rather than as 
conceived of by the lef t, are that it has a close 
and not necessarily conflictual relationship with 
capitalism, that it is 'liberal, rather than 
'communitarian' , and that 
it is not necessarily a 
unitary concept given the array of ideas and values 
associated with it [chapter three] . The new rightl. s 
discourses on citizenship [chapter two] have 
captured this more effectively than the left's have 
tended to. It is correct to recognise' that the 
effects of the new right's ideas and policies are 
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divisory, inegalitarian and lack a proper regard for 
full political and civil freedoms. However, a more 
critical understanding of citizenship, its paradoxes 
and complexities, suggests that the new right does 
represent a powerful and important project in 
citizenship with more scope and reach than. tends to 
be appreciated. It offered apparently attractive 
forms of 'universal membership', utilised the 
tensions within the concept of citizenship, and 
appropriated the liberal discourses associated with 
citizenship. The tensions within the new right 
project should not be ignored, but the over-arching 
purpose of that project should be appreciated as 
well. 
The new right's, and subsequently Thatcherism's, 
strength in this regard hap led to the I subversion 
of citizenship, - discourses in citizenship have 
been used to undermine I universal membership, , the 
ethical ideal aý the heart of the concept. This was 
illustrated in a number of case studies (chapters 
four-eight) . In addition, they suggested 
'that there 
was a strong underlying emphasis on 'control' under 
the Thatcher regime, in the sense of designing and 
implementing structures which delimit alternative 
values and understandings. As a result, Thatcherism 
itself, like the new right, may be characterised as 
a project in 'closure,, for the 'market society' 
[chapter nine] . The new right 
has suggested, in a 
critique directed particularly at Marxism, that 
theoretical authoritarianism tends to result in 
actual political authoritarianism. The same 
criticism may be directed back at the new right, and 
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evidenced to some degree under the Thatcher regime. 
Yet despite this 'authoritarian, thrust in the 
structure as well as the content of the arguments of 
the new right, its opponents should recognise also 
the forms of 'freedoms' it did appear to represent 
given that they drew on prominent conceptions within 
the 'dominant political culture'. In particular, 
these centred around 'private' individual 
accumulation in the market, and the conceptions and 
values which flow from them. 
In response, it was noted that parts of the left are 
attempting to f ind ways in which they may advance 
the project of '-universal membership' founded on a 
conception of citizenship as ', individual autonomy, 
within the dominant political culture [chapter ten]. 
Initially, the left (in its social democratic 
formulation) neglected political participation, but 
in the more recent rephrasing of citizenship has at 
times over-emphasised it. This has been ill- 
conceived, especially since it has not addressed key 
problems with the social democratic model, but 
rather has obscured them. In order to seek to 
resolve them, the lef t will have to accept a more 
critical, material and contextual conception of 
citizenship. 
The apparent 'crisis of politics' and this "new, 
progressive project of individual autonomy may 
appear to be contradictory. First, how, if there is 
a restriction on any alternative political projects, 
can any such project succeed ? The most rational 
response would be a form of politics which 
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recognises the problem of capital, and seeks its 
abolition - an orthodox Marxist position. Second, if 
there is a crisis of politics, would not a better 
strategy be to face this head-on, and seek to 
compose a project which argued foremost for a 
radically-expanded political sphere and 
participation ? It has been the suggestion of this 
argument. that the crisis of politics, and the need 
for a progressive project focused on individual 
autonomy, are closely- related. At this moment it is 
difficult to conceive of a-practical alternative to 
a more pragmatic, genuinely pluralist left project, 
one in which it is demonstrably clear that the left 
is seeking , to expand ordinary citizens, 
opportunities for social (rather than necessarily 
political) participation in ways which might not 
help the left's traditional over-arching political 
project for greater equality and collective 
solidarity. In the wake of the new right, only a 
'new' left appears to be attempting to deal 
critically with problems in, the social democratic 
account, often in ways which will alarm other parts 
of the left (no doubt as the new right alarmed more 
traditional parts of the right) . Citizenship may 
become a guiding theme for a new generation of 
progressive politics, but most profitably only if a 
greater understanding of its problematic as well as 
attractive characteristics. is developed. Following 
Michael Oakeshott's suggestion at the beginning of 
this study, without this knowledge, and allied to a 
better appreciation of actual forms of social 
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behaviour, progressives may not be able to make use 
of whatever else they may have learned. 
11.1 The Dilemma of 'Politics, 
However critical one might be of the concept of 
, citizenship', it may also be true that: "There is 
probably no other idea in human history which 
combines the aspirations of mAnIs need for equality 
and man's desire for liberty as does that of 
citizenship. "' Else why analyse it ? 
There is a subtext to such an analysis which seems 
relevant to any exploration of citizenship - the 
question of the nature and scope of 'politics, 
itself. There is, in the simplest of regards, a 
basic divide between thinkers. Citizenship brings 
this out most sharply. 
The first tends to argue that: 
". the political figure of Being, being a citizen, 
which is apparently one of the most partial and 
specific modes of Being, turns out to be 
fundamental; for where a full, rich concept of 
citizenship is lacking politics is absent, in 
abeyance, hiding, side-tracked, or even suppressed. 
Where citizenship a nd politics are absent the 
project of Being human is itself side-tracked. 112 
It is a challenging, inspirational vision. The form 
of discourse theory drawn-upon here compliments 
this, since 'politics, itself is regarded as the 
resistance to 'closure', the denial of 'radical 
3- Dahrendorf, 'Citizenship and Beyond: The Social Dynamics of 
an Ideal, Turner and Hamilton (1995b), p. 294. 
2 Clarke (p. 3,1994). 
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democracy'. Hence, in some form, politics bounds and 
defines everyday life and 'common sense' 
understandings. Politics is primary. 
The second claims to deny the centrality of politics 
and its value to everyday life,. Politics is a 
threat to established orders, assumptions, and 
accepted -ways of doing things. As a consequence, 
attempts are made to def lect and marginalise it, or 
more specifically to marginalise the political 
projects which may be seen to expand the 
'political,. There is no better contemporary example 
than the new right. It is an anti-political 
political project. It seeks to construct a 'culture 
of containment', as brought out by discourse 
analysis in particular, to in effect 'close down' 
politics. 
As with all simple dichotomies, the 'solution' may 
lie in a third option, a fusion between the two. 
Hence (Crick, p. 125,1962): 
"Politics, then, the liberal is right, is a limited 
activity. But he is wrong to think that these limits 
can be expressed precisely in any general rule; such 
rules are themselves political attempts to 
compromise and conciliate rival forces in a 
particular time and circumstance. Politics cannot 
embrace everything; but nothing can be exempted from 
politics entirely. " 
As suggested here, the (constructed) dominant 
political culture, while contested, contains an 
anti-political tendency within it. As human beings, 
it is difficult to resist the pervasiveness of 
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commonly- understood meanings and perceptions. It is 
draining to be 'political', in the critical sense, 
in everyday life. Thus political theory is crucial 
to, 'decoding' the social world, but might have to 
play a limited explicit role in any project which 
seeks to alter society. I 
This is the double movement apparent, with regard to 
'politics, for the left, and the implicit theme 
running through this study. One expands 'politics', 
the other suggests limits. 
The new right may be regarded as manipulating this 
problem more effectively than the left. At points 
during the post-war period the left was concerned 
about democratic participation, but this bore little 
fruit in terms of the Labour Party or many practical 
measures. Exacerbated by common perceptions of 
Eastern European and Russian state socialism, this 
allowed the new right to portray socialism as 
intrinsically inimical to democracy, and to argue 
that only by abandoning socialism' could popular 
power and control be achieved. The nature of the new 
right itself suggests the struggle-to construct and 
reinforce the 'market society,, and the primacy of 
the 'political, in methodological terms. As has been 
suggested before, the new right has had a broader 
conception of politics than the left has often had, 
despite being a fundamentally anti-political 
project. 
11.2 Conclusion 
The left should stand for a genuine plurality, 
linked to individual autonomy and enhanced 'social, 
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participation - even a freedom beyond its own 
preferences for politics or idealised models of a 
future society. In the wake of the apparent collapse 
of other visions of the left (particularly communism 
and social democracy), what other potential route 
exists for a popular new left politics ? 
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